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Abstract
This note examines derivatives and derivatives related issues. In particular, it evalutates the
costs and benefits of utilizing derivatives, explores the current debate over derivative regulation-
both domestically and transnationally, and the role and effect of Congressional intervention in
regualtion.
REGULATING DERIVATIVES: DOES TRANSNATIONAL
REGULATORY COOPERATION OFFER A VIABLE
ALTERNATIVE TO CONGRESSIONAL ACTION?
Thomas C. Singher*
INTRODUCTION
Markets in derivative financial instruments are rapidly ex-
panding,1 and are currently measured in trillions of dollars.'
These relatively new investment vehicles3 have provided their
users with unprecedented opportunities to protect themselves
against financial loss4 and other risks involved in conducting
* J.D. Candidate, 1996, Fordham University.
1. Barbara Donnelly Granito, Assessing the Size of the Market, WALL ST. J., Aug. 25,
1994, at A4. Derivatives markets are some of the fastest growing financial markets in
the world. John Andrew Lindholm, Financial Innovation and Derivatives Regulation -
Minimizing Swap Credit Risk Under Title V of the Futures Trading Practices Act of 1992, 1994
COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 73, 77 (1994).
2. Beleaguered Giant: As Derivatives Losses Rise, Industiy Fights to Avert Regulation,
WALL. ST.J., Aug. 25, 1994, atAl [hereinafter Beleaguered Giant]. Estimates of the size of
the global derivatives markets are in the US$10 trillion to US$35 trillion range. Id. The
U.S. General Accounting Office, at US$12.1 trillion in 1992, offers a more conservative
albeit less current estimate of the size of the global derivatives markets. U. S. GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. B-257099, GAO REPORT 3 (1994) [hereinafter GAO RE-
PORT]; see Eli M. Remolona, The Recent Growth of Financial Derivative Markets, 28 FED. RES.
BANK N.Y. Q. REv. 28, 28-29 (1993) (estimating size of global derivatives markets to be
US$10 trillion at end of 1991). For a general discussion of the market shares occupied
by various types of derivatives in global markets, see Barbara Donnelly Granito, Assessing
Size of Market, WALL ST. J., Aug. 25, 1994, at A4; Adam R. Waldman, OTC Derivatives &
Systemic Risk: Innovative Finance or the Dance into the Alyss?, 43 AM. U. L. REv. 1023, 1030
(1994) (discussing size of over-the-counter markets in comparison to exchange traded
derivatives).
3. Jerry W. Markham, "Confederate Bonds," "General Custer," and the Regulation of De-
rivative Financial Instruments, 25 SETON HALL L. REv. 1 (1994). Although modem deriva-
tives markets have only appeared in approximately the last ten years, historians are able
to trace derivative-like transactions back to 2000 B.C. Id.; see EDWARD J. SWAN, THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF FINANCIAL SERVICES 2 (1993) (discussing Mesopotamian
commodities contracts possessing characteristics similar to modem derivatives). Ro-
man law, although maintaining an aversion to futures contracts, did recognize such
contracts. Id. at 30-33. A crude form of a derivative financial instrument appeared in
the United States during the mid- to early eighteenth century when the State of Massa-
chusetts Bay issued notes that were to be paid in an amount calculated in correlation
with fluctuating prices of com, beef, sheeps wool, and sole leather. WILLIAM G. ANDER-
SON, THE PRICE OF LIBERTY. THE PUBLIC DEBT OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 24 (1983).
4. PAUL GoRis, THE LEGAL ASPECT OF Swps AN ANALYSIS BASED ON ECONOMIC SuB-
STANCE 45, 46 (1994); see Lindholm, supra note 1, at 84 (describing derivatives as they
are used to hedge against changing market factors).
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business across national borders.' These opportunities have
been accompanied, however, by new financial risks,6 and many
derivatives users have suffered large financial losses.7 Market
regulators and Congress have quickly responded to the per-
ceived derivatives threats by introducing new rules and proposed
legislation.'
Derivatives losses and the subject of how to regulate deriva-
tives markets has been a focus of attention in the U.S. Congress
("Congress").' Senators and House Representatives have de-
bated the merits and dangers presented by the current regula-
5. Waldman, supra note 2, at 1030. Multinational corporations, for instance, util-
ize derivative financial instruments to offset the risk that currency fluctuations will ad-
versely affect their financial interests across national borders. Id.
6. Henry T.C. Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives: The Causes of Informational Failure and
the Promise of Regulatoy Incrementalism, 102 YALE LJ. 1457, 1465-66 (1993); see Waldman,
supra note 2, at 1038-50 (separating risks accompanying derivatives into six general cat-
egories).
7. $1.5 Billion Loss Seen For County, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 2, 1994, at D1. The largest and
most recognized loss to date is that incurred by Orange County, California. Mark Platte
et al., O.C. to Liquidate its Portfolio, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1994, at Al. Analysts originally
projected the loss to be near US$1.5 billion but have now revised that figure to US$2.02
billion or 27% of a US$7.4 billion investment made by the county in an investment pool
utilizing derivatives. Id. The county subsequently filed for bankruptcy protection in
the largest such filing by a municipality on record. Bitter Fruit: Orange County, Mired In
Investment Mess, Files for Bankruptcy Decision, Following Default on Reverse-Repo Deals, May
Put Assets in Limbo, WALL ST. J., Dec. 7, 1994, at Al. For an exhaustive collection of
derivative-related losses, see Waldman, supra note 2, at 1039-41.
Losing investors, meanwhile, have been quick to seek redress in court. Karen Don-
ovan, Derivatives Slump; Losers Go to Court Lawsuits Over Exotic Securities May Bind Banks
Closer to Clients, NAT'L L. J., Nov., 1994, at Al. Both Gibson Greetings Inc. and Procter
& Gamble Company filed suits against Bankers Trust seeking US$73 million and
US$130 million for damages incurred from their respective losses of US$23 million and
US$157 million. Michael Quint, Gibson Suit On Trades Is Settled, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24,
1994, at D1. The losses were alleged to have occurred as a result of investment guidance
provided by Bankers Trust. Id. Gibson later dropped the suit against Bankers Trust in
exchange for forgiveness of US$14.5 million in debt Gibson owed to Bankers Trust. Id.
Another example of a losing investor taking action is that of Winifred Emmeline Van-
dyke, who filed a federal class action against Fundamental Family of Funds alleging that
the fund failed to tell investors the true nature of risks involved in its derivatives. David
E. Rovella, Derivatives Sales Draw Class Action Plaintiff Says Funds Group Misled Investors on
Risks, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 29, 1994, at B1; see Karen Donovan; Leslie Wayne, Orange County
in Suit Against Merrill Lynch, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 13, 1995, at D2 (discussing Orange
County's suit against Merrill Lynch contending that brokerage firm sold risky and un-
suitable securities to Orange County in violation of California Law).
8. Roger M. Zaitzeff, Pending Legislation Would Require Regulators to Monitor More
Closely The Complex Range of Activities in the Derivatives Market, NAT'L LJ., Aug. 29, 1994, at
B9.
9. Zaitzeff, supra note 8, at B9.
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tory influences governing derivatives.10 Some have argued that
the current regulatory system is sufficient to deal with the dan-
gers derivatives present,11 while others have disagreed, calling
for new derivatives-governing legislation."2 As financial losses
have persisted, pro-legislation Congressmen have promised fur-
ther debate."3
This Note examines derivatives and derivatives-related is-
sues. Part I describes derivative financial instruments, their ben-
efits and risks, and the parties that typically utilize them. Part I
also delineates the general regulatory framework that currently
governs derivatives and examines losses that have occurred
under that framework. Part II describes the current debate as to
how to regulate derivatives, specifically examining five proposed
10. Id.
11. Olaf De Senerpont Domis, D'Amato: No Need for Derivatives Legislation, AM.
BANKER, Jan. 6, 1995, at 1.
12. Zaitzeff, supra note 8, at B9. Chairman of the House Banking, Finance and
Urban Affairs Committee, Congressman Henry B. Gonzales [R-Texas], has described
the derivatives market as a transnational ponzi scheme. Derivatives Update-Further
Losses Will Make Legislation More Likely, INT'L BANKING REG., Oct 10, 1994 at 1. Senator
and member of Alfonse M. D'Amato [R-N.Y.] expresses his concern with derivatives
markets in stating "I don't want to have a situation where we have a debacle where we
wind up one morning reading that we've got a US$2 billion or US$3 billion loss in some
institution as a result of highly leveraged transactions within the banks." De Senerpont
Domis, supra note 11, at 1. House Representative and member of the House Banking,
Finance and Urban Affairs Committee, James A. Leach [R-Iowa], noted that "[t]he
sheer size of the [derivatives] market implies that it cannot be ignored." Michael Peltz,
Congress's Lame Assault on Derivatives, INSTITTIONAL INVETOR, Dec. 1994, at 65. Leach
has described the most worrisome aspect of derivatives to be "the fact that much of the
underpinnings of the trillion-dollar-a-day global derivatives market is rampant specula-
tion and gambling." Id. House Representatives Jim Leach and Henry Gonzalez have
both submitted legislation modifying the current supervisory framework governing de-
rivatives. H.R. 31, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); H.R. 20, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
House Representative Edward J. Markey [D-Mass.] has also introduced legislation that
would regulate unregulated derivatives dealers. H.R. 4745, 103d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1994). Similarly in the Senate, Senators Byron L. Dorgan [D-N.D.] and Barbara A.
Mikulski [D-Md.] have submitted a bill that would limit banks to using derivatives for
hedging purposes as opposed to speculative purposes. S. 2123, 103d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1994). The now former chairman of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs, Donald W. RiegleJr. [D-Mi.] also introduced a bill similar to the Gonza-
lez-Leach bill. S. 2291, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
13. Joanne Morrison, National, BOND BUYER, Dec. 20, 1994, at 24. Representative
Gonzalez, in response to the Orange County disaster, urged further Congressional
hearings to discuss recent derivatives-related losses. Id. Representative Markey also re-
cently promised to reintroduce derivatives legislation similar to proposals he had made
previously. Dominic Bencivenga, Congressional Agenda,; Litigation Reform, Derivatives Regu-
lation on Tap, N.Y. LJ., Jan. 19, 1995, at 5.
1400 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 18:1397
congressional bills, 4 and transnational efforts aimed at develop-
ing a framework for safe derivatives use. Part III argues that
Congress should refrain from passing legislation governing de-
rivatives that contravene regulatory agency and industry ap-
proval.1 5 This Note concludes that the current regulatory frame-
work, as supplemented by non-congressional efforts to amelio-
rate unnecessary derivatives losses, is the appropriate mechanism
to address derivatives-related problems.
I. DERIVATIVE FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS: AN OVERVIEW
The term derivatives, in the financial context, refers to a
wide variety of financial instruments.1 6 The purpose of a deriva-
tive financial instrument varies depending on the interests of the
particular parties involved in the derivative transaction. 17
Although derivatives can convey financial benefit to their users,
users must be willing to withstand varying degrees of derivatives-
inherent risk. 8 In the United States, derivatives are also subject
to various regulatory requirements depending on the nature and
type of the financial instrument.' 9 These requirements have
not, however, prohibited large derivatives-related losses."0
14. See supra note 12 (discussing five proposed bills).
15. Kenneth H. Bacon & Greg Hitt, Derivatives Pace New Regulation From Congress,
WALL ST. J., May 11, 1994, at A4. Regulatory bodies such as the Securities Exchange
Commission ("SEC") and the Commodities Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC")
have opposed attempts by the U.S. Congress to pass new derivative-governing legisla-
tion. Id.; see Beleaguered Giant, supra note 2, at Al (discussing the efforts of Federal
regulators, government issuers, Wall Street dealers, corporations, and mutual funds to
defend derivatives and forestall new regulations).
16. GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 4. Derivatives can be classified into four basic
categories: "Forwards," "Futures," "Options," and "Swaps." Id.
17. GLOBAL DERIVATIVES STUDY GROUP, DERIVATIVES: PRACTICES AND PRINCIPLES 28
(Group of Thirty eds. 1993) [hereinafter GROUP OF THIRTY] (describing various reasons
why derivatives users employ investment strategies that utilize derivative financial instru-
ments).
18. See Waldman, supra note 2, at 1038-50 (discussing six commonly classified risks
accompanying derivatives use).
19. See Daniel P. Cunningham et al., An Introduction to OTC Derivatives, in SWAPS
AND OTHER DERIVATIVES IN 1994, at 154-70 (PLI Corporate Law and Practice Course
Handbook Series No. B4-7062, 1994) (discussing current U.S. regulatory framework
governing derivatives).
20. John Greenwald, The Devil's in the Derivatives; Exotic Securities Spread Financial
Wreckage Across the Country in the Wake of Interest-Rate Hikes, TIME, Oct. 10, 1994, at 54.
REGULATORY DERIVATIVES
A. Defining the Derivative Financial Instrument
A derivative financial instrument consists of a contractual
agreement between two or more parties.2 1 The agreement,
which usually obligates the parties to exchange specified cash
payments, has a value to the parties and also an independent
value on an open market.12 The value of the agreement on the
open market depends upon the value of the underlying pay-
ments.2 3 The value of the underlying payments in turn, are con-
nected to the performance of named assets, rates, or indexes,
depending upon the terms of the derivatives contract. 24 Thus, as
the value of the contractual payments rises or falls depending
upon the value of the underlying asset, rate, or index, so too
does the value of the derivatives contract.25
Derivatives come in many shapes and sizes, ranging from
standardized exchange traded contracts2 7 to privately negotiated
21. GROUP OF THIRTY, supra note 17, at 28. A study of derivatives conducted by an
international task force set up by the global banking industry defined derivative transac-
tion as "a bilateral contract or payments exchange agreement whose value derives...
from the value of an underlying asset or underlying reference rate or index." Id. An-
other commentator simply defined derivatives as "paper assets whose value depends on
another asset." Scott T. Jones & Frank A. Felder, Using Derivatives In Real Decision Mak-
ing, 132 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 18 (1994). Henry T.C. Hu defines a derivative as
a contract that either allows or obligates one of the parties.., to buy or sell an
asset. Naturally, movements in the value of the underlying asset affect the
value of such a contract. Indeed, the contract's defining characteristic is that
its value derives from the value of the 'underlying,' be it a specific stock, com-
modity, stock index, interest rate, or exchange rate.
Hu, supra note 6, at 1464-65.
22. GROUP OF THIRTY, supra note 17, at 28.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See Hu, supra note 6, at 1465 (discussing effects of natural movements of un-
derlying asset upon value of agreement).
26. Albert R. Karr, Bank Regulator Signals Move On Derivatives, WALL ST. J., May 24,
1994, at C1. The Comptroller of the Currency has found more than 1200 types of
derivatives, and the financial innovators of Wall street continue to create new ones. Id.
Derivatives descend from four basic categories, "Forwards," "Futures", "Options," and
"Swaps." GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 4. Forwards are subdivided into groups such as
"Forward Commodity Contracts," "Forward Rate Agreements," "Forward Foreign Ex-
change Contracts." Id. Swap derivatives are classified as "Currency Swaps," "Interest
Rate Swaps," "Commodity Swaps," and "Equity Swaps," while options and futures may
link their value to global currencies and other commodities. Id. Hybrid instruments
such as the "Swaption" combine characteristics of several derivatives. GROUP OF THIRTY,
supra note 17, at 29; see Cunningham, supra note 19, at 127-31 (discussing particular
properties of many fundamental types of derivative financial instruments).
27. Hu, supra note 6, at 1465. Many derivatives are traded on organized exchanges
and a prospective buyer need only contact a broker to close a sale. Id. Such derivatives
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agreements between parties tailored to the parties' specific
needs.28 Organized derivatives exchanges' typically trade deriv-
atives commonly known as futures and options.3° A future is a
forward based contract" that obligates the buyer to deliver a
fixed quantity of a commodity at a fixed date and price in the
future.32 Option-based derivatives, however, do not bind the
buyer to do anything.3 3 An option merely gives the buyer the
option or right to buy or sell a particular commodity at an
agreed upon price at or prior to a specified date. 4 Whether
traded on or off organized exchanges, forward and option-based
contracts form the building blocks of all derivative financial
products.-'
generally have standardized contractual terms and generate sufficient market activity to
provide for an adequately liquid market. Id.
28. Id. Privately negotiated derivatives are most likely to be used by sophisticated
parties, for example, large corporations and sovereign entities. Id. Privately negotiated
contracts compose the over-the-counter or "OTC" derivatives market. Id.
29. RICHARD W. JENNINGS ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES & MATERIALS 7th
ed. 11-16 (1992) (discussing derivative financial instruments and organizations that
trade them). The Chicago Board Options Exchange ("CBOE"), inaugurated in 1973, is
one example of an organized derivatives market. Id. at 12. The CBOE provides a cen-
tral market where buyers and sellers of derivatives can trade derivatives known as op-
tions. Id.
30. GROUP OF THIRTY, supra note 17, at 29.
31. Id. A forward contract obligates one party to buy or sell a specified quantity of
an asset at a specified price and date. Id. at 30. A future is a standardized forward
contract where generally the price is the only open variable. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 32.
34. Id. at 29.
35. Id.; see Clifford W. Smith, Jr. & Charles W. Smithson, Financial Engineering: An
Overview, in THE HANDBOOK OF FINANCIAL ENGINEERING: NEW FINANCIAL PRODUCT INNO-
VATIONS, APPLICATIONS, AND ANALYSES 4-9 (1990) (noting that forward and option con-
tracts serve as building blocks in derivative financial products).
A common privately negotiated derivative transaction known as the forward-based
interest rate for equity swap might work as follows. Craig Torres, How a Simple Deriva-
tives Deal Works, WALL ST. J., Aug. 17, 1993, at A8. A money manager in the United
States could, for instance, arrange for a client to swap a contractual agreement to make
payment amounts based on a particular interest rate, for similar payments based on a
stock-market return. Id. The money manager might first invest for example, US$30
million of the client's funds in short-term notes at a yield slightly over the commonly
used London Interbank Offered Rate ("LIBOR"). Id. Subsequently, the money man-
ager would negotiate a swap with another party who possesses what the manager deter-
mines to be an adequate credit-rating. Id. The swap could be an agreement between
the manager's client and the creditworthy party whereby the client pays the bank a rate
equal to the LIBOR plus a small percentage. Id. In exchange, the creditworthy party
might pay the client the return on the Standard & Poor 500-stock index. Id. If the
creditworthy party were a bank, for example, it could realize a profit on the transaction
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B. Derivatives Users
A wide variety of entities participate in today's derivative
markets.3 6  The participants are separable into end-users and
dealers .3 The end-user is generally the party that initially seeks
to enter into the contract, and that ultimately is obligated to buy
or sell an asset.38 The dealer, in contrast, is merely an intermedi-
ary who facilitates the transaction in exchange for some form of
financial gain.39
The end-user class consists mostly of corporations, govern-
mental entities,4" institutional investors,4" and financial institu-
tions.4 2 Occasionally smaller and less sophisticated investors
enter into derivatives transactions.4 3 When such transactions oc-
by executing a similar transaction with another party possessing opposite commitments
(the bank would pay amounts based on the LIBOR while collecting payments based on
the S&P index). Id. The bank thus realizes as profit, the small premium paid over the
LIBOR minus the transaction costs of executing the second transaction. Id. The client,
meanwhile, earns the difference between the rate of return on the notes and the rate it
agreed to pay the bank, plus, the return on the S&P index. Id.
Some of today's computer engineered financial products are much more complex
than this example. See Steven Lipin & William Power, Derivatives Draw Warning From
Regulator, WALL ST. J., Mar. 25, 1992, at C1 (noting regulator's concern that derivatives
complexity may be so high that neither regulators nor derivatives traders understand
them).
36. GROUP OF THIR'Y supra note 17, at 34.
37. Id.
38. Hu, supra note 6, at 1465.
39. Waldman, supra note 2, at 1036. Dealers may realize a financial gain in the
form of a transaction fee. Id. Dealers may alternatively realize financial gain in the
form of "bid-offer spreads." Id. The bid-offer spread is the difference between the
bidding and offering price of the financial instrument. G&av L. GAsTINEAU, DIcTIONARY
OF FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 37 (1992). In the OTC market, dealers serve the important
purpose of making a market in OTC derivatives. Waldman, supra note 2, at 1036.
40. GROUP OF THIRTY, supra note 17, at 38. National governments, local govern-
ments, and state-owned or sponsored entities, all utilize derivatives. Id. The govern-.
mental end-user class, is not limited to large entities such as states and federal agencies.
Waldman, supra note 2, at 1034-35. Even small town municipalities have found uses for
derivatives. Id.
41. Id. at 40. Some examples of institutional investors that utilize derivatives are
Salli Mae, Sohio, and General Electric Capital Corporation. Id.
42. Id at 34. A Survey of Industry Practice conducted by the GROUP OF THIRTY, a
transnational organization of prominent banking and individuals involved in financial
markets, indicates that "[r] oughly 87% of the reporting private sector corporations use
interest rate swaps, 64% use currency swaps, and 78% use forward foreign exchange
contracts. Id. For option-based derivatives, 40% use interest rate options and 31% use
currency options." Id. at 34; see GLOBAL DERIVATIVES STUDY GROUP, DERIVATIVES: PRAC-
TICES AND PRINCIPLES 1 (Group of Thirty eds. 1993) (App. III: Survey of Industry Prac-
tice) (1994) [hereinafter GROUP OF THIRTY SURVEY].
43. Hu, supra note 6, at 1465. Generally the OTC market is only open to large
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cur in the over-the-counter market,44 they have drawn concern. 45
Due to the involvement of derivatives in mutual funds, insurance
companies, pension funds, and governmental entities, one com-
mentator stated that the investment mainstream has indirectly
become a collective end-user. 46
In contrast to a somewhat diverse end-user class, the dealer
class largely consists of banks and securities firms. 47 Less fre-
quently, insurance companies and highly-rated corporations also
deal in derivatives.48 Maintaining the position of dealer requires
substantial capital and credit appraisal experience, modern tech-
nology, financial expertise, and excellent credit standing.49
Once in possession of the appropriate assets, the dealer is then
able to access broad markets while maintaining the ability to
quickly process information those markets provide." A typical
dealer maintains a portfolio of derivatives that allows him to ac-
commodate a broad variety of customer transactions. 51 Upon ex-
sophisticated end-users who have the clout to negotiate directly with finance divisions of
industrial corporations, financial institutions, or money center banks. Id. But see Salo-
mon Forex v. Tauber, 795 F.Supp. 768, 769 (E.D. Va. 1993), aff'd, Salomon Forex, Inc.
v. Tauber, 8 F.3d 966 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 1540 (1994) (holding non-
U.S. currency exchange contracts between Mr. Tauber, doctor and real estate investor,
and Salomon Forex, Inc., large non-U.S. currency exchange company, unenforceable
under Commodities Exchange Act).
44. JENNINGS, supra note 29, at 62. The over-the-counter or "OTC" market, trades
an estimated 20,000 securities that are not listed on other organized exchanges. Id.
The OTC market has no physical location and there are no formalized procedures for
commencing or terminating transactions in a particular security. Id.
45. Waldman, supra note 2, at 1035. Some commentators fear that unsophistica-
ted investors involved in the OTC market will suffer from the absence of protection
afforded by suitability rules found on exchanges:
[c]urrently, there is no requirement that an OTC derivative instrument be
,suitable' for the need of a particular end-user. In contrast, dealers of ex-
change-traded products are proscribed from recommending options transac-
tions unless they have a reasonable basis for believing the customer has the
knowledge and sophistication to evaluate and financially bear the transaction
in question.
Id. Derivatives have also found their way into the hands of smaller investors through
mutual funds. David J. Lynch, Derivatives Get Some Money Market Funds in Trouble, OR-
ANGE Coumr REG., Aug. 2, 1994, at 3E.
46. Waldman, supra note 2, at 1035.
47. GROUP OF THmRTY, supra note 17, at 34.
48. Id. at 34.
49. Id. at 42. Most dealers are financial institutions with investment grade credit
ratings. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 41. Early in the evolution of OTC derivatives, dealers acted merely as
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ecuting a transaction with one end-user, a dealer will oftentimes
subsequently enter into an offsetting transaction with another
end-user.5" Thus, dealers provide valuable liquidity to deriva-
tives markets and eliminate the need for end-users to locate one
another independently.53 Dealers also support price efficiency
by identifying and exploiting price differences in underlying
market instruments.54 In exchange for his services, the dealer
collects not only his fee for executing the transaction,55 but also
any profit realized from his own portfolio.5"
C. Why Investors Use Derivatives
Derivatives facilitate identification, isolation, and separate
management of fundamental risks that are bound together in
traditional financial instruments. 57 Managers of financial portfo-
lios often take advantage of derivative financial products to
achieve desired combinations of cash flow, interest rate, and cur-
rency liquidity.58 In doing so, the manager may achieve the
objectives of his client to lower funding costs, 9 better manage its
assets and liabilities, 60 hedge61 against market risk, or to specu-
brokers. Id. They offered only limited services, such as finding offsetting counterpar-
ties for the investor. Id.
52. Cunningham, supra note 19, at 131.
53. Id. When purchasing an exchange-traded derivative, an end-user usually need
only place a call to a broker to execute the transaction. Id. In contrast, the OTC mar-
ket utilizes the reputation and creditworthiness of the dealer to match buyers and sell-
ers. Hu, supra note 6, at 1465.
54. GROUP OF THIRTY, supra note 17, at 42.
55. See supra note 39 and accompanying text (discussing profit opportunities for
dealers).
56. GROUP OF THIRTY, supra note 17, at 42.
57. Id. at 34.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 34.
60. Id. at 36.
61. GASTINEAU, supra note 39, at 123. Commentators define hedging as action that
reduces risk, often in exchange for opportunity for profit. Id.; see PAUL GoRIS, THE
LEGAL ASPECr OF SwAPs: AN ANALYSIS BASED ON ECONOMIC SUBSTANCE 79 (1994) (refer-
ring to hedging transaction as transaction intended to "safeguard the contracting entity
against the adverse consequences of unfavorable fluctuations in non-U.S. exchange
rates, interest rate levels, or other market variables"); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., Deriva-
tive Product Activities of Commercial Banks, in JOINT STUDY CONDUCTED IN RESPONSE TO
QUESTIONS POSED BY SENATOR RIEGLE ON DERIVATIVE PRODUCTS 3 (1993) (describing
"hedging" as acquiring position in instrument that moves opposite direction in value
from existing or anticipated position with "goal of protecting that existing or antici-
pated position against loss due to fluctuations in prices, interest rates or exchange
rates").
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late for profit. 62
1. Using Derivatives to Lower Funding Costs
End-users often take advantage of derivatives to lower fund-
ing costs. 63  One way derivatives promote lower funding costs is
by facilitating access to funding opportunities that exist in seg-
mented capital markets.' Once an end-user is able to access
those markets, principles of comparative advantage65 may oper-
ate to deliver cost savings for borrowers and higher yields for
investors than would otherwise be available. 66
For example, a corporation may desire funding in a particu-
lar currency at a lower rate than is currently available in markets
using that currency.67 The corporation may, however, find an
attractive rate in a market using another currency. 68 A common
derivative known as the currency swap69 allows a corporation to
take advantage of the attractive rate.70 The corporation issues
debt in the undesirable currency"' and then finds a counterparty
62. GORIS, supra note 4, at 82.
63. GROUP OF THIRTY, supra note 17, at 34; see Roger M. Zaitzeff, Regulating Finan-
cialDerivatives, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 29, 1994, at B9 (discussing lower cost funding as reason
for derivatives' growth in popularity).
64. GROUP OF THIRTY, supra note 17, at 35. Regulatory barriers and different per-
ceptions in credit quality result in segmentation of markets over both national and
transnational boundaries. Id.
65. Cunningham, supra note 19, at 131-32. Through the use of derivatives, parties
to a transaction are able to trade not only rates and currencies, but also any advantage
that one or both parties may have in a given market. Id.; see Lindholm, supra note 1, at
81-82 (noting that swaps allow both transaction parties to reduce their funding costs).
66. GROUP OF THIRTY, supra note 17, at 35. When an end-user takes advantage of
varying rates between different markets, it is said to be taking advantage of arbitrage
opportunities between markets. Id. Arbitrage savings in interest rate markets for exam-
ple, currently is likely to be in the range of 0.10% to 0.25%. Id.; see Hu, supra note 6, at
1466 (noting that end-users use derivatives to arbitrage price differences between capi-
tal markets).
67. See Hu, supra note 6, at 1466 (discussing similar example and increasing vol-
ume in swap transactions).
68. Id.
69. Marc A. Horwitz, Swaps Ahoy! Should Regulators Voyage Into Unknown Waters, 1
IND.J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 515, 521 (1994). Currency swaps are one of the most widely
utilized forms of derivatives today. Id. In a typical swap transaction, one party agrees to
pay periodic fixed amounts of one currency while the other agrees to do the same in a
different currency. Id. The transaction has the effect of transferring from one party to
the other the risk of exchange rate fluctuation. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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to execute a currency swap. 72 The counterparty agrees to peri-
odically pay the corporation fixed amounts of its desired cur-
rency in exchange for a fixed amount of the unwanted cur-
rency.73 The net result of the transaction is that the corporation
has issued debt in a desired currency at a lower rate than it could
have obtained in an otherwise unaccessible market. 74
End-users may also obtain lower cost funding by issuing se-
curities specifically tailored to individual investor needs75 or by
simply taking advantage of lower transaction costs. 76 In the for-
mer case, the end-user issues securities matching the particular
needs of an investor or investors and then utilizes derivative fi-
nancial instruments to tailor the return on that security to meet
the end-user's own needs.77 In the case of the latter, investing in
a derivative form of an asset may ultimately prove to be cheaper
than investing in the underlying asset. 78 Thus, the derivative
form of that asset such as a future or an option may prove to be
less costly than the alternative of investing in the underlying as-
set.
79
Regardless of which method a corporation chooses, using
derivatives to lower funding costs diversifies funding sources.80
Diversification of funding may be important to international cor-
porations that cannot raise capital in smaller capital markets.8'
Without the existence of derivative instruments to allow the rais-
ing of capital in one market to be used in another, corporations
might not be able to complete projects located in capital mar-
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See supra note 66 (discussing arbitrage profits).
75. GROUP OF THIRTY, supra note 17, at 35.
76. See FRANK J. FAnozzl & FRANco MODIGLArNI, CAPITAL MARKETS: INSTITUTIONS
AND INSTRUMENTS 181-82 (1992) (noting that futures markets may provide cheaper way
to adjust portfolios).
77. Cunningham, supra note 19, at 132. For example, the corporation may use
OTC derivatives to trade floating interest rate liabilities for fixed rate liabilities. Id.
Similarly, it may trade liabilities denominated in one currency for liabilities denomi-
nated in another currency. Id. The resulting liability is termed a synthetic liability as,
in effect, the corporation has combined several instruments to create one liability. Id.
Corporations may likewise create synthetic assets by trading away various asset based
characteristics. Id.
78. Hu, supra note 6, at 1466.
79. Id.
80. GROUP OF THIRTY, supra note 17, at 35.
81. Id.
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kets too small to provide adequate capital.82
2. Using Derivatives as an Asset and Liability
Management Tool
An alternative use for derivatives is to manage existing debt
or asset portfolios.83 As economic prospects vary; the holder of a
portfolio may desire to exchange certain characteristics of that
portfolio for other more favorable characteristics.8 4 For exam-
ple, the portfolio of a small thrift institution may consist of short-
term variable-rate liabilities,85 and long-term, fixed-rate assets.86
The prospect of rising interest rates may be unattractive to the
thrift, as its ability to pay floating-rate liabilities from the income
of fixed rate assets will diminish as interest rates rise.87 A large
commercial bank in contrast, may manage a portfolio consisting
of substantial fixed-rate liabilities 8 and floating rate-assets. 9
Through the services of a dealer,9 ° the two banks may execute a
.swap transaction whereby the thrift makes periodic fixed rate
payments in exchange for periodic floating rate payments. 91 As
parties receive favorable characteristics in exchange for unfavor-
able ones, the swap results in portfolios better attuned to the
needs of both parties.92
3. Derivatives as a Hedging Instrument
A third common use for derivative financial instruments
is to hedge93 against unfavorable movements in capital mar-
82. Id.; see Lindholm, supra note 1, at 83-84 (discussing swaps as effective tools to
control interest rate risk when used in asset and liability management).
83. GROUP OF THIRTY, supra note 17, at 36.
84. Id.
85. Cunningham, supra note 19, at 131. Variable-rate liabilities that the holder
must pay in the near future, typically consist of deposits or borrowings. Id.
86. Id. Fixed-rate liabilities that the holder need not meet until a relatively distant
time in the future, typically consist of mortgages. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. Publicly held debt for example, might compose the fixed-rate liability of a
large commercial bank. Id.
89. Id. Commercial banks typically may possess commercial loans as floating-rate
assets. Id.
90. See supra note 39 and accompanying text (discussing derivatives dealers).
91. Cunningham, supra note 19, at 131.
92. Id.
93. See supra note 61 (defining hedging). More than 82% of the corporations re-
sponding to the Group of Thirty survey 'indicated that they use derivatives to hedge
market risks arising from new financing. GROUP OF THIRTY SURVEY, supra note 42, at 36;
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kets.94 Often, end-users of derivatives face fluctuating markets
that in turn cause fluctuation in the value of their assets.9" The
derivative used as a hedge provides security against risk that
those fluctuations will adversely affect the end-user's financial in-
terests.96 The hedge participant exchanges opportunity for
profit in exchange for security or protection against unwanted
risk.97 By using derivatives to hedge against market fluctuations,
end-users are free to pursue their business objectives without di-
verting unnecessary energy to management of market con-
cerns.9" Hedging uses have saved companies large amounts of
money99 and promises to be popular uses for derivatives in com-
ing years. 00
The popularity of derivatives as hedging instruments stems
from benefits derived from transactions such as the following.
An end-user satisfying large short-term cash requirements with
short-term floating-rate borrowings might desire to control its in-
terest rate risk.10 1 By ensuring a stable interest rate, the end-user
see supra note 1, at 84 (noting that borrowers may use swaps to hedge against changes in
interest rates occurring months or even years away).
94. Goius, supra note 4, at 45-46. The interest rate and currency swap, two instru-
ments that are now used for a variety or purposes, were originally introduced during
the 1980's as hedging instruments to control unpredictable non-U.S. exchange and
interest rate fluctuations. Id. The new risk-hedging devices that which had been uti-
lized primarily by banks, rapidly became a market product available as a financial tool
to diverse end-users. Id. at 46. Currently, "[t]he customized nature of derivatives allows
end-users to hedge risk in a manner more closely resembling the actual risk that they
are assuming than was ever possible with ordinary securities." Waldman, supra note 2,
at 1029-30.
95. Waldman, supra note 2, at 1030. Multinational corporations such as McDon-
ald's are one example of a prospective end-user class. Id. Because the assets of multina-
tional corporations are located in multiple countries, the value of the corporation's
assets and thus, the corporation as a whole, is especially vulnerable to fluctuations in
non-U.S. currency. See GRouP OF THIRTY, supra note 17, at 37 (discussing Intel Corpora-
tion's successful use of hedging transactions to hedge approximately 90% of European.
order backlog against currency fluctuations).
96. Gojus, supra note 4, at 79.
97. Id.
98. Id.; see Hu, supra note 6, at 1466 (noting that end-users may prefer world where
they have been able to eliminate market risks).
99. William Glasgall & Greg Bums, Hedging Commandments: Rules to Live by in a
Dangerous Game, Bus. WK., Oct. 31, 1994, at 98.
100. Id. Many corporations have been able to hedge successfully. Id. Among the
most successful companies are Coca-Cola, Colgate-Palmolive, FMC, Ford, Lexmark, Mc-
Donald's, Merck, Mobil, 3M, and Union Carbide. Id. at 99..
101. See GROUP OF THIRTY supra note 17, at 36 (describing Ocean Spray's strategy
of using derivatives as insurance to hedge against large, unfavorable interest rate
changes that would negatively affect its short-term cash borrowings).
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would not have to worry about interest rate fluctuations affecting
its short-term borrowings.10 2 In order to ensure a stable rate, the
end-user might take advantage of derivative instruments known
as caps, 10 3 floors, 10 4 or collars."5 By purchasing combinations of
these instruments, the buyer contracts with a second party to pay
a premium in advance 10 6 in exchange for reimbursement by the
second party of any later incurred interest rate costs.1 0 7 Thus, by
using derivatives, the end-user effectively protects against rising
or falling interest rates while taking advantage of any benefits
conferred by the short-term floating rate.' 08
4. Using Derivatives to Speculate for Profit
In contrast to risk reducing uses for derivatives, some deriva-
tive users employ derivatives in a speculative quest for profits.109
The fundamental difference between risk reducing transactions
and speculative uses is that the former reduce market risk while
the latter increases it." 0 Speculative uses aim to achieve profits
102. Id.
103. Andrew B. Giles, Towards Diversification in THE REGULATIONS GOVERNING DE-
RrVATIVES: AN INTERNATIONAL GUIDE, INT'L 1992 FIN. L. REv. 4 (1992). A cap is "a con-
tract between two parties under which the seller, in return for an up front premium,
agrees to refund to the purchaser any excess interest costs over an agreed reference
rate." Id. Caps provide a ceiling on the interest rate level affecting floating rate borrow-
ings. Id. at 4-5.
104. Id. at 5. A floor is the opposite of a cap. Id. The seller of a floor receives a
premium in return for which he agrees to compensate the buyer for the difference
between actual interest rates and an agreed reference rate. Id. Floors protect the buyer
against a fall in interest rates below a specified rate. Id.
105. Id. A collar is the purchase of a cap simultaneous to the sale of a floor. Id.
Collars enable buyers to lock their interest costs into a specified range. Id.
106. Id. at 4. Alternatively the buyer may simply exchange any savings that he
would receive resulting from downward moving interest rate for the reimbursement of
future costs occurring as a result of upward moving rates. Id. This transaction would be
a collar. Id.; see supra note 105 (defining collar).
107. Giles, supra note 103, at 4; see supra notes 103-04 (discussing caps and floors).
108. See GROUP OF THIR Y supra note 17, at 36 (noting Ocean Spray and Muzak's
success using similar interest rate hedging techniques).
109. GORIS, supra note 4, at 82. Paul Goris defines speculation as "the conscious
and deliberate exposure to market uncertainties with the intention of acquiring an eco-
nomic benefit." Id.; see Glasgall & Bums, supra note 99, at 99 (noting that it is impor-
tant for a financial manager to know whether his objective is to trade for profit or to
offset changes in market values).
110. GORIS, supra note 4, at 77. The line between hedging and speculation is not
always so clear. Id. Some derivatives such as swaps are often used primarily to specu-
late, and secondarily to hedge. Id. Alternatively, a transaction may initially exhibit
speculative characteristics but then become a hedge or vice-versa. Id. at 82.
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by maintaining open-market risk positions.'11 The ultimate
profit or loss result of each position depends upon which direc-
tion the market moves."' l The participant bets that the market
will move favorable to his position.'
The popular currency swap where the initiating party does
not possess an underlying position in the denominated curren-
cies commonly exemplifies speculative derivatives use."' In this
arrangement, the initiating party agrees with a counterparty to
swap certain fixed amounts of one currency for another over a
period of time. 1 5 The party is not interested in the nature of
the currency flows but rather the difference between them." 6
Speculation occurs because the initiating party bets that cur-
rency markets will move in such a way that it will be able to rec-
ognize a profit.'1 7 If the market moves the other way, the initiat-
ing party will be responsible for the corresponding loss.118
D. The Risks Accompanying Derivatives
The financial benefits that end-users and dealers" 9
may recognize by participating in derivatives markets
do not occur without corresponding financial risk.'2 ° Analysts
broadly classify the risks end-users and dealers face by
separating derivatives risks into several categories:12 ' mar-
111. Id. at 80.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 80-81. In discussing derivatives known as swaps, one may distinguish
purely "speculative" use from "trading" use. Id. Trading use refers to the process of
seeking profit from mediation fees earned in exchange for performing the swap for a
third party. Trading use may also designate the specialized banking practice of exploit-
ing temporary market imperfections for profit, known as arbitraging. Id. at 81.
114. Id. at 77.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. See supra notes 36-56 and accompanying text (discussing derivatives users).
120. Id. at 43; see Hu, supra note 6, at 1467-71 (discussing financial risks accompa-
nying derivatives, focusing specifically on credit and market risk); Waldman, supra note
2, at 1038-50 (discussing six commonly classified financial risks involved with deriva-
tives).
121. Waldman, supra note 2, at 1038-39. These risks are roughly the same risks
that banks and securities firms face during the course of their regular line of business.
GROUP OF TutiRv, supra note 17, at 43. Thus, the risks are not new. Id. These risks do,
however, present complex issues regarding how to minimize risk not normally found in
the regular course of banking and securities business. Id.
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ket,12 2 credit,12 3 operational, 12 4 legal,1 25 liquidity,126 and systemic
risk.1 27 Together, the six risks compose the possibility that a de-
rivatives transaction may not result as the participants had in-
tended. 128
1. Market Risk
Like any other financial instrument, market risk resulting
from the use of derivatives is the risk that the derivative instru-
ment will not be as profitable as the investor had anticipated,
due to market fluctuations.1 29 Although the concept of market
risk may be simple to understand, managing market risk has not
been easy.1 30 Commentators have suggested that market risks
have been at the cause of the largest derivatives-related losses.13
1
Successful managers of market risk have been able to iden-
tify the market risks their investments face.13 2 Those investors
that maintain a portfolio of derivative investments such as deal-
ers, now typically manage the market risks of their derivatives on
the basis of net exposure of the entire portfolio.13 3 Determining
the net exposure of the entire portfolio may prove difficult, as
122. GROUP OF THIRTY, supra note 17, at 43. Market risk is the risk that the finan-
cial instrument will lose its value to the investor. Id.
123. Id. at 47. Credit risk is generally the risk that a loss will incur if a counterparty
defaults on the derivatives contract. Id.
124. Id. at 50. Operational risks refer to the risk of losses that may occur as a result
of inadequate systems and control, human error, or management failure. Id.
125. Id. at 51. Legal risks are the risks of loss that may occur because a contract
cannot be enforced. Id.
126. Waldman, supra note 2, at 1043-44. Liquidity risk is closely related to market
risk in that it occurs where an asset cannot be sold quickly at a reasonable price. Id.
127. Hu, supra note 6, at 1054-55. Systematic risk refers to the risk that one party's
inability to meet the obligations of its contract will create a domino effect of breached
obligations among counterparties. Id. Of the four risks, commentators sometimes
deem "credit" risk and "market" risk to be the most prominent. Id. at 1468.
128. Waldman, supra note 2, at 1038-39.
129. See supra note 122 (defining market risk); see also Hu, supra note 6, at 1469
(describing market risk as risk that value of underlying asset will move in wrong direc-
tion and noting that losses are potentially unlimited).
130. Waldman, supra note 2, at 1039-40.
131. Id. Bankers Trust lost US$300 million to investments in derivatives following
a 1994 rise in interest rates. Id. at 1040. A British multinational corporation, Allied-
Lyons, lost UK£147 million betting against the U.S. dollar in 1991. Id.
132. See GROUP OF THIRTY, supra note 17, at 43-44 (discussing managerial ap-
proaches to identifying market risks).
133. Id. at 43. An entire portfolio will often contain many offsetting positions and
thus, the overall risk of the portfolio may be substantially less than the individual invest-
ments. Id.
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the user must first identify the fundamental risks and exposures
of each individual investment in the portfolio.13 4
Upon identifying the risks that may devalue their invest-
ments, managers can avoid devaluation by employing hedging
strategies. 13' By investing in financial instruments whose value
will move inversely in equal amounts to movements in the entire
portfolio, the manager ensures that the market risk of the port-
folio is kept to a minimum. 36 Even though a money manager
may protect his portfolio against most market risk, the manager
may still find it difficult to protect against all market risk.'3 7
High transaction costs may additionally prohibit otherwise effi-
cient hedging opportunities.1 38
2. Credit Risk
Whereas the volatility of underlying markets determines the
amount of market risk involved in a derivatives transaction, 13 9
the credit worthiness of the two parties to the transaction deter-
mines the amount of credit risk involved.' 41 Credit risk is the
risk that one of the parties to the derivative transaction will de-
fault on its obligations arising from its entering into the transac-
tion.1 41 When one party defaults, the other will not receive its
benefit unless its enters into a replacement contract and thus,
the cost of default to that party is the cost of replacing the con-
tract with a new one.1 42
134. See id. (discussing types of risks that may affect each individual investment).
135. See supra notes 93-108 and accompanying text (discussing hedging).
136. See GROUP OF TmRTY, supra note 17, at 36 (discussing Ocean Spray savings).
137. Hu, supra note 6, at 1468-70. Identifying the risks a portfolio faces may prove
very difficult as many different factors influence a portfolio's value. Id. at 1468. Deter-
mining the value of an option-based portfolio, for example, requires identification of
the probable distribution of prices for the underlying asset at maturity. Id..
138. Id. at 1469. One popular type of hedging strategy that can prove cost prohibi-
tive is "delta hedging." Waldman, supra note 2, at 1044-45. A delta hedging manager
continuously realigns the hedge's position with regard to the portfolio so as to maxi-
mize the hedge's effectiveness and opportunity for profit. Id. Delta hedging may, how-
ever, require high transaction costs, and may also not be efficient in non-liquid markets.
Id.
139. See supra notes 129-37 and accompanying text (discussing market risk).
140. See supra note 123 (discussing credit risk).
141. GROUP OF THiRTY, supra note 17, at 47. Credit risk losses have so far been
relatively small. GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 52. For 1992, major OTC derivatives
dealers reported credit losses as less than one-half of one percent of their gross credit
exposures. Id. at 52.
142. GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 52. Credit risk calculations are especially im-
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In order to calculate the level of credit risk accompanying a
derivative contract, a party must determine both the cost of re-
placing the contract if the counterparty were to default immedi-
ately and the replacement cost if the counterparty were to de-
fault at some time in the future.143 The cost of replacing the
contract today, or "current" replacement cost, is equal to the
value of the expected future cash flows that the non-defaulting
party would have received if not for the breach by the defaulting
party. 1
44
The cost of replacing the contract in the future is the poten-
tial replacement cost.145 Potential replacement cost accounts for
changes in value the derivative contract would have incurred in
response to underlying market movements."4 Calculating po-
tential replacement cost is more difficult and less precise than
calculating current replacement cost.'4 7 In contrast to requiring
a calculation of value occurring at a fixed point in time, as does
current replacement cost, potential replacement cost constantly
portant to end-users engaging in over-the-counter derivatives transactions. GROUP OF
THIRTY, supra note 17, at 48. Unlike exchange-traded derivatives, OTC derivatives do
not pass through a dealer and thus the parties rely on one another for performance of
the contract. Waldman, supra note 2, at 1047. Thus, calculating the likelihood of
counterparty default is central to the value of the contract. Id. at 1049.
143. See GROUP OF THIRTY, supra note 17, at 47 (noting that two determinations
may be considered "current" and "potential" exposures). Credit risk is not necessarily a
factor for both parties, as some transactions create one-sided credit exposure. Id. at 48.
For example, the buyer of an option often pays the full price of the option at the time
of initiating the option contract. Id. The seller, however, is not under an obligation to
perform until such time as the buyer decides to exercise the option. Id. Thus the buyer
is exposed to the credit risk that the seller will not perform when the buyer exercises
the option. Id. The buyer thus incurs credit risk, whereas the seller does not. Id.
144. Id. at 47. Counterparty default does not always cause a loss. Id. Some trans-
actions, such as swaps and forwards, require that in order for there to be a loss, the
counterparty must not only default but the replacement cost must also be positive, so
that no profit is gained as a result of the loss. Id.
145. Id.
146. Waldman, supra note 2, at 1048. For example, a true measure of credit risk
would be able to account for the risk of having to replace a derivatives contract where
market volatility had driven the value of that contract up or down. See id. (describing
devaluation of options as time to expiration date diminishes).
147. Hu, supra note 6, at 1468-69. A completely accurate measure of credit risk
would require being able to predict the future because otherwise it is impossible to
determine the distribution of market prices that will affect the value of the derivative
contract. Id.; see GROUP OF THIRTY, supra note 17, at 47 (noting that credit risk calcula-
tions are at best mere estimates); Waldman, supra note 2, at 1048 (noting that even with
complex computer modeling techniques, calculation of credit risk is imprecise sci-
ence).
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changes as market volatility affects relevant variables. 148 An accu-
rate estimate of total credit risk may thus, not be possible at all
times as any assessment of credit risk may be more characteristic
of a best estimate than a precise measure.149 Calculating the
credit risk of an entire portfolio as compared to a single deriva-
tive investment, is even more complex and less likely to be accu-
rate. 
150
3. Operational Risk
Operational risk broadly refers to the risk that losses will oc-
cur as a result of improper or undesired functioning of trading
and management systems. 151 Two common operational risks are
the risks of human error and management or technological
lapses. 152 To reduce operational risk, derivatives users have insti-
tuted several main types of internal controls.155
Some examples of operational risk-reducing strategies in-
clude: documentation of policies and procedures regarding ap-
proval requirements, dollar limits, and activity disclosure. 4
These strategies are designed to set forth clear rules as to what
148. Waldman, supra note 2, at 1468-69.
149. GROUP OF THIRTY, supra note 17, at 47.
150. Id. at 47. Calculations of current portfolio replacement cost must take into
account the application and enforceability of bilateral netting agreements. Id. at 48.
Netting agreements allow parties to combine offsetting payment obligations arising
from multiple transactions into one total payment, thus leaving only one obligation to
be fulfilled. GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 65. When netting applies, the credit expo-
sure of a portfolio is the sum of positive and negative values of each contract. GRouP OF
THIRTY, supra note 17, at 48.
Determining whether netting applies raises certain legal issues. GAO REPORT,
supra note 2, at 65. Uncertainty remains as to whether some netting agreements, specif-
ically agreements that net across product types, will be enforceable under U.S. law. Id.
The Group of Thirty report recognizes however, that widely used standard documenta-
tion and changes in the legal environment in several jurisdictions have answered spe-
cific enforceability issues and eased legal concerns. GROUP OF THIRTY, supra note 17, at
51. The Group of Thirty report also recognized enforceability issues with regard to
netting in other countries and called for increased clarity across transnational borders.
See generally GLOBAL DERIVATIVES STUDY GROUP, DERIVATIVES PRACTICES AND PRINCIPLES I
(Group of Thirty eds. 1993) (App. II: Legal Enforceability; Survey of Nine Jurisdic-
tions) (1994) (discussing enforceability issues in two jurisdictions, Australia and Japan,
where the enforceability of netting agreements are particularly questionable, and gam-
bling statutes in Brazil, Canada, and Singapore that also make treatment of derivatives
uncertain in these jurisdictions).
151. GROUP OF THIRTY, supra note 17, at 50.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
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personnel may and may not do in the exercise of their duties.155
Independent audits and risk management review, provide
checks and balances from neutral sources outside the firms
utilizing derivatives.15 6 Additionally, new technology and ac-
counting systems have lowered operational risks by increasing ef-
ficiency in confirmation and payment systems.1 57
4. Legal Risk
Legal risk is the risk of loss due to the unenforceability of a
derivatives contract.158 Parties to a derivatives contract first cal-
culate legal risk when there is doubt as to whether the terms of
the derivatives contract may violate a law.'5 9 Legal risk also ac-
counts for the possibility that a party involved in the contract
may not have the legal authority to enter into such obliga-
tions.160  Uncertainty resulting from the question of whether
courts will enforce specific contractual provisions has addition-
ally been subject to focus in calculating legal risks. 61
5. Liquidity Risk
Liquidity risk is generally the risk that an asset may not be
sold promptly for a reasonable price. 62 This kind of risk is
closely associated with market risk 6 ' because it refers to the pos-
sibility that a particular transaction in a certain instrument may
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 64; see GROUP OF THIRTY, supra note 17, at 51
(defining legal risk as risk of loss incurred when contract may not be enforced).
159. See GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 64 (discussing decreased possibility that
derivative contract will violate Commodities Exchange Act ("CEA") now that Commodi-
ties Futures Trading Commission has exempted swaps from most CEA provisions).
160. See Hazell v. Hammersmith & Fulham, L.B.C., 2 W.L.R. 372 (1991) (holding
London Borough's interest rate swap agreements unenforceable due to borough's lack
of authority to enter into such contracts); see also GROUP OF THIRTY, supra note 17, at 51
(discussing British case of Hammersmith & Fulham). In the United Kingdom, defenses
to enforceability based on the grounds that one party lacked authority to enter into the
derivatives contract have produced some of the largest derivatives losses to date. GAO
REPORT, supra note 2, at 64.
161. Id.
162. Waldman, supra note 2, at 1043; see ROBERT A. SCHWARTZ, EQUITY MARKETS:
STRUCTURE, TRADING, AND PERFORMANCE 523 (1988) (discussing definitions and empiri-
cal measures of liquidity).
163. See supra notes 129-38 and accompanying text (discussing market risk).
1995] REGULATORY DERIVATIVES 1417
have a noticeable effect on the price of that instrument. 16 4 Li-
quidity risk also embodies concepts of credit risk 165 in that li-
quidity risk may increase when a particular party temporarily is
not liquid and therefore, is unable to meet its obligations."
In order to combat liquidity risk, derivatives users have de-
veloped complex hedging strategies to offset prospective
losses.'6 7 Delta hedging is one common technique whereby a
portfolio manager continuously adjusts the hedge position of
the portfolio as markets move up or down.1 68 Thus, one benefit
of this technique is the elimination of the risk that substantial
loss will occur as a result of a counterparty's illiquidity. 1 9
Critics of delta hedging have pointed out its faults, how-
ever.1 7° A primary fault of delta hedging and other hedging
techniques is that they presuppose the existence of a liquid mar-
ket.171 Although hedges may protect against illiquidity of one or
a handful of counterparties, should widespread illiquidity strike
financial markets, hedging techniques would become ineffec-
tive. 17 2
6. Systemic Risk
Systemic risk is the risk that one party's inability to meet its
obligations could cause a domino effect amongst other parties,
164. GROUP OF THIRrY, supra note 17, at 46.
165. See supra notes 139-50 and accompanying text (discussing credit risk).
166. Waldman, supra note 2, at 1043-44. Market participants are unlikely to trans-
act with a counterparty that is perceived to be non-liquid. Id.
167. Id. at 1044-47; see supra notes 93-108 (discussing hedging uses and tech-
niques).
168. Waldman, supra note 2, at 1044; see supra note 138 (discussing delta hedging).
169. Waldman, supra note 2, at 1044. Delta hedging also facilitates profit-taking,
unlike mirror hedges which are designed to yield no profit Id.
170. See Hu, supra note 6, at 1479 (noting that sophisticated hedging techniques
are imperfect when market conditions become chaotic).
171. See Waldman, supra note 2 (discussing presupposition of creators of hedging
techniques that markets will remain liquid).
172. Hu, supra note 6, at 1479. Unstable market conditions such as those that
occurred in the Fall 1992 European currency crisis may render impossible the adjust-
ments upon which hedging techniques rely, Id. The "portfolio insurance" technique,
as used prior to the 1987 stock market crash, illustrates just such a problem. Waldman,
supra note 2, at 1045-46. Prior to the crash, portfolio managers engaged in portfolio
insurance techniques by purchasing derivatives that were designed to increase in value
in the event that equity assets in the portfolio were to decrease. Id. The insurance
method failed, however, as buyers and sellers of the insuring instruments disappeared
because of the rapid decrease in stock prices. Id.
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causing the other parties to default on their obligations. 7t Sys-
temic risk largely arises because most derivatives transactions are
not fully secured. 174 Derivatives users and dealers often rely on
payments coming in from one contract to pay another.175  If
those payments should cease, as would be the case were the pay-
ments to come from a non-liquid party, the user or dealer would
not be able to meet payment obligations of its own. 17 6 Systemic
risk, thus, accounts for the possibility that industry reliance on
hedging strategies could worsen an illiquidity-driven market
downturn, by factoring in the possibility that one party's illiquid-
ity could cause widespread liquidity problems.177
Commentators note that several factors may exacerbate the
transmission of illiquidity. 171 First, a large portion of derivatives
business is conducted amongst a relatively small group of partici-
pants. 179  Full market illiquidity may therefore arise from illi-
quidity of only a few big market participants. 8 ' Second, particu-
lar obligations are often interconnected among institutions.' 8 '
A large number of transactions may involve a much smaller
number of counterparties and thus the failure of one
counterparty is likely to have broad-reaching effects.' 82 Third,
173. BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON IN-
TERRANK NETTING SCHEMES OF THE GROUP OF TEN COUNTRIES 9 (1990). Systemic risk is
the risk that "illiquidity or failure of one institution, and its resulting inability to meet its
obligations when due, will lead to the illiquidity or failure of other institutions." Id.; see
Waldman, supra note 2, at 1053-54. Systemic risk can be separated into two scenarios.
Id. First, the situation where one party's inability to meet it's contractual obligations
causes a defaulting domino effect amongst financial institutions. Id. Second, the wide-
spread reliance of investors on hedging strategies worsens an otherwise containable
market downturn. Id.
174. William Glasgall & Bill Javetski, Swap Fever: Big Money, Big Risks, Bus. WK.,
June 1, 1992, at 102-03.
175. See Waldman, supra note 2, at 1055 (discussing concern that failure of one
party to meet its obligations will cause other parties to do same).
176. Id.
177. Id. at 1054-56.
178. See, e.g., id. at 56 (noting that small quantity of large derivatives markets par-
ticipants and interconnection of swap markets may worsen problem of systemic risk).
179. Glasgall &Javetski, supra note 174 (noting that many traders conduct business
with only small group of highly-rated banks).
180. See Waldman, supra note 2 at 1054-56 (discussing likelihood that failure of
one institution could cause similar failures throughout industry).
181. See Keith Schap, iWen Domino Theory Meets OTC Credit Risk, FUTURES, Aug.
1992, at 38, 40 (discussing Merrill Lynch subsidiary's 161 transactions that only involved
51 counterparties); Glasgall & Javetski, supra note 174, at 102, 104 (discussing single
finance deal that required 240 swap transactions in order to balance).
182. Waldman, supra note 2, at 1054-56.
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the long-term nature of some derivatives contracts18 3 increases
systemic risk by providing a greater opportunity for counterparty
default.18 4
E. An Overview of the Regulatory Framework Governing Derivatives
Regulations governing derivatives are the result of a mixed
basket of requirements aimed not specifically at derivatives, but
rather, the financial industry in general.' 8 5 Securities and com-
modities laws, together with requirements issued by the Federal
Reserve Board' 86 and the Office of the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency,'87 broadly affect derivatives markets by imposing upon de-
rivatives traders, mandatory rules and guidelines.18 8  Private
groups like the Financial Accounting Standards Board 89 and
the International Swaps and Derivatives Association '" have also
contributed rules and requirements to the regulatory framework
governing derivatives markets.' 91
183. See GROUP OF THIRTY, supra note 17, at 54 (discussing difference in risk levels
of one-year contract compared to ten-year contract).
184. Claire Makin, Hedging Your Derivatives Doubts, INSnTUTIONAL INVESTOR, Dec.
1991, at 113, 119. Parties are more likely to default on a contract if they are provided
more opportunities to do so. Id.; see Lisa Vaughan, Swaps Boom Worries Regulators, IN-
DEPENDENT, Aug. 25, 1992, at 19 (discussing fears of deputy head of banking supervision
at Bank of England that longer duration contracts increase exposure to counterparty
default).
185. See Charles E. Dropkin et al., United States in The Regulations Governing Deriva-
tives: An International Guide, 1992 INT'L FIN. L. REv. 38 (noting that different types of
derivatives are subject to different regulatory requirements depending on derivative's
particular characteristics).
186. See id. at 51 (noting that Federal Reserve Board is principal regulator of bank
holding companies and state-member banks).
187. See id. at 52 (noting that Office of Comptroller of Currency is chief regulator
of U.S. national banks).
188. See id. at 51-53 (discussing power of Federal Reserve Board and Office of
Comptroller of Currency to regulate derivatives).
189. See ROBERT F. MEIGS & WALTER B. MEIGS, FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING 12 (6th ed.
.1989) (discussing history and role of Financial Accounting Standards Board). A private
agency, the FASB has been instrumental in developing and recognizing generally ac-
cepted accounting principles. Id. Composed of seven full-time members, the FASB
conducts extensive research of accounting issues and releases statements of accounting
standards that represent authoritative expressions of generally accepted accounting
principles. Id.
190. See Cunningham, supra note 19, at 138 (discussing role of International Swaps
and Derivatives Association in regulating derivatives). The ISDA is a private industry
trade association that has been instrumental in the development of standard documen-
tation in the derivatives industry. Id.
191. Id.
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1. Securities Regulation
Forming the backbone of U.S. securities law are the Securi-
ties Act of 193392 ("Securities Act") and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act"). 9 Whereas the Securities Act es-
sentially governs the initial infusion of securities into securities
markets, 194 the Exchange Act addresses regulation of those se-
curities once they are in circulation. 195 Both the Securities and
the Exchange Acts govern only those instruments that the acts
define as securities. 196 The defined instruments include, for ex-
ample, notes, stocks, bonds, puts, calls, options, privileges that
are traded on national securities exchanges, or any instrument
commonly known as a security.' 97 The Exchange Act also cre-
ated the Securities Exchange Commission,' 98 an independent,
non-partisan regulatory agency whose purpose it is to administer
192. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77z (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
193. 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1934 & Supp. 1993). Five statutes in addition to the two se-
curities acts, and the rules and regulations promulgated under all seven, comprise the
federal securities laws. JENNINGS, supra note 29, at 99. The additional statutes are: the
Public Utility Holding Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. § 79 (1935 & Supp. V 1993), the Trust
Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1939 & Supp. V 1993), the Investment Company
Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80 (1940 & Supp. V 1993), the Investment Advisers Act of 1940,
15 U.S.C. § 80 (1940 & Supp. V 1993)), and the Securities Investor Protection Act of
1970, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1988). THOMAS LEE HAZEN, FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW: FEDERAL
JUDICIAL CENTER 1 (1993).
194. JENNINGS, supra note 29, at 99.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. 15 U.S.C. § 77(b). The Exchange Act defines security as
[a]ny note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness,
certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collat-
eral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable
share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a
security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, any
put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or
group or index of securities (including any interest therein or based on the
value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a
national securities exchange relating to non-U.S. currency, or, in general, any
interest or instrument commonly known as a 'security,' or any certificate of
interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for,
guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the fore-
going.
Id. The Securities Act definition of security is almost identical to the Exchange Act
definition. 15 U.S.C. § 78(c). The Exchange Act definition, however, does not apply to
any note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker's acceptance that has a maturity at the time
of issuance of not exceeding nine months, exclusive of days of grace, or any renewal
thereof the maturity of which is likewise limited. Id.
198. 15 U.S.C. § 78d. The Securities Exchange Commission is responsible for en-
1995] REGULATORY DERIVATIVES 1421
and enforce the federal securities laws.1"
Derivative financial instruments do not fit neatly within defi-
nitions of securities and, thus, the purview of federal securities
laws.20 The acts' definitions of security, although covering
those financial instruments that are traded on national securities
exchanges, have not been interpreted to include many types of
derivative products.20 1 By falling outside the definition of secur-
ity, non-exchange traded derivatives avoid three substantial as-
pects of the federal regulatory system. 20 2 First, non-security de-
rivatives are not subject to the mandatory disclosure system that
applies to the sale and trading of security instruments. 203  Sec-
ond, unlike non-security derivatives, securities face stiff anti-
fraud provisions not found in common law.204 Finally, financial
intermediaries that deal in the securities that fall within the defi-
nitions under the acts, face close substantive regulation by the
suring fairness and honesty in the securities markets as well as adequate disclosure to
investors. JENNINGS, supra note 29, at 99.
199. JENNINGS, supra note 29, at 98.
200. See Horwitz, supra note 69, at 526 (discussing question of what constitutes
security under Securities and Exchange Acts).
201. Cunningham, supra note 19, at 162. The nontransferable character and two
party nature of OTC derivatives is largely responsible for the broad view that OTC deriv-
atives are not securities. Id. Swaps are not securities under federal securities laws and
therefore, registration provisions of the Securities Act and anti-fraud provisions of the
Exchange Act are inapplicable. Dropkin, supra note 185, at 38. In addition, swap par-
ticipants are not required to register as broker-dealers under the Exchange Act, and
neither are investment companies under the Investment Company Act of 1940, merely
because there is swap activity in their portfolios. Id.; see Horwitz, supra note 69, at 525
(discussing court decisions interpreting definitions of security under Securities and Ex-
change Acts).
202. JENNINGS, supra note 29, at 2.
203. Id. at 29. The Securities and Exchange Acts combine to create what is known
as an integrated disclosure system. HAROLD S. BLOOMENTRHAL & HOLME ROBERTS &
OWEN, SECURITIES LAw HANDBOOK 59 (1994). This integrated system requires disclo-
sure in connection with public offerings of securities as well as disclosure on a continu-
ous basis for companies with securities registered under the Acts. Id. For a general
discussion of the disclosure system and its requirements, see id. at 59-134 (providing
overview of integrated disclosure system). See also TloMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE
LAw OF SECURITIEs REGULATION 56-232, 388-98 (2d ed. 1990) (discussing registration
and reporting requirements under Securities and Exchange Acts).
204. JENNINGS, supra note 29, at 2. For a general discussion of the anti-fraud provi-
sions under the federal securities laws and other remedies for securities law violations,
see HAZEN, supra note 203, at 52-220. See, e.g., Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240 (1994)
(prohibiting employment of manipulative and deceptive devices in connection with
purchase or sale of security).
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Securities Exchange Commission.2 0 5 Dealers of derivatives that
do not fall within the definition of security, under the Securities
and Exchange Acts, are not subject to similar regulation. 0 6
As regulators have threatened to treat certain types of deriv-
atives as securities and thus subject them to the regulatory frame-
work of the Securities and the Exchange Acts, financial innova-
tors have responded by creating new financial instruments that
do not fall within established definitions of a security.20 7 For ex-
ample, swap participants may minimize potential exposure to
federal securities laws by structuring their transaction in such a
way as to fall outside the jurisdiction of securities laws.20 8
2. Commodities Regulation
Supplementing securities laws in the governance of deriva-
tives are federal commodities laws.2 9 The current commodity
205. SeeJENNINGS, supra note 29, at 625-51 (discussing regulation of trading activi-
ties by brokers and dealers of securities).
206. Id. at 2. Derivative dealers are not required to register under either the Se-
curities or Exchange Acts, unlike dealers in securities. Cunningham, supra note 19, at
162. Dealers that are registered under the Acts that choose to deal in derivatives are
also subject to the SEC's net capital rules as contained in Rule 15c3-1 under the Ex-
change Act. 17 C.F.R. § 240 (1994). For a discussion of net capital rules and related
requirements, see BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 203, at 1042. The Final Temporary Risk
Assessment Rules adopted by the SEC on July 16, 1992 impose additional requirements
upon those dealers that are required to register under the Acts. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17(h)
(1994). These rules require broker-dealers to maintain records and file with the SEC
on a quarterly and annual basis certain information regarding for example, risk man-
agement policies and aggregate amounts of interest rate swaps and other instruments
with similar risk characteristics. Id.; see Cunningham, supra note 19, at 163 (describing
requirements of Final Temporary Risk Assessment Rules).
207. See Dropkin, supra note 185, at 38 (discussing ability of swap market partici-
pants to structure their transactions so they fit within exemptions of Securities Act).
208. Id.
209. Dropkin, supra note 185, at 39. The Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1
(1988 & Supp. V 1993) [hereinafter CEA] at § 2 provides that the Commodities Futures
Trading Commission shall:
[h]ave exclusive jurisdiction ... with respect to accounts, agreements... and
transactions involving contracts of sale of a commodity for future delivery,
traded or executed on a contract market designated pursuant to section 5 of
this Act or any other board of trade, exchange, or market, and transactions
subject to regulation by the Commission pursuant to section 19 of this Act.
Except as hereinabove provided, nothing contained in this section shall (I)
supersede or limit the jurisdiction at any time conferred on the Securities and
Exchange commission or other regulatory authorities under the laws of the
United States or of any State, or (II) restrict the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission and such other authorities from carrying out their duties and respon-
sibilities in accordance with such laws.
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regulatory framework has developed from the provisions of the
Commodity Exchange Act ("CEA") 21° and the Commodity Fu-
tures Trading Commission Act ("CFTC Act").2 1  Congress
passed the CEA in 1936 to expand the Department of Agricul-
ture's authority over commodities markets. 212 In 1974, Congress
passed the CFTC Act to stabilize volatile commodities markets
and to create a federal regulatory agency to oversee commodities
market activities.213 The CEA, as amended, 14 provides that
transactions in commodity future and commodity option con-
tracts must occur be subject to the supervision of the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC").1 215
The CEA defines commodity as including a variety of agri-
cultural products from corn, butter, and eggs to grain sorghums,
flaxseed, livestock, and all other goods and articles.2 1 6 The defi-
nition also includes however, all services, rights, rights and inter-
ests in which contracts for future delivery are presently or in the
future dealt in. 17 Under this definition, some derivatives such
as futures and options contracts could be subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the CFTC.218 Rather than interpreting the definition as a
blanket inclusion of futures and options however, the CFTC has
instead limited its authority to the power of governing those
Id. § 2(a)(1)(A)(i).
210. 7 U.S.C. § 1.
211. Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88
Stat. 1389 (1974) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 4(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
212. Frank S. Shyn, Internationalization of the Commodities Market: Convergence of Reg-
ulatory Activity, 9 Am. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 597, 606-07 (1994).
213. Id.
214. See Mahlon M. Frandhauser & Ellen S. Levinson, Commodity Exchange Act
Amendments, 25 REv. SEC. & COMm. REG. 245 (1992) (discussing amendments to com-
modities acts).
215. CEA § 4; see Cunningham, supra note 19, at 164-67 (discussing provisions and
requirements of commodities acts).
216. 7 U.S.C. § la(3). The Commodity Exchange Act defines commodity as:
wheat, cotton, rice, corn, oats, barley, rye, flaxseed, grain sorghums, mill feeds,
butter, eggs, Solanum tuberosum (Irish potatoes), wool, wool tops, fats and
oils (including lard, tallow, cottonseed oil, peanut oil, soybean oil, and all
other fats and oils), cottonseed meal, cottonseed, peanuts, soybeans, soybean
meal, livestock, livestock products, and frozen concentrated orange juice, and
all other goods and articles, except onions as provided in Public Law 85-839 (7
U.S.C. § 13-1), and all services, rights, and interests in which contracts for fu-
ture delivery are presently or in the future dealt in.
Id.
217. Id.
218. Cunningham, supra note 19, at 164.
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transactions occurring on exchanges.2 °
The inclusion in the CEA of the Treasury Amendment,
2 2 0
places certain derivative instruments outside the reach of CFI'C
regulation.2 Most notably the Treasury Amendment exempts
derivative transactions in non-US. currencies.222 Consequently,
swaps, one of the most popular families of derivatives, 23 do not
fall within the CFTC's regulatory scope.22 4
Certain other commodity contracts are exempt from CFTC
jurisdiction under the trade option exemption. 225 This exemp-
tion authorizes particular commodity option transactions that
are not executed on designated contract markets and are of-
fered to commercial users in the line of their business.226  The
offeror need only reasonably believe that the prospective offeree
will use the option in the method the rule requires.227
219. See Dropkin, supra note 185, at 39 (noting that general requirement of ex-
change trading contrasts broader regulatory approach of SEC). This narrow approach
is consistent with the plain language of the Commodity Exchange Act, which limits the
CFTC's authority to transactions conducted on exchanges. See 7 U.S.C. § 2(a) (1) (A) (i)
(limiting CFTC's jurisdiction to contracts executed on markets designated by Section 5
of Act, or any other board of trade, exchange or market).
220. 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
221. Id. § 2(a)(1)(A)(ii). The Treasury Amendment provides:
[n]othing in this Act shall be deemed to govern or in any way be applicable to
transactions in non-U.S. currency, security warrants, security rights, resales of
installment loan contracts, repurchase options, government securities, or
mortgages and mortgage purchase commitment, unless such transactions in-
volve the sale thereof for future delivery conducted on a board of trade.
Id.; see 50 Fed. Reg. 42,963 (1985) (CFIC's statutory interpretation).
222. 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(A)(ii). Many of the other instruments exempted by the
Treasury Amendment fall under the regulatory regimes of other agencies. See, e.g., 15
U.S.C. § 78 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (defining security warrants within definition of se-
curity).
223. See Dropkin, supra note 185, at 36 (estimating size of swap market to be US$3
trillion). The Fourth Circuit has concluded that the Treasury Amendment exempts all
off-exchange transactions in non-U.S. currency, including futures and options. Salo-
mon Forex, Inc. v. Tauber, 8 F.3d 966, 976 (1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1540 (1994).
224. See Camden R. Webb, Note, Salomon Forex, Inc. v. Tauber - The "Sophisticated
Trader" and Foreign Currency Derivatives Under the Commodity Exchange Act, 19 N.C.J. INT'L
L. & CoM. REG. 579 (1994) (describing non-U.S. currency swaps exclusion from CFTC
jurisdiction).
225. 17 C.F.R. § 32.4(a) (1994).
226. 17 C.F.R. § 32.4(a). The rule states that the offeree must either be first, a
commercial user of, or a merchant handling the commodity, and second, the offering
must be solely related to the offeror's business. Id.
227. Id.; see Policy Statement Concerning Swap Transactions, 54 Fed. Reg. 30,694
n.14 (1989) (noting that only offeree of trade option need satisfy commercial user or
merchant requirement).
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In further limiting its regulatory control of derivatives, the
CFTC recently exempted2 2 8 swap agreements2 9 from its jurisdic-
tion, provided the agreements and swap participants meet cer-
tain requirements.2 30 In granting the CFTC authority to exempt
these types of interests, 23 ' Congress did not intend to determine
the legality of securities-based swaps or other transactions, taking
place in the off-exchange private marketplace, that otherwise
228. Cunningham, supra note 19, at 164. The CFTC adopted the exemptive regu-
lations on January 14, 1993 in response to authority Congress granted to it in the Fu-
ture Trading Practices Act of 1992 ("FIPA") Pub. L. No. 102-546, 106 Stat. 3590 (1992)
(codified at 7 U.S.C. 1). Id. Congress passed the FrPA with strong expectations that
the CFTC would utilize its new exemptive powers in four particular areas. Id. The four
types of instruments, hybrids, swaps, forwards, and bank deposits/accounts, are instru-
ments that have caused significant concern regarding legal enforceability. Id. To date,
the CFTC has only exempted swap agreements. 17 C.F.R. §§ 35.1-35.2 (1993).
229. 17 C.F.RI § 35.1(b). The exemption defines "swap agreement" as:
(i) An agreement (including terms and conditions incorporated by reference
therein) which is a rate swap agreement, basis swap, forward rate agreement,
commodity swap, interest rate option, forward non-U.S. exchange agreement,
rate cap agreement, rate floor agreement, rate collar agreement, currency
swap agreement, cross-currency rate swap agreement, currency option, any
other similar agreement (including any option to enter into any of the forego-
ing);
(ii) Any combination of the foregoing; or
(iii) A master agreement for any of the foregoing together with all supple-
ments thereto.
Id. The CFTC in granting the exemption did not, however, exempt parties from finan-
cial, record-keeping, reporting, or other requirements flowing from current CEA regu-
lation. Cunningham, supra note 19, at 165.
230. 17 C.F.R. § 35.2. To satisfy the swap exemption the transaction must satisfy
the following requirements:
(a) The swap agreement is entered into solely between eligible swap partici-
pants at the time such persons enter into the swap agreement;
(b) The swap agreement is not part of a fungible class of agreements that are
standardized as to their material economic terms;
(c) The creditworthiness of any party having an actual or potential obligation
under the swap agreement would be a material consideration in entering into
or determining the terms of the swap agreement, including pricing, cost, or
credit enhancement terms of the swap agreement; and
(d) The swap agreement is not entered into and traded on or through a mul-
tilateral transaction execution facility.
Id. The exemption states, however, that paragraphs (b) and (d) are not to be applied
to preclude netting arrangements between parties to swap agreements. Id. Finally, the
exemption allows for any person to apply directly to the CFTC for an exemption from
provisions of the Commodities Exchange Act and other regulatory regimes. Id.
231. See supra note 228 (discussing congressional expectations with regard to
granting CFTC authority to exempt certain types of financial instruments).
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comply with applicable regulations. 3 2 Prior to the 1993 swap
exemption, the CFTC approved a policy statement in 1989 that
set forth a nonexclusive safe harbor from CFTC regulation for
certain types of swap transactions.233 In adopting the new ex-
emption, the CFTC intended it to coexist with the existing safe
harbor rather than replace it.234
3. Bank Capital Adequacy Guidelines
Both the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
235
("OCC") and the Federal Reserve Board23 6 ("FRB") also have
substantial power to affect the use of derivatives. 23 7 Whereas the
SEC and CFTC arguably have direct statutory jurisdiction over
many derivative instruments,238 the OCC and the FRB affect de-
rivatives through governance of banks in the United States.239
Because banks are a principal user of derivative products,2 40 re-
232. Cunningham, supra note 19, at 166 (discussing congressional intentions in-
volved in passage of Future Trading Practices Act).
233. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Policy Statement Concerning Swap
Transactions, 54 Fed. Reg. 30,694 (1989) (hereinafter Policy Statement). In order to
qualify for the safe harbor provision, the transaction must meet the following require-
ments. Id. First, the transaction may only be consummated after individual credit de-
terminations and private negotiation with regard to material terms. Id. at 30,696. Sec-
ond, the transaction must create obligations that, absent default, may only terminate
upon consent of the counterparty. Id. Third, the transaction may not rely on third
party clearing organizations or margin systems. Id. In other words, the transaction may
not rely on margin or settlement systems designed to reduce or eliminate individualized
credit risk. Id.; see Cunningham, supra note 19, at 166 (noting safe harbor only applies
to transactions that are not subject to clearing organizations or margin systems).
Fourth, as the safe harbor is intended to preclude availability to public participation,
the transaction must be undertaken in conjunction with the participants' line of busi-
ness. Policy Statement at 30,696-97. Finally, consistent with the previous requirement,
participants may not market the transaction to the general public. Id.
234. See Cunningham, supra note 19, at 166 (noting that CFTC did not intend to
replace safe harbor with new exemption and furthermore, that market participants may
continue to rely on safe harbor in forming new swap agreements).
235. See supra note 187 and accompanying text (discussing role of OCC in regulat-
ing U.S. banks and derivatives trading).
236. See supra note 186 and accompanying text (discussing regulatory role of Fed-
eral Reserve Board).
237. Dropkin, supra note 185, at 52.
238. See supra notes 192-234 and accompanying text (discussingjurisdiction of SEC
and CFTC with regard to derivatives).
239. Id. at 51-53.
240. Id. at 51. Although there are approximately six-hundred banks that use deriv-
atives, roughly ten institutions control ninety percent of the market. See Barbara A.
Rehm, Regulators Try to Reassure Lawmakers on Swaps, Am. BANK'ER, Oct. 29, 1993, at 3
(discussing composition of derivatives users).
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quirements the OCC and FRB impose upon the banking indus-
try have the potential to widely affect derivative instruments. 24'
Both organizations have issued guidelines that directly affect the
use of derivatives. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion 242 ("FDIC") has also followed suit, thus rounding out the
imposition of capital guidelines upon financial institutions.24 "
The Bank Capital Adequacy Guidelines issued by the FRB in
198921 and similar guidelines adopted by the OCC245 and
FDIC246 in 1990 govern levels of risk banks may carry in relation
to amounts of capital.2 47 The guidelines assign risk weightings to
different types of bank assets and compare the total of risk-ad-
justed assets to qualified quantities of capital.248 The guidelines
prohibit risk levels above minimum capital to asset ratios. 2 49 If
241. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, THE FEDERAL RESERVE
SYSTEM: ITS PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS 109 (1939) [FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM]. One of
the specific duties of the FRB is to give particular attention to speculation involved in
the banking industry. Id. The FRB has authority to take action to prevent undue specu-
lation in the banking industry, specifically in the use of risky commodities and securi-
ties. Id. Such authority is consistent with the FRB's purpose of exerting a stabilizing
and corrective influence upon the U.S. banking system. Id. at 110.
242. Ernest T. Patrikis et al., Managing Risk Exposure in Derivatives: How to Deal With
Recent Regulatory and Legislative Developments, in MANAGING RISK EXPOSURE IN DERIVATIVES
150 (PLI Corporate Law and Practice Course Handbook Series No. B4-7089 (1994)).
The FDIC has some authority over all institutions with Federal Deposit Insurance, in-
cluding, national, state and non-U.S. banks, as well as savings institutions. Id. Most
banks are insured by the FDIC, and thus fall within FDIC regulation. JENNINGS, supra
note 29, at 78. The FDIC serves, in part, to ensure that financial institutions maintain
appropriate capital levels, expertise, and management controls in the course of opera-
tions. FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, supra note 241, at 150-51.
243. FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, FDIC INTERPRETIVE LETTER FL-34-
94 (1994). The FRB, OCC, and FDIC combine to regulate virtually the entire U.S.
banking system. JENNINGS, supra note 29, at 78; see Patrikis, supra note 242, at 80-96
(discussing particular provisions of FDIC derivatives guidelines).
244. 12 C.F.R. § 208 app. A (1994).
245. 12 C.F.R. § 567 (1994) (amended by 57 Fed. Reg. 33,441 (July 1992)).
246. 12 C.F.R. § 325 (1994).
247. Cunningham, supra note 19, at 154. The FRB requirements are a culmina-
tion of requirements agreed upon by supervisory authorities from twelve countries, in
July of 1988. Id.; see BASLE SUPERVISORS COMMITTEE, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF
CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS (July 1988) (setting forth Basle capital
requirements).
248. See Cunningham, supra note 19, at 154 (discussing operation of FRB's capital
adequacy guidelines).
249. See 12 C.F.R. § 208, § 567 (assigning and comparing risk ratios). The FRB
and OCC capital guidelines, for example, prohibit a risk to capital ratio greater than
eight. Id. The FDIC guidelines in contrast, deem a bank to be well-capitalized only if it
has a total risk-based capital ratio of ten or higher. 12 C.F.R. § 325. FDIC guidelines
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the subject bank does not meet the appropriate standard, it be-
comes, the target of substantial restrictions. 5 °
Derivatives enter the guideline picture because they are as-
sets that banks must include in calculating risk to capital ra-
tios.25 Regulatory bodies currently classify many derivatives in
categories reflective of greater risk when compared to the cate-
gorization of more stable instruments. 252 The inclusion of deriv-
atives in a bank's asset base can therefore negatively affect the
bank's risk to capital ratio.2 53 By assigning higher levels of risk to
derivative instruments, the regulatory bodies can discourage
their use and, thus, indirectly regulate derivatives markets.
254
4. The OCC, FRB, and FDIC Derivatives Guidelines
Beyond capital guidelines, the Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency ("OCC") has taken an additional step to control
derivatives-related risks, by issuing bank guidelines on managing
common derivative risks.255 , The OCC issued the guidelines for
prescribe, however, that a bank is adequately capitalized if its ratio is eight or higher.
Id.
250. 12 C.F.R. § 567. Under the OCC guidelines, a savings institution that does
not meet the OCC standards must first submit a plan to the OCC describing how it will
achieve compliance. Id. If the OCC does not approve the plan, the savings institution
may not increase its assets and is also subject to any other restrictions the OCC chooses
to impose. Id.
251. See 12 C.F.R. § 325 (discussing such derivative instruments as interest rate
swaps, basis swaps, forward rate agreements, caps, collars, floors, and any other instru-
ment that gives rise to similar credit risks); 12 C.F.R § 208 (including in FRB guidelines,
swaps, forward rate agreements, interest rate swaps, currency options, and any other
instrument that gives rise to similar credit risks). For a thorough discussion of swap
treatment under the guidelines, see Ernest T. Patrikis, Federal Reserve Capital Adequacy
Guidelines as Applied to Swaps, THE SWAP MARKET IN 1990 (Practicing Law Institute, Cor-
porate Law and Practice Course Handbook Series No. B4-6923, 1990).
252. See Cunningham, supra note 19, at 158 (noting that interest rate and ex-
change rate contracts are subject to risk weight as high as fifty percent). In contrast,
bank assets such as claims on governmental bodies or assets secured by collateral, are
assigned risk weightings of zero to twenty percent. Id. at 156.
253. Id. at 154-58. Because higher risk assets carry lower values in calculating the
banks quantity of capital, the overall ratio of assets to capital will be lower if risky assets
comprise the banks portfolio. See id. (discussing risk weighting of assets and calculation
of asset to capital ratios).
254. See Frederick D. Limpan, New Risk-Based Capital Guidelines Will Change Banks'
Future, 107 BANKING L.J. 3 (1990) (predicting that bank use of zero percent weighted
risk assets will increase while use of higher risk assets will decrease as result of capital
guidelines).
255. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, RISK MANAGEMENT OF FINAN-
GIAL DERIVATIVES, BANKING CIRCULAR No. 277 (1993) [hereinafter CIRCULAR 277]. The
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the purpose of notifying banks that they need to know their risk,
and be able to manage it.256 The derivatives guidelines address
and recommend management procedures257 to reduce each of
the six types of derivative inherent risks.25 8  The derivatives
guidelines also address issues of capital adequacy259 and account-
ing disclosure.260 After further study of these risks, the OCC re-
cently updated the original guidelines with examiner guidance
and examination procedures.261
In addition to requiring banks to analyze their own risk po-
sitions, the OCC derivatives guidelines require banks to analyze
risk from the position of other parties to derivatives transac-
262tions. Under the guidelines, management must identify
banking industry has not reacted negatively to the guidelines in large part because of
substantial existing compliance with the guideline recommendations. SeeJoanne Mor-
rison, Bank Examiners to Get Stringent Guidelines for Structured Note Investments, BOND
BUYER, Oct. 24, 1994, at 2 (quoting OCC's senior deputy, Douglas Harris, as stating,
"the majority of banks examined are in compliance").
256. Morrison, supra note 255, at 2.
257. CIRCULAR 277, supra note 255, at 3. The guidelines require banks to imple-
ment for example, comprehensive written policy procedures governing the use of deriv-
atives after having subjected such procedures to senior management approval. Id.
Under the guidelines, if a bank advises a customer against a particular purchase and the
customer makes the purchase anyway, the bank must specially document the transac-
tion. Id. Amongst the guidelines' recommendations are stringent risk measures and
limits, operational controls, and increased use of netting agreements. Id. at 8-9, 11, 13-
14.
258. See generally CIRCULAR 277, supra note 255 (discussing management principles
for market, credit, liquidity, operational, systemic, and legal risk issues).
259. CIRCULAR 277, supra note 255, at 14.
260. Id. at 15-16.
261. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, COMPTROLLER'S HANDBOOK,
RISK MANAGEMENT OF FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES 1 (1994). The updated procedures give
examiners more detailed guidance in assessing a financial institution's expertise in
managing derivatives risk and ability to use derivatives in a safe and sound manner. Id.
at 1. For example, under guidance from the handbook, financial institution boards of
directors should review any significant changes in derivatives policy and should gener-
ally encourage the use of netting agreements. Patrikis, supra note 242 at 148. The
examiner guidance and procedures deem lack of an adequate risk control functions
relative to levels of derivatives activities to be an unsafe and unsound banking practice.
Id. at 148-49. Dealers and active position-takers are subject to even more stringent stan-
dards in risk control areas. Id. at 144. The OCC has also issued a question and answer
bulletin answering many questions concerning the OCC's risk management guidelines.
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC BULLETIN No. 94-32, QUESTIONS
AND ANswERs FOR BC-277: RISK MANAGEMENT OF FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES (1994). The
Question and Answer release provides a basis explanation of derivatives related risks
and then provides further clarification of Circular 277. Id.
262. CIRCULAR 277, supra note 255, at 12, 13; see Patrikis, supra note 243 (discuss-
ing particular OCC derivative guideline requirements).
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whether proposed transactions are consistent with counterparty
policies and procedures known to the financial institution2 63 and
how the impact of the proposed transactions will affect the finan-
cial condition of the counterparty. 264 After ensuring the cus-
tomer's understanding of derivative-related risks, the bank must
periodically update its analysis of the counterparty's
creditworthiness .2 6  Finally, before entering into the proposed
transaction, the bank must reasonably assure itself that the
counterparty has the legal and regulatory authority to pro-
ceed. 6 Should the customer desire to proceed against bank
recommendations, the guidelines suggest that the bank docu-
ment its own analysis and information it provided to the cus-
tomer.26 7
After the OCC issued derivatives guidelines, the FRB fol-
lowed suit with its own set of guiding principles to assist its exam-
iners in the regulation of derivatives.26  The FRB was particu-
larly concerned that banks were selling complex risky financial
instruments to unsophisticated and unsuited investors.26 9 Like
the OCC guidelines, the FRB guidelines require banks to ensure
that their counterparties, and the banks engaging in the deriva-
tives transaction, understand accompanying risks. 7° The FRB
guidelines do not, however, require documentation of customer
orders made in contravention to bank recommendations. 1
Finally, the FDIC has issued guidance to its bank examiners
for determining whether banks are using derivatives appropri-
ately.27 2 Similar to the OCC and FRB guidelines, the FDIC also
263. CIRCULAR 277, supra note 255, at 11.
264. Id. at 12.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL. RESERVE SYSTEM, EXAMINER GUIDELINES
SR 93-69 (1993) [hereinafter SR 93-69]. The FRB's guidelines are similar to the OCC
guidelines except that the FRB guidelines do not require specific risk management
techniques. Claudia Cummins & Robert M. Garsson, Fed To Give Examiners Guidelines on
Swaps, AM. BANKR., Dec. 8, 1993, at 1.
269. See Garsson, supra note 268, at 1 (noting that Federal Reserve governor Susan
M. Phillips stated that Federal Reserve wanted to make sure that banks were selling
derivatives to sophisticated customers).
270. Patrikis, supra note 242, at 8.
271. See Lynn Stevens Hume, Fed Gives Bank Examiners Risk Management Policies For
Trading Activities, Including Derivative Products, BOND BUYER, Jan. 5, 1994, at 6 (contrast-
ing requirements of OCC guidelines against those of FRB).
272. FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, INTERPRETIVE LETTER No. 34-94,
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requires that banks must understand the risks involved with their
derivative investments. 27 The FDIC guidelines require banks to
develop risk parameters expressed in terms of worst case scena-
rios, in order to aid management in deciding how to best treat
the bank's derivatives holdings.2 74
5. Additional Regulatory Influences
Beyond statutory regulation and supervisory guidelines, sev-
eral other agencies significantly influence the use of deriva-
tives. 2 75 The Financial Accounting Standards Board 276 in coop-
eration with the Federal Financial Institutions Examination
Council2 77 ("FFIEC") has made contributions to disclosure issues
with regard to derivatives. 7 8 Work done by the International
(May 18, 1994) [hereinafter FDIC No. 34-94). The FDIC derivatives guidelines focus
on the examination of financial institutions that are end-users of derivatives. Patrikis,
supra note 242, at 81-82. Under the guidelines, FDIC examiners review the risks associ-
ated with a particular financial institution's derivative activities to determine whether a
full institution examination is necessary. Id. at 82.
273. Jeffrey L. Seltzer, The Role of the Board of Directors and Senior Management in the
Derivatives Business, in MANAGING RISK EXPOSURE IN DERIVATIVEs, at 5 (PLI Corporate
Law and Practice Course Handbook Series No. B4-7089, 1994). The FDIC issued the
examiner guidelines not to discourage prudent risk taking, but rather, to ensure that
acceptable management expertise accompany bank derivatives transactions. FDIC Issues
Examiner Guidance on End-users of Derivatives Products, 62 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 23, at
984 (June 6, 1994).
274. FDIC No. 34-94, supra note 272, at 17. In conducting their preliminary exam-
ination, the FDIC guidelines instruct bank examiners to consider a bank's market risk,
credit risk, liquidity risk, operating risk, legal risk, settlement, and interconnection (sys-
temic) risk before determining the necessity of a full examination. Id. at 18; see FDIC
Issues Examiner Guidance on End-users of Derivatives Products, Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 23,
at 984 (June 6, 1994) (further discussing requirements of FDIC No. 34-94).
275. See Cunningham, supra note 19, at 138-39 (discussing derivatives-related ef-
forts of International Swaps and Derivatives Association and Federal Financial Institu-
tions Counsel).
276. See supra note 189 (discussing role of Financial Accounting Standards Board).
277. 12 U.S.C. § 3301 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) Section 3301 describes the purpose
of this Federal Counsel as:
[to] prescribe uniform principles and standards for the Federal examination
of financial institutions by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the
Federal Deposit Insurance corporation, the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, the Federal Home Loan Bank board, and the National Credit
Union Administration and make recommendations to promote uniformity in
the supervision of these financial institutions. The Council's actions shall be
signed to promote consistency in such examination and to insure progressive
and vigilant supervision.
Id.
278. Cunningham, supra note 19, at 169.
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Swaps and Derivatives Association2 79 ("ISDA") has resulted in
standardized agreements that certain derivative transaction par-
ticipants may use to ensure the legality and efficiency of their
transactions.28 0
In seeking to enhance disclosure in connection with deriva-
tive financial instruments, FASB issued statement number
119.21 The statement, entitled "Disclosure About Derivative Fi-
nancial Instruments and Fair Value of Financial Instruments,"
seeks to accomplish not only better disclosure standards for de-
rivatives 28 2 but also to make general disclosure with regard to fair
value of financial instruments. 283 Issued in early October 1994,
the statement aimed to achieve these two goals in time for year-
end financial reporting.28 4
The FASB Statement prescribes that with respect to certain
derivatives, entities shall disclose certain information that gen-
eral accounting principles did not require.283 Such new infor-
mation includes the amount of capital invested in derivatives
and on what terms.286 The disclosure must include discussion of
credit and market risks pertaining to subject financial instru-
ments, the cash requirements of those instruments, and applica-
ble accounting policies. 2 7 Disclosures should also distinguish
between derivatives held for trading verses other purposes.288
The statement further encourages entities to disclose quantita-
279. See supra note 190 (discussing history and role of International Swaps and
Derivatives Association).
280. See Cunningham, supra note 19, at 138-42 (discussing historical and opera-
tional aspects of ISDA master agreements).
281. FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, STATEMENT No. 119, DISCLOSURE
ABOUT DERIVATIVE FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS AND FAIR VALUE OF FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS
(1994) [hereinafter FASB 119].
282. Id. at summary.
283. Id.
284. FASB Issues Final disclosure Standards For Derivative Instruments, BNA's Banking
Rep. (BNA) at 1 (Oct. 10, 1994), available in Westlaw, BNA-BNK database.
285. Id. The statement applies to derivatives, standards that FASB Statement 105
does not already encompass within its requirements. Id.; see FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING
STANDARDS BOARD, STATEMENT No. 105, DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION ABOUT FINANCIAL
INSTRUMENTS WITH OFF-BALANCE-SHEET RISK AND FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS WITH CONCEN-
TRATIONS OF CREDIT RISK (1990) (setting forth disclosure standards pertaining to finan-
cial instruments containing risk not disclosed on balance sheets).
286. FASB 119, supra note 281, at 4.
287. Id. at 4-5.
288. Id. at 4. The new disclosure standards specifically require reporting of the
average fair value of derivatives held for trading together with losses or gains secured
from those derivatives. Id. With regard to derivatives held for other purposes than
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tive information that would be useful in contrasting stated objec-
tives in holding the instruments against the actual results of
those holdings."8 9
The International Swaps and Derivatives Association has
also made contributions to developing standardized documenta-
tion with regard to derivatives transactions. 9 ' Beginning in
1985, the ISDA issued publications containing standardized
codes and wording to be used by derivative transaction partici-
pants.9 ' The ISDA's standardized wording agreements became
known throughout the industry as master agreements, 2 92 and by
1993, the ISDA had published a set of master agreements and a
user's guide explaining how to use them. 93 Derivative transac-
tion participants now use the agreements more than any other
type of documentation.29 4
The ISDA publications295 aim to facilitate netting across dif-
trading, the entity must disclose the purpose for its holding the instrument and the
expected gains or losses resulting therefrom. Id. at 4-5.
289. Patrikis, supra note 251, at 169-74. The FFIEC is also considering a proposal
to revise reports that commercial banks must file with regard to their income position
and overall financial condition. Id. at 97. The FFIEC has, however, deferred imple-
mentation of its proposal until March 31, 1995 in order to give the FASB time to coordi-
nate its proposals. Id. The FFIEC proposal would require banks to report a single net
credit exposure across all their derivatives contracts, taking into account netting agree-
ments. Id. The proposal would also require further breakdown of monies invested in
derivatives by contract type and gross fair value of derivative instruments. Id.
290. Cunningham, supra note 19, at 132-33.
291. Id. at 13.
292. Cunningham, supra note 19, at 139. Master agreements are standardized de-
rivative contracts that the ISDA has developed over a period of years and published for
industry use. Id. Prior to the development of these standardized contracts, typical OTC
derivative documentation consisted of 15 to 25 page agreements for each individual
transaction. Id. at 138. Because many of the agreements contained standardized words
and phrases, master agreements began to materialize. Id. The formation of master
agreements has been a'transnational effort involving many parties. See Richard Waters,
ISDA Adopts Agreement, FIN. TIMES, June 17, .1992, at 32 (noting ISDA's recognition of
efforts by hundreds of participants from Europe,Japan, and United States in contribut-
ing to development of master agreements).
293. Cunningham, supra note 19, at 139.
294. Christopher L. Culp, A Hidden Threat Lurks In Derivatives Legislation, Am.
BANKER, June 16, 1994, at 26. More than 70% of swaps dealers utilize master agree-
ments in their transactions. Waters, supra note 292, at 32. In total, more than ninety
percent of all OTC derivative transactions use the ISDA master agreements. Id.
295. See Cunningham, supra note 19, at 139 (discussing extensive list of ISDA
master agreement publications and accompanying user's guides). For a detailed discus-
sion of how ISDA master agreements work, seeJoshua D. Cohn, ISDA Master Agreements:
1992 and 1987 Versions Described and Compared, 1993 Pending Issues, in SWAPS AND OTHER
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ferent product types,2 96 and documentation of multiple deriva-
tives transactions under one master agreement.2 97 In doing so,
the agreements reduce derivatives-related risk by promoting
legal certainty2 98 and lower credit risk.2 99 The master agree-
ments, although not eliminating all risk,"°° have become widely
known as risk reducing mechanisms for derivatives transac-
tions. 31
F. Financial Loss Under the Current Regulatory System
Under the current regulatory system, investors have in-
curred a variety of substantial financial losses.30 2 Losses by large
U.S. companies measuring in the hundreds of millions of dollars
have been reported by Merrill Lynch, Salomon Brothers, Bank-
ers Trust, J.P. Morgan, Proctor & Gamble, Gibson Greetings,
George Soros, and Kidder Peabody. 0 3 Even larger losses have
DERIVATIVES IN 1993 (PLI Corporate Law and Practice Course Handbook Series No. B4-
7033, 1993).
296. See supra note 150 (discussing netting).
297. Cunningham, supra note 19, at 139.
298. Robert Rice, Business and the Law: A Question of Standards -Robert Rice on Resist-
ance to Further Regulation of the Derivatives Industry, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1994, at 20.
Master agreements ensure the enforceability of netting arrangements by providing stan-
dard provisions that have already been determined to be legally enforceable. Id.; see
supra notes 158-60 and accompanying text (discussing legal risk).
299. Aaron Pressman, Quick Study: Master Agreement Can Reduce Risk, Save Time with
Multiple Swaps, BOND BUYER, May 25, 1994, at 6. By facilitating netting and its legal
enforceability, master agreements lower credit risk because the parties may take advan-
tage of offsetting transactions in the event of counterparty default. Id. Master agree-
ments also reduce credit risk by, for example, allowing a party to terminate the agree-
ment in the event of counterparty bankruptcy, thus eliminating the possibility that the
party would be liable to the debtor without corresponding responsibilities by the
debtor. Robert M. McLaughlin, Risks in Derivatives Products Are Substantial But Managea-
ble, AM. BANKER, Oct. 17, 1994, at 30; see supra notes 139-49 and accompanying text
(discussing credit risk).
300. Denis M. Forster, Standard Swaps Agreements Don't Insulate Users from Risk, AM.
BAN ER, June 13, 1994, at 20. Even the best documents cannot eliminate all derivatives
risk. Id. Although master agreements have simplified many contractual issues, they still
remain complex and derivatives users should be prepared to resolve many critical issues
through negotiation rather than through standardized agreements. Id.
301. Pressman, supra note 299, at 26.
302. Greenwald, supra note 20, at 54; see Waldman, supra note 2, at 1040 (describ-
ing many derivatives-related losses).
303. Id. at 1040. Merrill Lynch lost US$377 million, Solomon lost US$250 million,
Bankers Trust lost as much as US$339 million,J.P. Morgan lost US$100 million, Proctor
& Gamble Co. lost US$157 million, Gibson Greetings lost US$16.7 million, George
Soros lost $600 million, and Kidder Peabody lost US$25.5 million. Id.
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been reported by Japanese investors.3 °4 Showa Shell Sekiyu K.K.
for example, lost US$1.59 billion, Kashima Oil lost US$1.5 bil-
lion while Toyota lost US$935 million.3 0 5 British multinational
Allied-Lyons and German Klockner & Company KgaA and
Metallgesellschaft AG lost a combined total of almost US$2 bil-
lion investing in oil and currency derivative contracts. 30 6 Most
recently, Britain's oldest investment firm, Barings Bank, suffered
financial collapse after a derivatives trader lost an estimated
US$1 billion in unauthorized trading.30 7
Although corporations have incurred most of the high pro-
file losses, derivatives-related troubles have also struck munici-
palities and mutual funds.308 Orange County California lost over
US$2 billion of a US$7.4 billion investment30 9 and subsequently
filed for bankruptcy protection.1 0 On a smaller scale, Maple
Grove, a Minneapolis suburb lost US$1.4 million on a US$5 mil-
lion investment.31' A small college in Odessa Texas lost half of
its US$22 million investment to derivatives, forcing the college
to raise tuition, and the local community to raise property
taxes.31 2 Mutual funds have also been big derivatives losers, as
PaineWebber, Kidder Peabody, and BankAmerica combined to
lose US$500 million to derivatives in 1994.s' 3
304. Waldman, supra note 2, at 1040.
305. Id. at 1041.
306. See id. at 1041-42 (discussing individual losses and US$1.9 billion bailout by
Metallgesellschaft's creditors to keep it from entering bankruptcy).
307. See Richard W. Stevenson, Markets Shaken As British Bank Takes Big Loss, N.Y.
TIME.S, Feb. 27, 1995, at Al (discussing derivatives trader's huge losses resulting from
unauthorized derivatives transactions).
308. Greenwald, supra note 20, at 54.
309. See supra note 7 (discussing Orange County losses).
310. Id.
311. Greenwald, supra note 20, at 54. Maple Grove is a small community with a
population of approximately 40,000. Id. Other municipalities have also lost large sums
to derivative investments. Little Action Expected on Derivatives, Gannet News Service, Jan.
5, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File. Senator Barbara Boxer [D-
Ca.] noted losses of US$50 million by the Louisiana state pension fund, US$90 million
by the Florida state treasury, and 20% of a Minnesota investment pool that had served
20 cities. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id.
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II. FUTURE OVERSIGHT OF DERIVATIVES MARKETS:
CONGRESSIONAL, REGULATORY, AND
TRANSNATIONAL APPROACHES
The losses related to derivative financial instruments have
attracted the attention of Congress, federal regulators, and pri-
vate industry representatives."' Although all agree that deriva-
tives present new challenges and dangers to world financial mar-
kets,3 1 5 they do not all agree as to the best way to approach deriv-
atives-related problems. 316  Several congressmen have suggested
new legislation while regulators and industry representatives op-
pose the idea. 17 In opposing prospective legislative changes,
governmental agencies and industry representatives have offered
alternative agendas to bring about better regulatory oversight.318
314. Zaitzeff, supra note 8, at B9. A Representative commented on Orange
County's losses, stating, "Washington's failure to provide adequate oversight of the de-
rivatives market was at the heart of this week's (Orange county) bankruptcy filing."
Leach Says House Banking Ready to Take on Derivatives, Powers, and Consolidation, Manage-
ment Briefing (BNA) at 1 (Dec. 12, 1994). Leach also asked, "Where was the Commis-
sion? Where was Treasury? Where was Congress?" Id. In Leach's opinion, unless regu-
lation of the derivatives business occurs soon, "an international trauma could erupt."
John Hanchette, House, Senate Banking Chairmen Go After Exotic 'Derivatives, Gannet News
Service, Jan. 3, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
315. Zaitzeff, supra note 8, at B9.
316. Id.
317. Id. The SEC has stated that it will not seek congressional approval for in-
creased oversight of derivative instruments. Aliza Fan, No New Limits Needed on Deriva-
tives, Administration Officials Tell Senators; Senate Banking Committee Hearing On The Finan-
cial Derivatives Market, OIL DAILY, Jan. 6, 1995, at 3. Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the
Federal Reserve Board, instructed Congress not to use the Orange County bankruptcy
and other recent losses as an excuse to pass unneeded derivatives legislation. Greenspan
Attacks Laws On Derivatives, BUFFALO NEws, Jan. 5, 1995, at 1. As of December 12, 1994,
no federal regulator had stated that its authority was inadequate and that legislation was
necessary. Swaps and Other Derivatives: Regulatory and Legislative Developments, S&P's REv.
OF BNKG. & FIN. SERV., Dec. 12, 1994, at 117.
318. Derivatives Legislation Depends on Regulators, Fed Official Says, Pens. & Ben. Rep.
(BNA) at 1 (Jan. 19, 1995), available in LEXIS, BNA Library, BNAPEN File. Federal
Reserve Board Governor Susan Phillips recently stated that the progress of regulators in
regulating derivatives will be a key factor in determining whether Congress passes new
derivatives legislation. Id. For examples of current regulatory efforts, seeJoanne Morri-
son, Levitt Says That Delayed Derivatives Guidelines Will be Ready by Dec. 12, BOND BUYER,
Nov. 15, 1994, at 5 (noting that SEC, in cooperation with securities industry representa-
tives, is drafting voluntary derivatives standards in an effort to stave off congressional
action that could require SEC to step up its regulation of derivatives affiliates of securi-
ties firms and investment companies). The Federal Reserve Bank of New York, has
nearly completed a first draft of a voluntary code of conduct for participants in deriva-
tives markets. William Acworth, Derivatives SRO Urged By Fed Counsel, INSURANCE Ac-
couNTANT, Jan. 30, 1995, at 3. The International Swaps and Derivatives Association,
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Derivatives guidelines and regulatory principles are also develop-
ing on a global level, as transnational agencies and national reg-
ulators strive for cooperation in approaching derivatives-related
risks.3 19
A. U.S. Congress Contemplates Legislative Action to Combat
Derivatives Related-Risks
Congress has not ignored3 21 mounting derivatives losses.3 2 1
In addition to holding hearings to determine whether deriva-
tives could pose a threat to investors, several congressmen have
proposed derivatives-governing legislation. 22 New legislation to
restrict derivatives use, promises to be a popular topic for debate
in the 1995 Congress. 3
Public Securities Association, Securities Industry Association, New York Clearing House,
Foreign Exchange Committee and Emerging Markets Traders Association are also
working with the New York Federal Reserve bank to establish the code. Id. The Na-
tional Association of Securities Dealers also plans to issue sales practice rules for govern-
ment securities dealers, including those engaged in selling derivatives. NASD Delays Fi-
nal Sales Practice Rules Until March, Reuters Newswire, Jan. 11, 1995, available in Westlaw,
INT-NEWS Database.
319. See, e.g., Statement of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Com-
modity Futures Trading Commission and the Securities and Investments Board, Release
No. IS-642, 56 S.E.C. Docket 759 (Mar. 15, 1994) [hereinafter Joint Statement] (estab-
lishing cooperation between the SEC, CFTC, and SIB in developing regulatory frame-
work to oversee derivatives activities).
320. Peter C. Newman, The Real Story Of An Insurance Giant's Fall, MACLEAN'S, Oct.
24, 1994, at 40. After a leading American mutual fund announced that it had lost
US$950 million on derivatives, Dorgan compared using derivatives to handling nitro-
glycerine. Id. Dorgan noted that "putting your faith in derivatives, the most hyped-up
and uncontrollable way to invest, is like hiring Daffy Duck to be your mutual fund
manager." Id. Dorgan also stated that his bill would prevent "banks and other institu-
tions with federal insurance from playing roulette in the derivatives market .... If an
institution has deposits insured by the federal government, it should not be involved in
trading risky derivatives for its own account." Dean Tomasula, Bills on Swaps Oversight
Making Investors Nervous, Am. BANKER, June 24, 1994, at 24.
321. See supra notes 302-13 and accompanying text (discussing derivatives losses).
322. See, e.g., H.R. 31, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (Derivatives Safety and Sound-
ness Supervision Act of 1995); H.R. 20, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (Risk Management
Improvement and Derivatives Oversight Act of 1995).
323. Joanne Morrison, National, BOND BUYER, Dec. 20, 1994, at 24. Outgoing
House Banking Committee Chairman Henry B. Gonzalez [D-Texas] urged the new
chairman to immediately hold Congressional hearings to discuss recent derivatives-re-
lated losses. Id. Gonzalez also sent a letter to Leach stating "you and I have worked
together introducing legislation, 'the derivatives safety and soundness supervision act of
1994', and I hope we can continue in this effort to ensure that derivatives use does not
threaten the viability of our financial system and the deposit insurance funds." Id. Rep-
resentative EdwardJ Markey [D-Mass.] recently vowed to reintroduce legislation, to reg-
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1. Congressional Motivation for Change:
Responding to the Losses
Congress has responded to derivatives losses to determine
whether to take derivatives-governing legislative action.3 24 Com-
ments made by congressmen from both congressional houses in-
dicate congressional concern that derivatives could cause finan-
cial problems similar to the Savings and Loan crisis. 3 2 5 Congress-
men who aggressively favor derivatives governing legislation
argue that the current regulatory framework and market forces
are not sufficient to avoid impending financial disaster.3 26 They
also contend that properly drafted legislation would not cause a
shift of derivatives business to other markets.327
2. Bills in the House of Representatives
Derivatives legislation has been a popular topic for debate
ulate derivatives dealers, similar to proposals he made previously. Congressional Agenda;
Litigation Reform, Derivatives Regulation on Tap, N.Y. L.J., Jan 19, 1995, at 5.
324. Michael Peltz, Congress's Lame Assault On Derivatives, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR,
Dec. 1994, at 65.
325. Derivatives Update-Further Losses Will Make Legislation More Likely, INT'L BANK-
INC REG., Oct 10, 1994, at 1; see supra note 12 (discussing congressional reactions to
derivatives market risks).
326. Markey Says Kidder Events Show Derivatives Oversight Needed, 26 Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep. (BNA) No. 32, at 1112 (Aug. 12, 1994). Representative Markey cited a rogue
dealer's fraudulent trading in derivatives as evidence that increased derivatives regula-
tion is necessary, in contradiction to regulators' and industry representatives' argu-
ments for congressional restraint. Id. Markey also strongly objected to proposed rules
by the National Association of Securities Dealers that would have provided sales prac-
tice guidance for derivatives dealers. Derivatives: Tougher Rules Urged for Securities Dealers,
AM. BANKER, Oct. 25, 1994, at 18. He stated that the proposed rules have "serious defi-
ciencies" and that they must be more stringent. Id. Representative Leach has stated,
"[a]s helpful as derivatives are, they are a wild card in international finance" and
"[t] here is no way to get a level playing field unless there is legislation. The Regulators
have no power to achieve this without legislation." Rep. Leach Pushes Derivatives Legisla-
tion; May Hold Glass-Steagall Hearings By Spring, Pens. & Ben. Rep. (BNA) (Feb. 9, 1995),
available in LEXIS, BNA Database, BNAPEN File.
327. Joanne Morrison, Congress Expected to Take Gingerly Approach Toward Derivatives,
Aides Say, BOND BUYER, Nov. 30, 1994. House Banking Committee aide Terri Miller
stated, "We don't want to drive the business overseas. We're not prohibitors, we're not
banners, we just want to make sure they're being used properly." Id. Markey com-
mented on his proposed bill, H.R. 4745, by stating, "[t]his bill is not a radical restructur-
ing of the derivatives market. It is focused laser-like on closing the real gaps that exist
in the current regulatory framework." Steven Brostoff, Markey Bill Would Regulate Deriva-
tives Dealers, NAT'L UNDERWRITER, July 25, 1994, at 5. Jerry Schober, a senior evaluator
speaking for Congress' investigatory arm, the General Accounting Office, stated "[i]f
regulation were to drive the business offshore, it would have been long gone by now."
Ronald Fink, Shadow Boxing, FIN'L WORLD, Oct. 25, 1994, at 92.
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in the House of Representatives where Representatives Henry B.
Gonzalez [D-Texas] andJim Leach [R-Iowa], have jointly328 and
independently 29 proposed legislation to overhaul the regulatory
system governing derivatives. 330 The latest versions of their bills,
the Risk Management Improvement and Derivatives Oversight
Act of 1995,31 and the Derivatives Safety and Soundness Act of
1995,332 are refined and expanded versions of bills submitted in
previous terms.333 Representative Edward Markey [D-Mass.] has
also proposed legislation to increase regulation of derivatives
dealers.334
a. The Risk Management Improvement and Derivatives
Oversight Act of 1995
The Risk Management Improvement and Derivatives Over-
sight Act of 1995331 ("House Bill 20") represents the latest at-
tempt by Congress to pass derivatives governing legislation. 336
House Bill 20 has gained substantially more support than previ-
328. H.R. 4503. 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994); see Zaitzeff, supra note 8, at B9 (not-
ing that in 1994, Representatives Gonzalez and Leach jointly proposed Derivatives
Safety and Soundness Supervision Act of 1994).
329. Litigation, Glass-Steagall Reform are Topics on Congressional Agenda' 1995 Daily
Report for Executives (BNA) at 10 (Jan. 17, 1995). Before submitting a joint bill in
1994, Leach and Gonzalez had each submitted similar bills in the previous year. Id.
For previous versions of the derivatives bills, see H.R. 3748, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994),
H.R. 4170, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994), H.R. 4503., 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994). The
unity of purpose shared by the two may be dissolving. See Republican Victory Will Squash
Threat of Legislation, Say Some, INsrITUTIoNAL INVESTOR, Nov. 14, 1994, at 1 (noting that
both favor refined regulation of derivatives but, unlike Gonzalez, Leach does not view
derivatives as a ponzi scheme). But see Hill Hearings Loom?; Industry Braces for Fallout From
Cap Corp Crisis, NCUA WATCH, Feb. 6, 1995, at 1 (describing Leach and Gonzalez as
being on same wavelength in regards to seeking specific derivatives regulation).
330. Tighter Derivatives Regs Expected, Experts Say, CFO ALERT, Feb. 13, 1995, at 8.
331. H.R. 31, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
332. H.R. 20, 104th Cong., 1st Ses. (1995).
333. See supra note 329 (discussing previous Leach and Gonzalez bills).
334. See, e.g., Derivatives Dealers Act of 1994, H.R. 4745, 103d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1994). Representative Markey expects to reintroduce similar legislation in 1995. Do-
minic Bencivenga, Congressional Agenda; Litigation Reform, Derivative Regulation on Tap,
N.Y. L.J. Jan. 19, 1995, at 5; BT Securities to Pay $10 Million To Settle SEC, CFTC Fraud
Charges, 27 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) at 10 (Jan. 6, 1995) (discussing Markey's plans to
reintroduce legislation based on Derivatives Dealers Act of 1994).
335. H.R. 20, 104th Cong., 1st Ses. (1995).
336. 141 Cong. Rec. H 163 (Jan. 11, 1995). On January 1, 1995, the Act was re-
ferred to the House Banking and Financial Services Committee, the House Commerce
Committee and the House Agriculture Committee, where it is currently under consid-
eration. Id.
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ous derivatives bills.337 If successful, House Bill 20 would signifi-
candy affect derivatives markets.338
House Bill 20 sets forth several major objectives.33 9 First,
the bill Would establish a Federal Derivative Commission
("FDC") for the purpose of setting oversight standards federal
regulators would apply in supervising financial institutions that
engage in derivatives transactions.34 ° The FDC would also make
recommendations for the purpose of promoting better risk man-
agement processes. 34' The bill specifically seeks to address
problems related to counterparty, market, operational, legal,
and systemic risks. 34 2  The Federal Derivatives Commission
would also seek to enforce uniformity in the supervision of the
subject financial institutions.3 43
Second, the bill would require stricter internal controls for
banks involved in derivatives transactions. 344 The FDC would set
guidelines for effective senior management and oversight by
337. H.R. 20. The Act gained 140 co-sponsors, which far surpassed the levels of co-
sponsorship of previous bills. See, e.g., H.R. 4170, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (no co-
sponsors); H.R. 4503, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 1994 (six co-sponsors). The Derivatives
Dealers Act of 1994 also lacked support when only one congressman co-sponsored the
bill. H.R. 4745, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
338. Tighter Derivatives Begs Expected, Experts Say, CFO ALERT, Feb. 13, 1995, at 8
(noting that Leach's bill would create change in derivatives accounting, bankruptcy
treatment and supervisory roles).
339. See generally H.R. 20 § 101 (discussing objective of bill to promote consistency
in regulatory practices and to ensure progressive and vigilant supervision).
340. See id. (setting forth purposes of Act); see also id § 103 (establishing Federal
Derivatives Commission). The Federal Derivatives Commission would be composed of
the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Comptrol-
ler of the Currency, the Chairperson of the Board of Directors of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, the Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision, the Chairman
of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Chairman of the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission, and the Secretary of the Treasury. Id. The Commission is to be
chaired by the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Id.;
see id. § 104 (establishing principles and standards of Commission and guidance in
making recommendations for regulatory action).
341. H.R. 20 § 104(b)(1)(B).
342. H.R. 20 §§ 104(b) (1) (B),(G)-(H),(L); see supra notes 129-84 and accompany-
ing text (discussing counterparty, market operational, legal, and systemic risks).
343. H.R. 20. Section 101 of House Bill 20 specifically states that the commission
shall be designed to promote consistency in regulatory practices and to ensure progres-
sive and vigilant supervision. Id. § 101. Section 108 creates a state liaison to encourage
the application of uniform examination principles and standards by State and Federal
supervisory agencies. Id. § 108.
344. See H.R. 20 §§ 201-03 (imposing new regulatory standards upon banks engag-
ing in derivatives activities).
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boards of directors to ensure that derivatives activities are being
conducted in a safe and sound manner.s The new standards
would deem a bank to have engaged in unsafe or unsound bank-
ing practice thereby entitling the FDIC to revoke federal insur-
ance of the bank 4 1 if the bank is found to have had inadequate
technical expertise with regard to the derivatives activities in
which it has engaged .1 7 Non-U.S. banks engaging in derivatives
activities would also be subject to increased scrutiny when seek-
ing Federal Reserve Board approval for participation in U.S.
marketsA48
Title IV of House Bill 20, entitled the Derivatives Dealer
Self-Regulation Act of 1995, would grant the Federal Reserve
Board authority to decide whether or not to create a self-regula-
tory agency for the purpose of supervising derivatives dealers.3 49
In making that decision, the Board is to consider, amongst other
factors, the effect such an agency would have on controlling de-
rivatives-related risks,35 ° uniformity in regulation, 51 prevention
of fraud and manipulation in derivatives markets, 5 2 and a gen-
eral improvement in the supervision and functioning of deriva-
345. Id. § 104(b)(1)(D).
346. 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
347. H.R. 20 § 301. Section 1818 of 12 U.S.C. sets forth grounds upon which the
Board of Directors of the FDIC may terminate federal insurance of a depository institu-
tion. 12 U.S.C. 1818. One such ground is if the institution is engaging in- an unsafe or
unsound practice. Id. § (2) (A) (i). Under Subsection 8, the depository institution is
deemed to have engaged in an unsafe or unsound practice if it has "unsatisfactory asset
quality, management, earnings, or liquidity." Id. § (8). House Bill 20 states that
"[f]ailiare of an institution-affiliated party engaged in derivatives activities to have ade-
quate technical expertise may be deemed by the appropriate federal banking agency to
constitute an unsafe or unsound banking practice within the meaning of section 8 of
the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. § 1818)." H.R. 20 § 201(a).
348. 12 U.S.C. § 3105(d)(2)(A) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Under Section 3105, the
Federal Reserve Board may not approve an application of a non-U.S. bank for participa-
tion in U.S. markets unless the non-U.S. bank is subject to comprehensive supervision
or regulation on a consolidated basis by the appropriate'authorities in its home coun-
try. Id. House Bill 20 would add a qualification that if the non-U.S. bank is engaged in
derivatives activities, the bank must also be subject in its home country to "comprehen-
sive supervision and regulation for derivatives activities." H.R. 20 § 203.
349. H.R. 20 §§ 401-408; see Derivatives Bill Called Good Start In Setting Regulatory Ju-
risdiction, Pens. & Ben. Rep. (BNA) at 1 (Jan. 30, 1995) available in LEXIS, BNA Library,
BNAPEN File (discussing New York Federal Reserve's proposed authority to establish
self-regulatory association to supervise derivatives dealers).
350. H.R. 20 § 404(B) (2).
351. Id. § 404(B) (3).
352. Id. § 404(B)(8).
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tives markets.353 House Bill 20 would not, however, require bro-
kers and dealers that are already registered as securities or fu-
tures commission merchants, to join the self-regulating
association.3
54
b. The Derivatives Safety and Soundness Act of 1995
The Derivatives Safety and Soundness Act of 19953
55
("House Bill 31") represents the culmination of efforts to bring
about derivatives legislation by Representative Gonzalez [D-
Texas] .3 6 The act sets forth many of the same ideas as Leach's
House Bill 20.311 Similar to House Bill 20, for example, House
Bill 31 would seek to establish uniformity in standards of capital,
accounting, disclosure, risk management, and suitability in the
supervision of derivatives activities .35  House Bill 31, also like
353. Id. § 404(B) (9). The Board must also take into account the following factors:
promotion of fair and orderly markets for derivative financial instruments; improve-
ment in regulatory coordination among those responsible for supervision of derivatives
dealers; closure of gaps and loopholes in the supervision of derivatives dealers;
strengthened enforcement of rules and regulations applicable to derivatives dealers;
and maintenance of high standards and qualifications for derivatives dealers. Id.354. See H.R. 20 § 403(2) (defining derivatives dealer as not including any person
that is registered as broker or dealer of securities or as futures commission merchant).
355. H.R. 20, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
356. H.R. 20. House Bill 20 is the updated version of the Derivatives Safety and
Soundness Supervision Act of 1994. H.R. 4503, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994). The new
bill encourages more disclosure and calls for international cooperation in regulating
derivatives. Digest, WASH. PosT, Jan. 5, 1995, at D9. The 1995 version of Gonzalez's
derivatives legislation now adds insurance firms and securities companies to its subject
matter in addition to the prior covered depository institutions. Compare H.R. 31 § 2(7)
with H.R. 4503, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(7) (1994) (H.R. 31 adds insurance firms and
securities firms to previous definition of financial institution found in the 1994 version
of the Act). See Gonzalez Offers Bill On Derivatives Oversight, 22 Pens. & Ben. Rep (BNA)
No. 5, at 340 (Jan. 30, 1995) (noting H.R. 31 addition). The 1995 version of the Deriva-
tives Safety and Soundness Supervision Act includes, in part, the following in its defini-
tion of financial institution: any depository institution; any institution that is subject to
the oversight of the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise or oversight of the Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development; any federal home loan bank and the office
of finance of the federal home loan bank; any broker, dealer, government securities
broker, government securities dealer, municipal securities broker, or municipal securi-
ties dealer; any investment company; any investment adviser; any futures commission
merchant, floor broker, commodity trading advisor, or commodity pool operator; any
insurance company; and any affiliate of a depository institution. H.R. 20 § 2.
357. Zaitzeff, supra note 8, at B9. The similarity between the H.R. 20 and H.R. 31
could be due to previous cooperation between the two proposing Representatives. Id.
The 1994 Derivatives Safety and Soundness Supervision Act of 1994 combines the in-
dependent approaches of Gonzalez and Leach. Id.
358. H.R. 31 § 101 (a). The uniformity objectives set forth in Section 101 of House
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House Bill 20, would specifically make legal, credit, market, and
operational risks factors in determining whether regulated insti-
tutions are operating in compliance with regulatory require-
ments. 359 Both bills also seek to tighten internal controls of fi-
nancial institutions. 6 ° Whereas House Bill 20 requires the FDC
to establish guidelines regarding effective management oversight
of derivatives activities,361 House Bill 31 expressly sets forth man-
agement guidelines.3 62 Finally, both bills state the same require-
ment that in order for the Federal Reserve Board to approve a
non-U.S bank's operation in the United States, it must consider
whether the derivatives activities of that bank are adequately su-
pervised and subject to regulation in the bank's home coun-
try.
363
House Bill 31 differs from House Bill 20 in several as-
pects. 314 House Bill 31 seeks to enforce its objectives in an en-
tirely different manner than the Leach bill.365 Whereas House
Bill 20 would create a Federal Derivatives Commission composed
Bill 31 are similar to those set forth by Section 101 of H.R. 20. See supra note 343 and
accompanying text (describing House Bill 20's objectives). The Gonzalez bill specifi-
cally seeks improvements in capital requirements, risk management, disclosure, and
accounting standards in Sections 101 (b) (A)-(B), (H), 102(a), and 102(c)(2). H.R. 20.
359. H.R. 31 § 101 (b) (1) (A); see H.R. 20 § 104 (setting forth market, operational,
credit, legal, and systemic risks as factors to be considered when deciding whether an
institution using derivatives is in compliance with regulatory requirements).
360. See H.R. 20 § 104 (requiring Federal Derivatives Commission to establish
management guidelines to be applied by financial institutions); H.R. 31 § 201 (ex-
pressly setting forth management guidelines financial institutions are to follow).
361. H.R. 20 § 104.
362. H.R. 31 § 201. An acceptable management plan must be approved by the
board of directors and:
(1) ENSURE THAT SUCH ACTIVITIES ARE-
(A) conducted with appropriate oversight of the directors and the senior ex-
ecutive officers;
(B) conducted in a safe and sound manner; and
(C) consistent with the overall risk management philosophy and business
strategy of the management of the institution; and
(2) establishes prudential standard for the management of the risks involved
in such activities and a framework for internal controls with respect to such
activities.
Id.
363. H.R. 20 § 203; see H.R. 31 § 204 (also requiring derivatives supervision in
bank's home country).
364. Zaitzeff, supra note 8, at B9.
365. See, e.g., H.R. 20 § 103 (establishing Federal Derivatives Commission to over-
see derivatives in contrast to H.R. 31's delegation of oversight authority to existing regu-
latory bodies).
1444 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 18:1397
of leaders of major financial regulators, 66 House Bill 31 would
require regulatory bodies to work together to regulate deriva-
tives.36' House Bill 31 would also place a premium on requiring
the United States to take substantial steps towards derivatives
regulation in the global context.368 The bill would specifically
require the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board and the
Comptroller of the Currency to encourage transnational cooper-
ation in adopting regulatory standards. 369 House Bill 31 also dif-
fers from House Bill 20 in that it would order a study by the
Comptroller General of the United States to inquire into specu-
lative uses of derivatives.37 °
c. The Derivatives Dealers Act of 1994
The most recently proposed derivatives legislation by Repre-
sentative Markey is the Derivatives Dealers Act of 1994371
("House Bill 4745"). House Bill 4745 narrowly focused on regu-
lation of derivatives dealers.372 Markey's proposed bill reflected
his opinion that standards governing sales practices for deriva-
tives are deficient.3 73
366. See supra note 340 and accompanying text (discussing formation of Federal
Derivatives Commission proposed by H.R. 31).
367. H.R. 20 § 101; See Gonzalez Offers Bill On Derivatives Oversight, 22 Pens. & Ben.
Rep. (BNA) No. 5, at 340 (Jan. 30, 1995) (noting that Gonzalez bill would require
regulators to coordinate their efforts in regulating derivatives).
368. See id. (noting that Gonzalez bill would require United States to assume lead-
ership position in promoting transnational coordination in supervision and regulation
of transnational derivatives industry).
369. H.R. 20 § 402. Section 402 specifically states:
The Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and
the Comptroller of the Currency shall encourage central banks, and regula-
tory authorities of the other industrialized countries to work toward maintain-
ing and, where appropriate, adopting comparable supervisory standards and
regulations, particularly capital standards for financial institutions engaged in
derivatives activities.
Id.
370. H.R. 20 § 501.
371. H.R. 4745, 103 Cong., 2d Sess. 1994.
372. Steven Brostoff, Markey Bill Would Regulate Derivatives Dealers, NAT'L UNDER-
WRITER, July 25, 1994, at 5. Describing his bill, Markey stated "[t]his bill is not a radical
restructuring of the derivatives market .... It is focused laser-like on closing the real
gaps that exist in the current regulatory framework." Id.
373. SeeJoanne Morrison, Suitability Rules Near for Bank Sales of Government Securities,
Some Derivatives, BOND BUYER, Nov. 23, 1994, at 3. A Markey aide stated "I think that the
increased complexity of the product and the relationship of trust and confidence that
develops between the customers and the dealers, makes derivatives a rather different
product .... " Id. Markey has stated that rules for derivatives have "serious deficien-
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House Bill 4745 would have addressed Markey's concerns by
regulating derivatives dealers in a three-step approach. 74 The
bill first proposed to amend Section 3(a) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 by adding a paragraph to define "derivative"
and "derivatives dealers."375 House Bill 4745 would then have
required the registration of all derivatives dealers that had not
already registered for other reasons.3 76 Once having registered,
the dealers would have been subject to the SEC's authority to
promulgate rules and regulations addressing the dealers's activi-
ties. 77 The bill would have further required registered deriva-
tives dealers to become members of a registered securities associ-
ation, thus, submitting themselves to additional regulation.378
Association rules might, for example, focus on accurate record-
cies" and that therefore, the rules governing derivatives dealers ought to be tightened.
Derivatives: Tougher Rules Urged for Securities Dealers, Am. BANKER, Oct. 23, 1994, at 18.
374. US Legislative and Regulatory Activity Affecting Derivatives Markets, FIN. REG. RE'.,
July 1994, at 1 [hereinafter Legislative Activity]; see Peltz, supra note 12, at 65 (describing
Markey's main focus as "plugging the regulatory gap that exists for derivatives affiliates
of securities firms and insurance companies"). Markey has described his effort to ex-
tend SEC's regulatory jurisdiction as an effort to extend jurisdiction to "the regulatory
black hole." Id. In contrast to the Gonzalez and Leach approaches, Markey believes
that bank regulators already have sufficient power to regulate. Id. It is the regulation
of dealers that presents a more urgent problem to Markey. Id. One writer quoted
Markey as stating that "[w] e must ask senior management of the dealers in derivatives if
it really understands what the 26-year-old-rocket scientists are doing with the firm's
money." James Bethell, Egg-heads With Attitude Drive Financial Wizardry, SUNDAY TIMES,
Oct. 2, 1994, at 1.
375. H.R. 4745 § 2. The Act defined derivative as any financial contract, or the
instrument that derives its value from the value or performance of any security, cur-
rency exchange rate, or interest rate (or group of index thereof). Id. The Bill did not
include exchange or NASDAQ-traded securities, futures, options on futures, or savings
institution deposits. Legislative Activity, supra note 374, at 1. The Bill defined derivatives
dealer as any person engaged in the business of buying, selling, or entering into deriva-
tives for his own account. H.R, 4745 § 2. The definition did not include persons who
trade for their own account, but not within their regular business. Id.
376. H.R. 4745 § 101.
377. Peltz, supra note 12, at 65.
378. 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Section 15A of the Exchange Act, sets
forth substantial requirements that a securities association must satisfy in order to qual-
ify for registration under the 34 Act. Id. § 78(o). For example, the association must
impose rules on its members that are:
designed to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practice, to foster
cooperation and coordination with persons engaged in regulating, clearing,
settling, processing information with respect to, and facilitating transaction in
securities, to remove impediments to and perfect the mechanism of a free and
open market and a national market system, and, in general to protect inves-
tors and the public interest.
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keeping, sales practices, and internal risk management con-
trols . 79
Derivatives dealers affiliated with already registered dealers
would also have been subject to the Markey bill's provisions. 380
Section 101 of the bill required materially associated persons of
brokers and dealers to file notice with the SEC of their status as
such.38' As an associated person the dealer would be indirectly
regulated by its registered broker-dealer affiliate. 2
The second step of House Bill 4745's approach would have
been to aid the SEC in developing mechanisms by which to regu-
late derivatives dealers. 383 The bill would have amended the Ex-
change Act 384 to allow the SEC to require derivatives dealers to
maintain detailed records of their activities and to submit those
records to the SEC.3 85 Such reports would have enabled the SEC
to evaluate the effects of the various dealers and associated per-
sons on derivatives financial markets. 3 86 The reports would also
have given the SEC a first-hand look at the operational healths
of the respective reporting dealers.387
Finally, House Bill 4745 would have imposed standards of
financial responsibility upon derivatives dealers.388 Specifically,
the bill would have amended the Exchange Act3 89 such that the
SEC would have been required to monitor the total financial
379. Legislative Activity, supra note 374, at 1.
380. See H.R. 4745 § 101 (requiring associated persons of brokers and dealers to
file notice with the SEC).
381. H.R. 4745 § 101 (B). The Markey bill defines materially associated person as:
any associated person of a broker, dealer, government securities broker, gov-
ernment securities dealer, municipal securities dealer, or derivatives dealer
(other than a natural person) whose business activities are reasonably likely to
have a material impact on the financial or operational condition of any such
broker, dealer, government securities broker, government securities dealer,
municipal securities dealer, or derivatives dealer, including on its net capital,
its liquidity, or its ability to conduct or finance its operations.
Id. § 2; see supra note 376 and accompanying text (noting that SEC would have rule-
making and enforcement authority over both affiliate and dealer).
382. Legislative Activity, supra note 374, at 1.
383. Id.
384. 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
385. H.R. 4745 §§ 205-206. The records would contain, for example, the regis-
tered person's policies and procedures for controlling derivatives-related risks, records
of derivatives trading activity, and any other information the SEC should require. Id.
386. Legislative Activity supra note 374, at 1.
387. Id.
388. H.R. 4745 § 203.
389. 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1934).
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condition of a registered broker-dealer, including the condition
of the broker-dealer's materially associated persons.390  Markey
incorporated this proposal into House Bill 4745 in order to
toughen regulations governing certain securities and insurance
firms that have developed derivative-dealing affiliates that cur-
rently escape the jurisdiction of financial regulators.39 a
3. The Senate Considers Derivatives Legislation
The Senate, although less active3 92 in proposing derivatives
legislation, did consider two substantial derivatives bills during
the 1994 term.393 The Derivatives Supervision Act of 1994394
proposed by Senator Donald W. Riegle Jr. [D-Mich.], and the
Derivatives Limitation Act of 1994395 proposed by Senator Byron
L. Dorgan [D-N.D.], both attracted the attention of fellow con-
gressmen, regulators, and the press.3 96 Neither of the Senate
bills are before the current Congress, but future derivatives legis-
lation may emulate their proposals.3 97
390. H.R. 4745 § 101.
391. Legislative Activity, supra note 374, at 1.
392. Zaitzeff, supra note 8, at B9.
393. See Olaf de Senerpont Domis, Bankers Lobby Hard Against Bills to Curb Deriva-
tives Activity, AM. BANKER, Sept. 13, 1994, at 3 (discussing bills proposed by Senators
Riegle and Dorgan).
394. S. 2291, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
395. S. 2123, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
396. See Lynn Stevens Hume, Riegie's Derivatives Bill Is Far-Reaching, But May Not Go
Anywhere In Congress, BOND BUYER, July 20, 1994, at 32 (noting industry official's com-
ment that Riegle's bill will provide guidance in drafting future legislation); see Stephen
A. Davies, Senate Derivatives Bil Building on House Plans, Would Stiffen Regulation, BOND
BUYER, July 19, 1994, at 1 (noting Riegle's influential voice in drive to advance deriva-
tives related legislation).
397. Olaf de Senerpont Domis, Bankers Lobby Hard Against Bills to Curb Derivatives
Activity, AM. BANKER, Sept. 13, 1994, at 3. No further action is currently on Congress'
schedule for the Riegle and Dorgan bills. Id. Senator Riegle, since introducing his bill
has retired, but, industry officials have commented that his bill may guide Congress in
the future. Lynn Stevens Hume, Riegles Derivatives Bill Is Far-Reaching, But May Not Go
Anywhere in Congress, BOND BUYER, July 20, 1994, at 32. Commentators noted, however,
that substantial congressional action affecting derivatives is not unlikely in coming
terms. Id.; see Derivatives Disclosure Legislation Dead For This Congressional Session, 63 Bank-
ing Rep. (BNA) No. 11, at 406 (Sept. 26, 1994) (correctly predicting that Congress
would not pass derivative legislation in 1994 term, but noting that regulators have been
alerted to Congress's resolve).
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a. The Derivatives Supervision Act of 1994
The Derivatives Supervision Act of 1994398 ("Senate Bill
2291") compiled many ideas from the House bills while adding
several new proposals.3 99 Similarly to the House bills, Senate Bill
2291 would have granted the SEC authority to oversee and regu-
late affiliates of derivatives dealers and insurance companies.4"'
Also similarly to other bills, Senate Bill 2291 would have re-
quired federal regulators to develop standards for capital ade-
quacy, disclosure, and sales practices."° In the same spirit as
House Bill 31, Senate Bill 2291 called for regulators to help de-
velop transnational coordination of derivatives regulations.4 °2
Senate Bill 2291, unlike previous proposals, took specific
aim at eliminating speculative use 40 3 of derivatives by certain reg-
ulated entities such as federally insured banks, credit unions,
and government-sponsored agencies.40 4 The bill directly prohib-
398. S. 2291, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
399. Zaitzeff, supra note 8, at B9; see supra notes 328-97 and accompanying text
(discussing House bills).
400. S. 2291 § 7; see Hume, supra note 396, at 32 (discussing Senate Bill 2291's
effects on derivatives dealers).
401. S. 2291 § 4. Senate Bill 2291 specifically required regulatory cooperation in
addressing credit, market, operational, and legal risks associated with derivatives. Id.
Section 10 of the Riegle bill also specifically addresses systemic risk by requiring federal
regulatory agencies to promulgate, within 18 months of the bill's passage, regulations
addressing a list of systemic risk-reducing items. Id. § 10; see Hume, supra note 396, at
32 (discussing similarity between Riegle bill and other derivatives legislation with regard
to establishing derivatives standards).
402. S. 2291 § 8. Section 8 provides:
The Secretary of the Treasury and the Chairman of the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System, in consultation with the Federal financial institu-
tions regulatory agencies, shall encourage governments, central banks, and
regulatory authorities of other industrialized countries to work toward main-
taining and, where appropriate, adopting comparable supervisory standards,
regulations, and capital standards in particular, for regulated entities and ma-
jor dealers engaged in activities involving derivative financial instruments.
Id.; see Hume, supra note 396, at 32 (discussing transnational cooperation requirement
of Riegle bill).
403. See supra notes 109-18 and accompanying text (discussing speculative uses for
derivatives).
404. S. 2291 § 2. Under the bill, regulated entities are insured depository institu-
tions; federal home loan banks; the Federal National Mortgage Association and any
affiliate thereof; and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation and any affiliate
thereof. Id. § 2(9). The involvement of banks in speculative derivatives trading is
heavy. Anne Schwimmer, Dorgan Bill Seen as Threat to Banks' Derivatives Use; Senator
Would Ban Derivatives In Proprietary Trading, INVESTMENT DEALERS' DIG.,June 20, 1994, at
6. Three federally insured New York banks hold derivatives worth over US$6 trillion.
Id.
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ited these types of institutions from using derivatives for specula-
tive purposes. 40 5 They would, however, have been able to use de-
rivatives, upon federal regulatory approval, for hedging40 6 pur-
poses only.4"7 Additionally, upon approval from the Federal
Reserve Board, the institutions that the bill banned from using
derivatives for speculative purposes, would have been able to es-
tablish subsidiaries to speculatively trade derivatives. 40 8 As condi-
tions for establishing such a subsidiary, the prospective subsidi-
ary would no longer have been able to receive federal insur-
ance,40 9 and would also have been subject to SEC jurisdiction.41 0
Senate Bill 2291 would also have required banks and federally
insured institutions to develop and maintain clear management
policies. 411 These policies would have been required to state in-
stitutional objectives in using derivatives, and the procedures
each institution would employ to ensure that its use of deriva-
tives is consistent with its stated objectives.412
405. S. 2291 § 3(a). Section 3 prohibits regulated entities from purchasing, selling
or engaging in any transaction involving a derivative financial instrument for the ac-
count of that entity. Id.
406. See supra note 61 (discussing hedging uses for derivatives).
407. S. 2291 § 3(c). Subsection 3(c) reiterates the prohibition in subsection (a) by
stating: "Nothing in this section shall be construed to authorize a regulated entity, or
any subsidiary of such entity, to purchase, sell, or engage in a transaction involving a
derivative financial instrument for its own account for any speculative purpose." Id.
§ 3(c). Subsection 3(b) delineates the hedging use exception. Id. § 3(b). The section
states in pertinent part:
A regulated entity may purchase, sell, or engage in any transaction involving a
derivative financial instrument for the account of that entity for the purpose
of engaging in a hedging transaction if such activity involves a category of
derivative financial instruments approved by rule, regulation, or order of the
appropriate federal financial regulatory agency for such purpose.
Id.
408. S. 2291 § 9.
409. Id. Section 9 specifically provides that a bank subsidiary may only engage in
derivatives transactions if is not federally insured. Id. This provision is consistent with
Riegle's concern that taxpayer money may have to fund derivatives losses. U.S. Bank Bill
Would Protect From Derivatives Risk, Reuters Newswire, July 18, 1994, at 1, available in
Westlaw, INT-NEWS Database (quoting Riegle as stating, "derivative transactions are
highly speculative and major losses put deposit insurance funds at great risk").
410. Hume, supra note 396, at 32; see Riegle Introduces Derivatives Bill RequiringAffili-
ates, Greater SEC Role, Sec. Reg & L. Rep.,July 22, 1994, at 1027 (noting proposed legisla-
tion would require Federal Reserve Board to approve establishment of bank subsidiar-
ies, and SEC would regulate activities of approved subsidiary). Institutions that were
not affiliated with banks could enter into speculative derivatives transactions under the
Bill. Id.
411. S. 2291 § 6.
412. Id. Section 6 requires that the institutions develop a management plan set-
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b. The Derivatives Limitation Act of 1994
The Derivatives Limitations Act of 1994 ("Senate Bill
2123")41s as proposed by Senators Byron L. Dorgan [D-N.D.]
and Barbara A. Mikulski [D-Md.] is the narrowest of the congres-
sional bills, aiming only to prohibit insured depository institu-
tions and credit unions from engaging in certain types of activi-
ties involving derivative financial instruments.4 14 Senator Dor-
gan has suggested regulation of derivatives with strong
conviction4 1 5 and thus, Senate Bill 2123, or a bill similarly ad-
dressing the risks derivatives impose on banks, may reappear
during the 1995 congressional term.416
Senate Bill 2123 is substantively similar to parts of Riegle's
Senate Bill 2291.417 Senate Bill 2123 begins with a general prohi-
bition on the trading of derivatives by federally insured deposi-
tory institutions,418 while excepting hedging transactions from
ting forth: the purpose of the institution's investing in derivatives; how its holdings are
consistent with an overall risk management plan; how the derivatives were acquired; the
accounting methods used with respect to those derivatives; the level of management
oversight, and the frequency with which senior management reviews the derivatives
holdings. Id.
413. S. 2123, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
414. Zaitzeff, supra note 8, at B9. The Dorgan bill is intended to ban banks form
using derivatives in their proprietary trading activities. Anne Schwimmer, Dorgan Bill
Seen As Threat to Banks'Derivatives Use; Senator Would Ban Derivatives in Proprietary Trading,
INvESTMENT DEALERS' Dic.,June 20, 1994, at 6. Like Senator Riegle, Dorgan drafted his
bill to "ensure that banks don't have to use [federal insurance] to cover losses on deriv-
atives trading for their own accounts." Id.; see Hill Briefs, NAT'L L.J.'s CONGRESS DAILY,
May 18, 1994, at 1 (quoting Dorgan as saying before Congress, "What investors do with
their own money is their own business. But, what they do with money insured by Ameri-
can taxpayers, is the business of Congress.").
415. See supra notes 320-27 and accompanying text (discussing congressional moti-
vation in proposing derivatives legislation).
416. Robert A. Rosenblatt, Orange County in Bankruptcy; Greenspan Indicates County
Will Not Get Federal Help; Congress: Federal Reserve Board Chairman Says Paper Losses Occur
Throughout The Economy and That The Markets "Are Adjusting Well To That", L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 8, 1994, at A26. Senator Dorgan stated in that he will offer legislation in the 1995
congressional term barring banks from using derivatives to trade in their own accounts.
Id.
417. See supra notes 398-412 and accompanying text (discussing provisions of Sen-
ate Bill 2291).
418. S. 2123 § 2. Section 2 provides, with exceptions, "neither an insured deposi-
tory institution, nor any affiliate thereof, may purchase, sell, or engage in any transac-
tion involving a derivative financial instrument of the account of that institution or
affiliate." Id.; see supra notes 405-12 and accompanying text (discussing prohibitions on
derivatives trading found in Senate Bill 2291).
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the prohibition upon appropriate federal regulatory approval.41 9
Senate Bill 2123 also permits derivatives trading for non-hedging
purposes so long as such trading is conducted by affiliates of the
insured institution that are separately capitalized and not feder-
ally insured.42  Senate Bill 2123, unlike Senate Bill 2291, does
not offer broader proposals regarding regulatory cooperation in
developing specific derivatives trading standards, or transna-
tional cooperation.42 1
B. Federal Regulatory and Private Responses to Derivatives
Private derivatives industry participants have opposed the
idea of legislation as the answer to derivatives-related
problems.4 2 Financial regulators have joined the opposition in
an attempt to dissuade Congress from passing what the regula-
tors consider to be imprudent and unneeded legislation.423
419. S. 2123 § 2. The Riegle bill defines hedging transaction, as any transaction
involving a derivative financial instrument if:
(A) Such transaction is entered into in the normal course of the institution's
business primarily-
(I) to reduce risk of price change or currency fluctuations with respect to
property which is held or to be held by the institution; or
(II) to reduce risk of interest rate or price changes or currency fluctuations
with respect to loans or other investments made or to be made, or obligations
incurred or to be incurred, by the institution; and
(B) Before the close of the day on which such transaction was entered into
(or such earlier time as the appropriate federal banking agency may prescribe
by regulation), the institution clearly identifies such transaction as a hedging
transaction.
Id. § 2(B).
420. S. 2123 § 2. Affiliates must also comply with rules, regulations, or orders of
appropriate federal banking agencies. Id.; see supra note 409 and accompanying text
(discussing similar provision in the Riegle bill); see also S. 2123 § 4 (amending Section 3
of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C. § 1842, to permit subsidiaries of
banks to trade in derivatives so long as subsidiary is independently capitalized and not
federally insured).
421. See S. 2291 §§ 8, 10 (requiring national and transnational regulatory agency
cooperation in development of derivatives standards).
422. Banking Figures, INr'L BANKING REc., Jan. 9, 1995, at 8. Private agencies that
champion derivatives causes such as the International Swaps and Derivatives Association
are known for their confrontations with Congress. See Bankers Hopeful A GOP congress
Will Mean Expanded Powers, More Relief, 1994 DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES (BNA) No. 10,
at 17 (Jan. 17, 1995) (noting strong opposition to derivatives legislation by banking and
securities industries).
423. Zaitzeff, supra note 8, at B9. Regulators in the United States are unified with
banking and securities industries against Congress. Id. Andrew C. Hove Jr., acting
chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, in response to H.R. 4745,
stated, "[w]e believe that appropriate supervision and risk control of financial institu-
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Both groups cite actions they have already taken specifically to
reduce and control derivatives-related risks, as reason to post-
pone or eliminate legislative proposals.42 4
1. Arguments Against Congressional Action
Parties opposed to new derivatives legislation argue that
such legislation is not necessary for several. reasons.425 One rea-
son, they contend, is that the losses that have drawn attention to
derivatives, 42 16 have been due to bad investment planning and
poor financial management, not the instruments themselves. 42
7
tions' derivative activities can be achieved without additional legislation." Markey Bill
Would Regulate Derivatives Dealers, NATIONAL UNDERWRITER (Life & Health/Financial
Services ed.),July 25, 1994, at 5. Many industry participants are fearful of congressional
action merely because it is difficult to predict what form legislation will eventually take.
Peltz, supra note 12, at 65.
424. Lynn Stevens Hume, Federal Regulators Say They Can Oversee Derivatives and Con-
cerns Are Overstated, BOND BUYER, Oct. 28, 1993, at 1. Regulators have stated that they
have and are developing appropriate tools to deal with derivatives-related risks and that
concerns about derivatives are "overblown." Id. One representative from the OCC,
with respect to the prospect of new legislation, said "[w]e feel we have sufficient powers.
More important, we've been exercising those powers." Peltz, supra note 12, at 65. SEC
chairman Arthur Levitt told Congress, "[t ] he commission is not persuaded that legisla-
tive changes are needed at this time to address pricing and liquidity issues raised by
derivatives," and that the SEC was currently considering three changes it could achieve
on its own without new legislative authority. SEC's Levitt Lays Out Plan For Derivative
Holdings, INVESTMENT DEALERS' DIG., Oct. 3, 1994, at 41. Federal Reserve Board Gover-
nor John Laware told a conference on mutual funds' use of derivatives that further
legislation in the derivatives area would be counterproductive because the existing reg-
ulatory scheme is sufficient. Derivatives Survey Will Give Regulators Better Handle On Bank-
ing Industry Risks, 63 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 21, at 818 (Dec. 5, 1994). Laware also
noted that investors have already begun pulling away from riskier mutual funds because
of the funds's use of derivatives. Id.
425. Peltz, supra note 12, at 65. The SEC, for example, argues that there is no
regulatory gap with respect to derivatives and that it has more power than many recog-
nize. Id.
426. See supra notes 302-13 and accompanying text (discussing derivatives losses).
427. Regulators Tell Senate Panel No Derivatives Legislation Needed Now, 64 Banking
Rep. (BNA) No. 2, at 67 (Jan. 9, 1995). Treasury Secretary Frank Newman, Federal
Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan, Securities and Exchange Commission Chair-
man Arthur Levitt, and Commodity Futures Trading Commission Chairman Mary
Schapiro all testified before Congress in hearings held to examine derivatives problems,
that no new legislation was needed because current derivatives losses are due to poor
investment strategies. Id. SEC Chairman Levitt stated, "[d]erivatives did not cause the
Orange County Pools' problems. The fault lies in a failed investment strategy involving
the use of borrowed money for speculation." Tony Munroe, Fed Chief Urges Senate Not to
Make 'Mistake' of Regulating Derivatives, WASHINGTON TIMES, Jan. 6, 1995, at B7. The
Comptroller of the Currency stated that even though losses will occur from derivatives,
"this is a period in which the banking industry is very strong." Joanne Morrison &
Martha M. Canan, Congress May Hold Hearings in Wake of California Pool's Derivatives
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The opposition to legislation urges that patience and better un-
derstanding of young derivatives markets will lead to better fi-
nancial management and fewer financial losses.428
Another reason regulators and the derivatives industry op-
pose congressional action is because they fear the effect such ac-
tion could have on markets in the United States. 429 They argue
that increased regulation will cause markets to quickly move off-
shore.430 Should that occur, they contend, the United States will
lose a multi-billion dollar financial industry while investors will
not receive any greater protection.431
Some commentators that are opposed to legislation also
doubt the ability of Congress to pass any legislation that could
Losses, BOND BUYER, Dec. 5, 1994, at 1. Another commentator stated "[d]erivatives
aren't a pyramidal house of cards; in fact derivatives aren't dangerous at all. What's
dangerous are the naive treasurers who delude themselves into believing that they are
financial wizards, smarter than professional traders on the world's fastest markets."
Thomas G. Donlan, Fear of Derivatives May Be More Threatening Than Derivatives, BAR-
RON'S, Dec. 5, 1994, at 62.
428. Greenspan Opposes Legislation On Derivatives, BALTIMORE SUN, Jan. 6, 1995, at
10C. Levitt likened derivatives to electricity in its early years, "dangerous if mishandled
but bearing the potential to do tremendous good." Id. One commentator argued,
"[h]eavy-handed legislative responses, like those already proposed to regulate deriva-
tives use, ignore on-going efforts of banking regulators and the industry itself to analyze
and minimize the systemic risks created by these sophisticated financial instruments."
GOP Takeover May Mean Turmoil for Muni Issues, BOND BUYER, Nov. 10, 1994, at 1; see
Joanne Morrison, More Conservative Approach Is Likely For Derivatives After Losses In 1994,
BOND BUYER, Jan. 4, 1995, at 1 (noting that financial managers will most probably be
less likely to use riskier derivatives after witnessing Orange County losses).
Some congressmen are balking at the idea of new legislation. See, e.g., Regulators
Tell Senate Panel No Derivatives Legislation Needed Now, 64 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 2, at
67 (Jan. 9, 1995) (noting opposition to derivatives legislation of Senators Phil Gramm
[R-Texas], Richard Shelby [R-Ala.], Lauch Faircloth [R-N.C.], Robert Bennett [R-Utah]
and Connie Mack [R-Fla.]).
429. Peltz, supra note 12, at 65. New York Federal Reserve Bank President E. Ger-
ald Corrigan has noted that "[t ] here are some dangers in the legislative approach, espe-
cially given the extraordinary complexities of these markets and the fact that they don't
start at the Pacific and end at the Atlantic." Id.
430. Fed To Issue Proposal To Address Capital Assessment Needs for Loan Securitization,
64 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 4, at 150 (Jan. 23, 1995). Federal Reserve Board Governor
John Laware has stated that if Congress takes the conventional approach of writing a
bill to solve derivatives problems, "we'll simply export this market to London or Frank-
furt or Tokyo or someplace else." Id.
431. Id. Laware has described the movement of derivatives markets away from the
United States as a "tragedy for U.S. capital markets." Id. One Wall Street firm that
would be hit hard by legislation is Merrill Lynch. Leah Nathans Spiro, Securities: On
Wall Street: This Too Shall Pass, Bus. Wy-, Jan. 9, 1995, at 95. Approximately 30% of
Merrill Lynch's US$2 billion trading revenue in the first nine months of 1994 was attrib-
utable to derivatives. Id.
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catch derivatives within an effective regulatory framework. 432
They argue that similar attempts have been made in Japan and
these attempts' unequivocal failure should serve notice that the
best approach to derivatives in the United States is not through
federal legislation.433 The commentators argue that regulators
and government must approach derivatives from a transnational
perspective if they hope to contribute to the safety of global fi-
nancial markets. 434
Finally, some commentators opposed to congressional ac-
tion argue that even current market regulators should hesitate
before taking any derivatives-related action. 43 5 They assert that
market participants who participate in regulated markets may
develop too much confidence in the regulation itself, and thus,
not remain diligent in avoiding risks.4 6 The commentators con-
tend that such a possibility is particularly likely with non-finan-
cial corporations.43 7
432. GregoryJ. Millman, Derivatives as Dump Trucks; They Are Risky, But They Haul
Away the Refuse of Bad Government Policy, WASH. POST, Dec. 18, 1994, at C2. One com-
mentator stated that "regulation was pointless because 'we'll eventually be financial in-
stitutions headquartered on ships floating mid-ocean.'" Id. Another noted that
"[a] tempting to legislate the regulation of products as complex as derivatives is rather
like instructing a child to insert a square peg into a round hole. Despite the futility, an
obedient child will try to make the peg fit, often with disastrous consequences for the
peg." Steve H. Hanke, The Protection Racket, FORBES, Oct. 24, 1994, at 104.
433. Millman, supra note 432, at C2. One SEC official noted, "[i]f the Japanese
haven't been able to do it with as tight a regulatory net as anybody, it's hard for me to
envision how the U.S. with all the wonders of due process could write a rule that
wouldn't be subject to some challenge." Id.
434. See, e.g., U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, TESTIMONY OF BRANDON
C. BECKER, DIRECTOR DIVISION OF MARKET REGULATION U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, CONCERNING DERIVATIVE FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS, BEFORE THE SUBCOMMIT-
TEE ON ENVIRONMENT, CREDIT AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE,
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, (June 14, 1994) (noting SEC support of CFTC empha-
sis on interagency and international cooperation in addressing derivatives-related con-
cerns).
435. Regulator's Progress Will Determine Lawmakers' Actions, Fed' Phillips Says, 64 Bank-
ing Rep. (BNA) No. 4, at 160 (Jan. 23, 1995). Former Treasury Undersecretary Robert
Glauber noted that a cost of regulation is that the safety net will go where the regulators
go. Id. SEC Commissioner Richard Roberts believes that the marketplace and not the
SEC, should determine the success or failure of derivative products. Lynn Stevens
Hume, Success of Derivatives Products Is Better Left to the Marketplace, BOND BUYER, May 2,
1994, at 5.
436. Regulators'Progress Will Determine Lawmakers'Actions, Fed's Phillips Says, 64 Bank-
ing Rep. (BNA) No. 4, at 160 (Jan. 23, 1995).
437. Id. Advocates of less regulation assert that better disclosure to shareholders
will educate shareholders as to the importance of a decision to use derivatives. Id. Hav-
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2. Federal Regulator and Private Action
While opposing legislative proposals, regulatory forces al-
ready in place have been and are continuing to take action to
lower derivatives-related risks.4 8 The Federal Reserve Board 439
("FRB"), Office of the Comptroller of the Currency"' ("OCC"),
and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation" 1 ("FDIC") have,
for example, issued mandatory guidelines that banks and other
financial institutions are to use when investing in derivatives. 442
Private organizations like the International Swaps and Deriva-
tives Association 4 3 have lowered the risks of using derivatives by
developing standardized formats for derivatives transactions. 
4
"
Cross-border actions like the joint statement of cooperation be-
tween the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Commodi-
ties Futures Trading Commission, and the U.K.'s Securities and
Investment Board have further attempted to lower derivatives-
related risks." 5
a. OCC, FRB, and FDIC Actions
The Office of the Comptroller, the Federal Reserve Board,
and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation have taken sev-
eral affirmative steps to ameliorate derivatives-related risks." 6
ing become better informed, the shareholders can then fairly bear the risk of their
investment. Id.
438. Zaitzeff, supra note 8, at B9. Comptroller of the Currency Eugene Ludwig
stated before Congress that regulators have taken many of the steps current legislation
proposes, and that legislative action is not necessary at this time. Id.
439. See supra note 186 and accompanying text (discussing Federal Reserve Board
purpose and function).
440. See supra note 187 and accompanying text (discussing OCC function and pur-
pose).
441. See supra note 242 and accompanying text (discussing FDIC function and pur-
pose).
442. See supra notes 255-71 and accompanying text (discussing FRB and .OCC de-
rivatives guidelines).
443. See supra note 190 (describing International Swaps and Derivatives Associa-
tion).
444. See supra notes 290-301 and accompanying text (discussing master agree-
ments).
445. SEC, CFTC, UK Regulators Issue Statement On OTC Derivatives Oversight, INT'L
Bus. & FIN. DAILY, Mar. 16, 1994, at D9.
446. Lynn Stevens Hume, Fed Gives Bank Examiners Risk Management Policies For
Trading Activities, Including Derivative Products, BOND BUYER, Jan. 5, 1994, at 6. Deriva-
tives guidelines issued by the FRB and the OCC are very similar to each other not only
in the requirements they set forth, but also in their ultimate goal of lowering derivatives
risks by ensuring that derivatives users understand the nature of their investments. Id.
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Perhaps the highest profile regulatory action to date has been
the issuance of derivatives guidelines by both the OCC and FRB
to be applied to banking institutions." 7 Because banks compose
approximately seventy percent of the over-the-counter market in
derivatives, these guidelines affect a large portion of derivative
trading in the United States.448 Similar to proposed legisla-
tion,449 the guidelines seek to reduce risks associated with deriva-
tives trading by prescribing procedures to manage the funda-
mental risks accompanying derivatives use. 450 The FDIC has fol-
lowed a similar path in developing special derivatives guidelines
that its bank examiners are to follow when determining whether
a bank is conducting business in a safe and sound manner.45 '
The OCC, FRB, and FDIC have also included derivatives in
their bank capital adequacy guidelines.452 The inclusion of de-
rivatives in capital adequacy guidelines has given these agencies
447. See supra notes 255-71 and accompanying text (discussing FRB and OCC de-
rivatives guidelines).
448. Zaitzeff, supra note 8, at B9
449. Id. By requiring banks and other users to establish written policies regarding
derivatives trading, as well as identification of fundamental risks, the guidelines aim at
an objective of safety and soundness in the banking industry similar to the proposals of
Representatives Gonzalez and Leach. Id.; see supra notes 335-69 (discussing provisions
of Gonzalez and Leach proposals); see also Agencies Plan New Capital Requirements on De-
rivatives, BANKING POL. REP., Sep. 19, 1994, at 5 (noting that legislation sponsored by
Gonzalez and Leach would convert into law, many of rules left to discretion of such
regulatory bodies as OCC and FRB).
450. See supra notes 255-71 and accompanying text (discussing OCC and FRB de-
rivatives guidelines).
451. See supra notes 272-74 and accompanying text (discussing FDIC examiner
guidelines).
452. See supra notes 244-54 and accompanying text (discussing bank capital ade-
quacy guidelines). The development of capital adequacy guidelines has also proceeded
on a transnational level, as regulators worldwide are considering standards not only for
capital but also for disclosure, accounting, and internal controls. Derivatives, Oversight of
Derivatives Activity Moving at Acceptable Pace, Fed's Phillips Says, Daily Rep. for Executives
(BNA) No. 25, at A184, Sept. 26, 1994. In 1993, work by the Bank for International
Settlement's Basle Supervisory Committee resulted in a preliminary framework to assess
the quantities of capital banks would need to cover market risk associated with traded
debt, equity, and non-U.S. exchange. Id. Federal Reserve Board Governor Susan Phil-
lips recently told a conference on global financial markets in Washington that the
group is currently reworking its proposals, "a key aspect of which will be considering the
use of banks' internal risk management models for determining regulatory capital." Id.
In addressing the issue of developing a reliable system to be incorporated in the Basle
framework, in order to measure the exposure of banks to the market risks of derivatives,
Federal Reserve Board Governor John P. Laware stated that the OCC and FRB guide-
lines on derivatives should provide "a valuable checklist." Fed's Laware Says U.S. Policy
Toward Foreign Banks Is Paranoid, Protective, INT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY, Mar. 8, 1994, at D4.
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a second method in addition to the derivatives guidelines,45 by
which to regulate derivatives activity. 454 By raising or lowering
the amounts of capital that banks must provide to offset their
derivatives activities, the OCC, FRB, and FDIC can discourage or
encourage derivatives use.4 5 5
In addition to developing special capital requirements and
guidelines for derivatives,456 the FRB has also sought to elimi-
nate fraudulent derivatives transactions.457 In December 1994,
for example, the FRB imposed a stiff penalty on a subsidiary of
Bankers Trust, BT Securities, for having committed fraud in its
dealings with Gibson Greetings Inc.45" The penalty consisted of
the signing of a written agreement by the subsidiary requiring
Bankers Trust to institute strict controls in its derivatives trading
business.459 Under the agreement, the company had to institute
strict standards for determining whether derivative type invest-
ments are appropriate for investors. 460
453. See supra notes 446-54 and accompanying text (discussing derivatives guide-
lines).
454. See supra notes 251-54 and accompanying text (discussing capital adequacy
guideline effect on derivatives use).
455. See supra notes 251-54 and accompanying text (discussing ability of regulators
to govern derivatives use through bank capital adequacy guidelines).
456. See supra notes 446-55 and accompanying text (discussing derivatives guide-
lines and capital adequacy requirements).
457. See, e.g., Saul Hansell, Bankers Trust and U.S. Set Pact On Disclosure of Derivatives'
Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1994, at Al (noting Bankers Trust agreement to disclose deriva-
tives risk after Federal Reserve Board investigation revealed fraudulent transactions); see
also Dominic Bencivenga, Congressional Agenda; Litigation Reform, Derivative Regulation on
Tap, N.Y. LJ., Jan. 19, 1995, at 5 (discussing terms of Bankers Trust penalty).
458. Hansell, supra note 457, at Al.
459. Id. at Al. Written agreements are the Federal Reserve's second strictest form
of action and are rarely applied to the nation's larger banks. Id. The FRB's penalty is
particularly significant because it indicates a willingness by the FRB to take strong ac-
tion against derivatives related fraud, and more importantly, an active position in deriv-
atives regulation. Id. Representative Leach responded to the FRB's actions by stating,
"[w] hat's been established is a new standard for industry practices that by contract ap-
plies to Bankers Trust, but, in effect, could well apply to all banks and potentially all
market participants." Id. Under the signed agreement, Bankers Trust must now inform
its customers of the value of their derivatives positions every day, rather than only upon
a customer's request. Id.
460. Id. This penalty followed in the wake of a private settlement with Gibson
Greeting in which BT Securities paid Gibson US$14 million. Bencivenga, supra note
457, at 5. Bankers Trust also agreed without admitting any wrongdoing to payment of a
US$10 million fine jointly to the SEC and CFTC for settlement of additional fraud
charges. Saul Hansell, Settlement By Bankers Trust Unit, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 23, 1994, at D1;
John C. Coffee Jr., Bankers Trust Settlement: Whither the Swaps Market, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 26,
1995, at 5.
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b. The Commodities Futures Trading Commission's
Derivatives Activity
Unlike more recent derivatives related actions of the FRB
and the OCC,4 1 the Commodities Futures Trading Commis-
sion" 2 ("CFTC") began taking action concerning derivatives as
early as 1987.463 The first CFTC actions were in the form of in-
vestigatory and enforcement proceedings against the developers
of swap transactions involving commodities. 464 These investiga-
tory and enforcement proceedings ceased upon adoption of an
exemption for swaps from most provisions of the Commodities
Exchange Act in 1992.465 Despite the swap exemption, the
CFTC has continued to keep watch over derivative instruments
within its jurisdiction. 6 For instance, the CFTCjoint statement
of cooperation with the SEC and SIB" 7 promises substantial
CFTC involvement in the transnational derivatives market regu-
latory effort.4 68
c. SEC Action
In July 1992, the SEC adopted new rules that require regu-
lated broker-dealers469 to disclose a variety of information re-
461. See supra notes 446-60 and accompanying text (discussing OCC and FRB re-
sponse to derivatives challenges).
462. See supra notes 211-14 (discussing origin and purpose of CFTC).
463. Cunningham, supra note 19, at 164.
464. Id. The result of the CFTC investigations and actions was to completely halt
development of the commodity price swap market in United States. Id. U.S. institu-
tions in response, shifted their business to alternate markets around the globe. Id.
465. See Cunningham, supra note 19, at 164-67 (discussing derivatives-related ac-
tions of CFTC). In order qualify for exempt status, the swap transaction must still meet
several requirements. See supra note 230 (listing swap exemption requirements).
466. Statement of Mary L. Schapiro Chairman, Commodity Futures Trading Commission
Before the Senate Committee On Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, Federal News Service,
Jan. 5, 1995, at 24-25. The CFTC has also completed a study reviewing the need, if any,
for additional regulation of OTC markets. COMMODiy FUTURES TRADINc COMMISSION:
OTC DERIVATIVE MARKETS AND THEIR REGULATION (1993). The study concluded that
greater coordination between federal regulators in overseeing derivatives markets
would be beneficial but no fundamental structural changes in the regulatory system are
necessary. Id. at 172.
467. Joint Statement, supra note 319.
468. Id.
469. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17h-lT-2T (1994). Rule 17h-lT establishes a Material Associ-
ated Person category. Id. Whether a person fits in this category depends on: the close-
ness of the person's legal relationship with the dealer; the financial requirements of the
dealer and the degree to which the two parties are financially independent on one
another; the degree to which the two parties are interconnected for operation support;
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garding the financial condition of the broker-dealers's materially
associated persons.47 ° Such information must be disclosed on a
quarterly and annual basis.47 1 The SEC promulgated the new
rules in response to concern that unregulated associates of the
broker-dealers, specifically those associates dealing in deriva-
tives,472 could negatively impact the broker-dealers.473
In addition to collecting more information concerning un-
regulated associates of broker-dealers, the SEC has been working
directly with the largest private derivatives traders to develop in-
dustry wide guidelines for derivatives use.474 While the SEC ad-
mits that developing such guidelines will take time, it seeks to
preclude legislation by filling regulatory gaps in rules governing
derivatives dealers.475 Armed with better information regarding
the practices and policies of derivatives players, new guidelines,
and reporting requirements, the SEC is confident it can prevent
future derivatives related problems. 476 The SEC has also re-
the level of risk present in the associated person's investment activities; and the extent
to which the associated person may withdraw capital from the dealer. Id.
470. Id.; see Final Temporary Risk Assessment Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 34-
30,929, 51 S.E.C. Docket 1613, 1992 WL 172844 (explaining risk assessment rules and
discussing subsequent public comments). The Rules require that broker-dealers pro-
vide to the SEC information regarding associated person. Id. The information is to
describe material legal proceedings, aggregate amounts of interest rate swaps, and con-
solidated financial sheets. Id.; see Cunningham, supra note 19, at 163 (describing rule
requirements).
471. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17h-IT-2T.
472. Cunningham, supra note 19, at 162.
473. Id. at 162-63. The bankruptcy of Drexel Burnham Lambert Group and its
subsidiary Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc. spurred the SEC in its efforts to ensure finan-
cial stability of broker-dealers. Id.
474. Peltz, supra note 12, at 65. The SEC has been working with representatives
from CS First Boston, Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stan-
ley & Co., and Salomon Brothers to broaden SEC authority without legislation. Id. The
work group is focusing on four specific areas: management and control, capital require-
ments, regulatory reporting and disclosure, and sales practices. Id. The six derivatives
dealers which account for more than 90% of derivatives business in the United States
have, as a result of the SEC's efforts, voluntarily agreed to submit their operations to
review by federal regulatory agencies. Saul Hansell, Firms Agree to US. Review Of Deriva-
tives Operations, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1995, at Dl, D4. The firms specifically agreed to
enact internal controls to reduce risk, issue reports of their derivatives activity to the
SEC and CFTC, develop computer simulation models to predict derivatives-related
risks, and to adopt standards regarding disclosure to clients. Id. at D4.
475. Zaitzeff, supra note 8, at B9.
476. Lynn Stevens Hume, Federal Regulators Say They Can Oversee Derivatives and Con-
cerns Are Overstated, BOND Buwra, Oct. 28, 1993, at 1. J. Carter Beese, a commissioner
with the SEC stated, "[ojur challenge going forward is to coordinate our efforts so that
we have an adequate understanding of the aggregate size of the market and properly
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sponded to calls from Congress to step up examination of rules
governing derivatives use by mutual funds.47 7 After several sub-
stantial derivatives-related mutual fund losses,478 the SEC re-
sponded by issuing a strong warning to the mutual-fund indus-
try.479 The SEC urged mutual-funds to take appropriate steps to
ensure proper understanding and management of derivatives-re-
lated risks.48 0 The SEC subsequently responded with a three-
point plan of action4 ' designed to improve disclosure rather
than adding new regulations or prohibitions.482
d. The Response of Industry Organizations: ISDA and
FASB Action
Private organizations such as the Financial Accounting Stan-
dards Board48 ("FASB") and the International Swaps and Deriv-
atives Association48 4 ("ISDA") have also played a role in chang-
ing the way derivatives users conduct business.485 The FASB has
promulgated new sets of accounting rules specifically to keep
track of financial information arising from derivatives move-
identify" potential risks. Id.; see Peltz, supra note 12, at 65 (noting that regulators have
been trying to convince Congress that they do not need or want more authority to
regulate derivatives).
477. Brett D. Fromson, Legislators Urge SEC Probe of Funds; Derivatives Deals, WASH.
PosT, June 16, 1994, at B13. Representatives Edward J. Markey [D-Mass.] and Jack
Fields [R-Texas] drafted a letter to the SEC requiring examination of mutual fund rules
in response to derivatives-related mutual fund losses. Id.
478. Id. Recent mutual fund losses by PiperJaffray Co., PaineWebber Group, and
BankAmerica Corp alone totaled in excess of US$85 million. Id.
479. Mark H. Anderson, SEC Chief Levitt Warns Mutual Funds To Be Cautious in Han-
dling Derivatives, WALL. ST. J., June 21, 1994, at C18.
480. Id.
481. SEC's Levitt Lays Out Plan for Derivative Holdings, INVESTMENT DEALERS' DIc.,
Oct. 3, 1994 at 1. The plan first promised a proposal for a new quantitative risk mea-
sure to be added to fund prospectuses. Id. The measure would provide investors with a
mode by which to judge and compare risk types between different mutual funds. Id.
The second step would be a new SEC guideline permitting non-money market funds to
reduce their holdings of illiquid assets to 10%, from 15% of total assets. Id. Finally, the
plan included issuing a release seeking public comment on appropriate regulatory and
legislative solutions regarding leverage resulting from fund use of derivatives. Id.
482. Id.
483. See supra note 188 (discussing Financial Accounting Standards Board).
484. See supra note 189 (discussing International Swaps and Derivatives Associa-
tion).
485. See Dominic Bencivenga, Congressional Agenda; Litigation Reform, Derivative Reg-
ulation on Tap, N.Y. L.J.,Jan. 19, 1995 at 5 (noting that private regulators like FASB have
taken steps to improve disclosure and accounting of derivatives, and acknowledging
difficulty of establishing uniform standards).
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ment. 48 6 Although commentators observe that the FASB deriva-
tives rules have been conservative so far, FASB promises to take
continuing account of new information and adopt changes
when necessary. 48 7 The ISDA has developed the standardized
documentation and procedures now used almost universally in
derivatives markets. 488 Because of the work the ISDA has com-
pleted, derivatives users face greater legal certainty with respect
to the enforceability of their transactions. 489 The decreased op-
portunity for counterparty default arising from unenforceability
has resulted both in lower legal and credit risks for derivatives
users.
490
C. Transnational Cooperation
Both government regulators and private industry represent-
atives have been able to cooperate separately, and together, on a
transnational level.49 ' Non-U.S. approaches to derivatives regu-
lation, emphasizing better management control and understand-
ing of derivatives-related risks, have been much more popular
than proposed government legislation.492 The Bank for Interna-
486. See supra notes 281-89 and accompanying text (discussing new FASB treat-'
ment of derivatives).
487. Waiting for FASB's ACT II: Swaps Disclosure Rules Likely To Get Tougher, Am.
BANKER, Oct. 17, 1994.
488. Jill Treanor, ISDA Aims To Clear Mist Obscuring Derivatives, Reuters Newswire,
Aug. 9, 1994, available in Westlaw INT-NEWS Database; see supra notes 290-301 and
accompanying text (discussing ISDA master agreements).
489. See supra notes 290-301 and accompanying text (discussing ISDA's work and
consequences).
490. See supra note 301 and accompanying text (noting decreased risks resulting
from ISDA master agreements).
491. See, e.g.,Joint Statement, supra note 319 (discussing cooperation between the
SEC, CFTC, and SIB);Joint Press Statement by Basle Committee and IOSCO Technical
Committee (July 27, 1994) (discussing cooperation between transnational securities
and transnational banking organizations).
492. Steven Burrell, Derivatives -Regulation v. Risk, AusrlALiAN FIN'L REv., Feb. 24,
1993, at 12. Australian financial market regulators believe that sufficient mechanisms
are already in place to manage potential derivatives risks. Id.; see Canadian Regulators
Take Softer Line On Derivatives, Reuter Newswire - Canada, May 20, 1994, available in
Westlaw, INT-NEWS Database. Richard Gresser, a senior policy analyst at Canada's Su-
perintendent of Financial Institutions, stated that "in the absence of evidence of a [de-
rivatives] problem, I don't think it's time for someone to say the sky is falling." Id.
Canadian regulators favor as much self-regulation as possible in the derivatives industry.
Id. German Banking Supervisory Office President Wolfgang Artopoeus has stressed
principles of orderly management and thorough credit risk assessment, while rejecting
the idea that non-banks doing business in derivatives should be placed under regulatory
supervision. German Bank Regulator Studies Derivative Use -Paper, Reuter Newswire - West-
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tional Settlements4 93 ("BIS"), through its Basle Committee on
Banking Supervision ("Basle Committee") ,4 and the Interna-
tional Organization of Securities Commissions49 5  ("IOSCO"),
ern Europe, Aug. 24, 1994, available in Westlaw, INT-NEWS Database. Commenting on
regulatory proposals, Laura Cha, Executive Director of the Honk Kong Securities and
Futures Commission ("SFC") stated that the SFC does not "want to regulate too much
because [derivatives] are for sophisticated investors." Kerry Wong, Commission Studies
V ews on Derivative, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 2, 1994, at 1. The chairman of
the SFC stated that the commission would wait for international coordination before
amending over-the-counter derivatives rules. HK SFC Plans No Immediate OTC Derivatives
Changes, Reuter Newswire - Far East, June, 8, 1994, available in Westlaw, INT-NEWS
Database. Japanese regulators, in response to the Barings Bank failure, declined to
intensify regulatory efforts and instead called for increased internal risk management
and disclosure. Japan Derivatives Allergy Seen Boosted By Barings, Reuter Newswire - Far
East, Feb. 27, 1995, available in Westaw, INT-NEWS Database. Tokyo Stock Exchange
head Yoshiaki Kaneko noted that "some people in Japan are afraid that the Japanese
market might be defective as an international market and that its role might be declin-
ing because of high cost and excessive regulation." Anthony Rowley, Tokyo, London E-
change Chiefs Clash Over Securities Laws, Bus. TIMES (Japan), Oct. 21, 1994, at 1. Onno
Ruding, Vice Chairman of Citicorp and former Dutch Finance Minister, stated "I wel-
come the active role of regulators, but it is not wise to bring in new additional legisla-
tion. There are sufficient powers in the current laws .... " No Need For New Derivative
Laws - Ruding, Reuter Newswire - Western Europe, Sept. 9, 1994, available in, Westlaw,
INT-NEWS Database. Singapore's Finance Minister Richard Hu recognized that crip-
pling derivatives losses have occurred when users fail to appreciate or manage deriva-
tives risk. Quak Hiang Whai, Derivatives Here To Stay Despite Concern Over Losses Abroad -
DrHu, Bus. TIMES (Singapore),Jan. 10, 1995, at 1. Dr. Hu places responsibility for such
losses on the financial institutions. Id.
493. See GAO Report, supra note 2, at 32 (describing origins and functions of Bank
for International Settlements). Western European Central banks established the Bank
for International Settlements in 1930 in Basle, Switzerland. Id. One of the bank's pri-
mary functions is to provide a forum for cooperative efforts by central banks from the
world's industrial countries. Id.
494. SeeJ.J. NORTON ET AL., INTERNATIONAL BANKING REGULATION AND SUPERVISION:
CHANGE AND TRANSFORMATION IN THE 1990s 265 (1994). The Basle Committee on
Banking Supervision is a Committee of banking supervisory authorities. Id. The Com-
mittee, formed by central bank governors of the Group of Ten Countries in 1975 was
formed in response to the failure of Bankhaus Herstatt of West Germany. Id. The
Basle Committee's primary aim is to promote gradual transnational convergence of
supervisory practices governing financial institutions. JOSEPH J. NORTON, BANK REGULA-
TION AND SUPERVISION IN THE 90s 83 (1991). The Basle Committee operates under the
administrative auspices of the Bank for International Settlements and meets regularly
three or four times a year. Id. The Committee, currently chaired by Dott T. Padoa-
Schippa, Deputy Director General of the Bank of Italy, represents central banks and
other authorities possessing prudential supervision responsibilities from Belgium, Can-
ada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland,
United Kingdom, United States, and the Secretariat. Id.; see International Monetary
Fund: Group of Ten Report on the Functioning of the Monetary System, May 16, 1985,
24 I.L.M. 1685 (describing the origins and development of Group of 10).
495. HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND SECURITIES
REGULATION § 1.10(2)(a), at 25 (1982). The International Organization of Securities
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have issued guidelines derivatives users should employ in dealing
with derivatives-related risks.496  In partial recognition of
IOSCO's work,497 the SEC and CFTC have joined with the U.K.'s
Securities and Investments Board4"' ("SIB"), in issuing a state-
ment of cooperation in developing a transnational regulatory ap-
proach to govern derivatives.499
Commissions was formed in 1974 to provide a forum for securities regulators from dif-
ferent countries to promote transnational cooperation in the development of securities
laws. Id. The IOSCO currently consists of over 100 members from greater than sixty
different countries. See Securities Regulators to Begin 6-day Meeting Sunday, JAPAN WEEKLY
MONITOR, Oct. 17, 1994, available in Westlaw, PTS-NEWS Database (noting that 800
officials from 110 regulatory bodies from 64 countries and two regions were expected to
gather in Tokyo for IOSCO meetings in October of 1994). IOSCO's Technical and
Market Development Committees attempt to identify and solve areas of transnational
regulatory conflict. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 495, § 1.10(2)(b), at 26. Although
IOSCO lacks binding authority over its members, it is expected to contribute to transna-
tional coordination of securities markets during the 1990s and beyond. Id.
§ 1.10(2) (a), at 25.
496. TECHNICAL COMMITTEE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF SECURITIES
COMMISSIONS, OPERATIONAL AND FINANCIAL RISK MANAGEMENT CONTROL MECHANISMS
FOR OVER-THE-COUNTER DERIVATIVES ACTIVITIES OF REGULATED SECURrrIES FIRMS 1
(1994) [hereinafter IOSCO GUIDELINES]. Albert Cheok, Executive Director of the
Hong Kong Monetary Authority described the Basle and Iosco guidelines as a "global,
co-ordinated initiative by banking and securities supervisors to promote better risk man-
agement of financial derivative activities." Noel Fung, Talks Begin On Management of
Derivatives Risk, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 2, 1994, at 2; see Global Derivatives
Reporting Rules Proposed - Paper, Reuter Newswire - Far East, Sept. 19, 1994, available in
Wesdaw, INT-NEWS Database (describing requirements under separate IOSCO propo-
sal regarding dealer reporting).
497. Joint Statement, supra note 319, at 1. The joint statement states that "the
Authorities believe the work in progress in the International Organization of Securities
Commissions regarding the regulation of OTC derivatives is valuable, and intend to
continue working within that framework." Id.
498. See 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF MONEY & FINANCE 424 (1992) (dis-
cussing purpose, function and authority of Securities and Investment Board). Like the
SEC, the SIB has broad powers to both shape the regulatory system and to enforce
applicable rules. Id. at 425. Formed in 1985, the SIB, unlike the SEC, is a private com-
pany. The SIB's purpose is to ensure protection of investors while promoting interests
of commerce through the establishment and maintenance of high standards in the
United Kingdom's financial services industry. Id. at 424. Its activities are aimed princi-
pally at the development and administration of a regulation system for entities involved
in the investment business. Id.
499. Joint Statement supra note 319. The International Organization of Account-
ants has also made transnational progress on the issue of financial reporting of deriva-
tives. IASC Nears Guidelines For Derivatives Trade, Financial Dagblad, Oct. 26, 1994, avail-
able in Westlaw, INT-NEWS Database.
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1. The Basle Committee and IOSCO Derivatives Guidelines
The Basle Committee"' and IOSC 0 1 have formulated de-
rivatives guidelines together to help harmonize derivatives prac-
tices across borders and industries.50 Both sets of guidelines di-
rectly address issues of market, credit, operational, legal, and li-
quidity risks,5 1 As applied to financial institutions, the
guidelines additionally establish recommended written policies
and procedures outlining management guidance that the board
of directors must approve.50 4 Most importantly, measuring,
monitoring, and controlling of risk should take place indepen-
dently from individuals actively engaged in derivatives trading
500. -See supra note 494 (discussing Basle Committee).
501. See supra note 495 (discussing International Organization of Securities Com-
missions).
502. BASLE COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, RISK MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES
FOR DERIVATIVES 1 (uly 1994) [hereinafter BASLE GUIDELINES]; IOSCO GUIDEINES,
supra note 496. Guillermo Harteneck, chairman of IOSCO's Emerging Markets Com-
mittee, stated "[d]eveloped markets' problems are essentially international - the har-
monization of principles to make international business more fluid and to exchange
information with other regulatory agencies." Emerging Markets Watch Dogs Said To Have
Own Agenda, Reuter Newswire -Far East, Oct. 21, 1994, available in Westlaw, INT-NEWS
Database. Both organizations worked together because as Tim Shepheard-Walwyn,
chairman of the IOSCO technical Committee working group stated, " [c] learly it is not
possible for securities regulators to progress this subject (of reporting to regulators) on
our own because many participants are banks." Securities Watchdogs, Basle to Work on
Derivatives, Reuter Newswire - Far East, Oct. 21, 1994, available in Westlaw, INT-NEWS
Database.
503. BASLE GUIDELINES, supra note 502, at 13-19; IOSCO GUIDELINES, supra note
496, at 3-4. The guidelines call for independent management and calculation of mar-
ket risk and monitoring of the effectiveness of pricing and valuation systems. BASLE
GUIDELINES, supra note 502, at 6; IOSCO GUIDELINES, supra note 496, at 10. Proper risk
controls should also implement independent credit risk management calculated across
all customers and products. BASLE GUIDELINES, supra note 502, at 13-14; IOSCO GUIDE-
LINES, supra note 496, at 11. With regard to operational risks, the guidelines suggest
that firms ensure the availability of proper resources to support operations and systems
development and maintenance. BASLE GUIDELINES, supra note 502, at 16; IOSCO
GUIDELINES, supra note 496, at 11. The guidelines recommend that, to lower legal risk,
firms should utilize netting and master agreements, as well as thorough credit history
research before entering into any transaction. BASLE GUIDELINES, supra note 502, at 13;
IOSCO GUIDELINES, supra note 496, at 11-12. Furthermore, in lowering liquidity risk,
firms should be aware of the size, depth and liquidity of particular derivatives markets.
BASLE GUIDELINES, supra note 502, at 15; IOSCO GUIDELINES, supra note 496, at 14.
504. BASLE GUIDELINES, supra note 502, at 5; IOSCO GUIDELINES, supra note 496, at
9; see Details of Basis IOSCO Derivatives Guidelines, Reuter Newswire - United Kingdom,
July 26, 1994, available in Westlaw, INT-NEWS Database (discussing risk managing provi-
sion of Basle and IOSCO derivatives guidelines).
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activities.5"5 In taking this approach, the guidelines focus on the
need for sound internal risk management as opposed to external
regulation." 6 Although the Basle Committee and IOSCO do
not have the power to bind derivatives users to the guidelines,
non-U.S. regulators have positively responded to the internal
risk management.50 7
2. The Joint SEC, CFTC, SIB Statement of Cooperation
Resulting from years of discussions between three influen-
tial regulators, the SEC, CFTC, and SIB agreement sets forth a
joint-agency agenda to address derivatives related concerns.5 8
The promised agenda seeks to establish substantial cooperation
between the three agencies in establishing a transnational regu-
latory framework to reduce derivatives-related risk.50 9  The
agreement has been described as the first of its kind. 10
The agenda prescribed by the joint statement consists of a
505. BASLE GUIDELINES, supra note 502, at 6; IOSCO GUIDELINEs, supra note 496, at
11-12.
506. World Watchdogs Grapple With Derivative Disclosure, Reuter Newswire - Far East,
Oct. 18, 1994, available in Westlaw, INT-NEWS Database.
507. HK Issues Basle IOSCO Guidelines For Consultation, Reuter Newswire - Far East,
Aug. 1, 1994, available in, Westlaw, INT-NEWS Database. The Monetary Authority of
Hong Kong, Hong Kong's central bank, issued the Basle and IOSCO guidelines for
industry comment before deciding how many of the guidelines should form the basis
for Hong Kong's forthcoming formal derivatives guidelines. Id. In response to the
failure of Barings Bank, a Japanese monetary source in Tokyo responded that the ap-
propriate response would be to continue moving in the direction of internal risk man-
agement as taken by the Basle Committee and IOSCO. Japan Derivatives Allergy Seen
Boosted By Barings, Reuter Newswire - Far East, Feb. 27, 1995, available in Westlaw, INT-
NEWS Database. The International Swaps and Derivatives Association although recog-
nizing slight disagreements between its approach and the Basle/IOSCO approach
stated that it "is looking forward to an ongoing dialogue with the BIS on all these is-
sues." ISDA Seeks Changes To BIS Derivatives Proposals, Reuter Newswire - USA, Jan. 7,
1994, available in Westlaw, INT-NEWS Database.
508. Joint Statement, supra note 319. SEC commissioner Arthur Levitt noted that
by working cooperatively, the SEC "can create a springboard for the development of
sound, cross-border regulatory schemes for OTC derivatives." SEC, CFTC, and UK. Reg,
ulators Issue Statement on OTC Derivatives, 62 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 12, at 561 (March
21, 1994). Andrew Large, the SIB's chairman described the statement s meaning, that
the securities regulators are now "singing from the same hymn sheet." Id.
509. Joint Statement, supra note 319, at 1.
510. SEC, CFTC, and U.K. Regulators Issue Statement on OTC Derivatives, 62 Banking
Rep. (BNA) No. 12, at 561 (Mar. 21, 1994). The CIFTC described the joint statement as
"the first international understanding among futures andsecurities regulators for devel-
oping and coordinating an approach to the OTC derivatives market." Id.
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seven-point program of action." First, the regulators have
agreed that in the interests of promoting transnational over-
sight, they will enhance existing arrangements for sharing infor-
mation.51 2 Second, the regulators have agreed to improve risk
management by promoting the use of legally enforceable net-
ting.513 Third, in order to address concerns regarding excess lev-
erage in derivatives markets, the agencies will promote the estab-
511. Joint Statement, supra note 319, at 1.
512. Id. at I. The authorities plan specifically to exchange financial and opera-
tional information concerning major securities firms that operate across the agencies's
jurisdictional boundaries. Id. Such a transfer of information is to occur upon either
one of two events if the information concerns a firm subject to SEC jurisdiction. Id. at
1. The first would be the occurrence of an event that would serve to put one of the
authorities on warning that the subject firm was having "significant" financial or opera-
tional difficulties. Id. The statement notes that with regard to a securities firm, such an
event would be when 1) a securities firm under Rule 17a-1 1 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 must give notice to its U.S. self regulatory organization because i) its mini-
mum net capital falls below the minimum required by SEC net capital rules; ii) its
books and records are no longer current; or iii) the internal controls or accounting
safeguards are found to be inadequate. Id. The second possible triggering event would
be a securities firm's notification pursuant to Section 5(a) (1) of the Securities Investor
Protection Act of 1970 that the firm is in or is approaching financial difficulty or is
about to materially default whether on an exchange or OTC transaction. Id.
If the firm is subject to Commodities Exchange Act requirements, the event would
occur under either of three other possibilities. Id. First, the event would trigger if the
firm pursuant to Rule 1.12 of the CEA, 7 U.S.C. § 4 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), provides
notice to its self-regulatory agency or the CFTC that a) the firm's adjusted net capital
has fallen below the applicable net capital rule, b) the firm's books and records are not
current, or c) the firm has not satisfied accounting system, internal accounting controls
or customer safeguarding procedures as specified in Rule 1.16(d) (1) under the CEA.
Id. The second event would be filing of notification with the CFTC under Rule 190.6 of
a bankruptcy filing or third, other notification by the firm to the appropriate regulator
of information negatively affecting its financial or operational validity. Id.
In the United Kingdom a triggering event would occur when a regulator has rea-
son to believe that a firm under its jurisdiction 1) is or will be in breach of financial
reserve requirements, 2) will or expects to be unable to submit proper financial report-
ing statements at the appropriate time, 3) is about to default on an OTC or exchange
transaction, or 4) is, or expects to be unable to maintain adequate accounting systems
or internal controls.
The second trigger of information sharing would simply occur upon request by
one of the regulatory authorities. Id. Such a request need only be based upon reason-
able grounds for concern that the financial or operating condition of the firm may be
materially affected by a related entity. Id.
The joint statement also describes the type of information the Authorities will pro-
vide. Id. They will provide information regarding financial and operational conditions
including net and gross capital, capital requirements, financial reports filed with the
applicable Authority and any other such information as the Authorities deem appropri-
ate. Id.
513. Id. at II. The Authorities stress the benefits of appropriately designed netting
agreements and agree that future capital standards should take these types of agree-
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lishment of prudent risk-based capital charges and the use by
firms of stress simulations of severe market conditions.51 4
Fourth, the agencies will work together to promote the develop-
ment and use of sound management controls.51 5 Fifth, in recog-
nition of the complexity and lack of transparency characteristic
of many derivatives products, the agencies agree to encourage
tougher standards for customer protection.1 6 Sixth, the agen-
cies recognize the importance of clearinghouses in reducing
credit risk and as such, they agree to examine the regulatory
framework for multilateral clearing arrangements. 517 Finally, be-
ments into account. Id.; see supra note 150 (discussing netting agreements and their
benefits).
514. Joint Statement supra note 319, at III. The Authorities state that capital stan-
dards should pay particular attention to market and counterparty risks. Id. In this risk
context the regulators plan to encourage incentives for good risk management. For
example, a firm that uses legally enforceable netting agreements and/or other appro-
priate risk management techniques might be subject to lower capital requirements. Id.
The Authorities also agree, for prudential reasons, to encourage market stress simula-
tions by derivatives users. Id.
515. Id. at V. In encouraging effective management controls, the Joint Statement
states, "management controls are critical for a securities and futures firm because they
provide the firm with the ability to monitor and control activities and risk. This is par-
ticularly important in the field of OTC derivatives because of the complexity, and rate
of change, of the OTC products being developed." Id. The Authorities then draw on
seven concepts to provide guidance in developing appropriate management controls.
Id. The policies recommend that a firm's board of directors should promulgate and
oversee derivatives activity policies. Id. Execution of these policies should reflect
proper valuation of risks. Id. Management policies should clearly delineate responsibil-
ity throughout the transaction chain. Id. Information systems should be designed and
function to provide adequate information about not only about the derivatives in a
particular transaction but also, other factors relevant to the transaction. Id, Appropri-
ate expertise at all levels and internal controls independent from other firm personnel
should be dedicated to evaluation of credit, market and legal risk. Id. Finally, the poli-
cies should take advantage of available risk reducing techniques. Id.
516. Id. at V. In addressing the issue of customer protection, the joint statement
proclaims that the Authorities will review current transaction requirements and recom-
mend amendments where necessary to reflect the nature of the derivatives industry. Id.
The Authorities also agree to promote customer protection by encourage the customer
himself to develop and maintain adequate management controls to address the risks
inherent in their transactions. Id.
517. Id. at VI. The Authorities generally recognize the benefits of clearinghouse
type arrangements and agree to promote similar arrangements in OTC derivatives mar-
kets. Id. One of the benefits that clearinghouses provide is the promotion of confi-
dence in markets resulting from clearinghouse responsibility for counterparty defaults.
Id. According to the statement, clearinghouses also facilitate customer matching, regis-
tration, record of execution, and designation of trades. Id. The three Authorities pro-
pose to work with other industry groups and participants to consider possible adoptions
of clearinghouse-type arrangements to the OTC market. Id.
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cause the agencies consider development of accounting recogni-
tion to be of great importance, they have agreed to promote im-
proved standards for accounting recognition, measurement, and
disclosure. 518
III. DERIVATIVES LEGISLATION IS UNNECESSARY IN LIGHT
OF CURRENT REGULATORYEFFORTS
Passing new legislation in the United States, in accordance
with the wishes of some current members of Congress 519 is not
the best solution to derivatives-related problems. After compre-
hending the actual level of risk global derivatives markets pres-
ent 5 2 0 it is readily apparent that the best solution in addressing
derivatives-related challenges exists on a transnational scale,
rather than narrowly in the United States. Further development
of the agenda set forth by the SEC, CFTC, SIB, IOSCO, and the
Basle Committee 521 will prove to be the most prudent regulatory
approach to derivatives.
A. Actual Derivatives-Related Risk Is Lower Than Some
Commentators Have Indicated
Before choosing a specific plan of action to regulate deriva-
tives, Congress must understand that the actual nature of deriva-
tives-related risk is much lower than anxious legislators have de-
scribed. Although the size of global derivatives markets may be
as large as US$35 trillion, only a fraction of those dollars are
actually at risk.5 23 Derivatives are not financial instruments that
518. Id. at VII. With regard to advancing accounting and disclosure, the Authori-
ties are particularly interested in promoting standards that will result in greater market
transparency and adequate information to end-users. Id. The Authorities agree to
work with and to encourage appropriate accounting standards setters to achieve this
result. Id.
519. See supra notes 328-421 and accompanying text (discussing proposed deriva-
tives-governing legislation).
520. See GROUP OF TilIy, supra note 17, at 53-54 (discussing methods of calculat-
ing size and risk of global derivatives markets).
521. See supra notes 491-507 (discussing derivatives-related actions of SEC, CFTC,
SIB, IOSCO, and Basle Committee).
522. See supra note 2 (discussing estimates of derivatives market size).
523. GROUP OF THIRT, supra note 17, at 53-54. Measurements of the size and risk
of derivatives markets that count total derivatives activity do not accurately forecast risk
for three reasons. Id. at 54. Measuring the total value of all derivatives contracts fails to
take into account that many of these contracts, in the hands of end-users, offset one
another. Id. One party may possess two offsetting derivatives contracts, and thus, the
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necessarily carry a lot of risk. 24 Even the General Accounting
Office report on derivatives, one of the few sources recom-
mending derivatives legislation, cannot provide any evidence of
impending market failure as a result of derivatives. 525
B. Faulty Derivative Financial Instruments Have Not Been the
Fundamental Cause of Derivatives Losses
Most derivatives-related losses, are attributable not to the
derivative instrument itself, but instead to poor financial plan-
ning.526 Commentators widely accept, for example, that deriva-
tives did not send Orange County, California into bankruptcy,
but rather, risky financial planning by the county treasurer was
the source of the county's' difficulties. 27 Derivatives investors
must realize that some derivatives, are naturally risky. instru-
ments528 and thus, a one-sided investment in a risky derivative,
without an offsetting hedge investment,"2 is likely to either gain,
or lose value rapidly. Derivatives investors concerned with the
prospect of large losses would be wise to cover their position by
hedging,5 ° or avoid derivatives entirely.
net risk held by the party is zero, and not the total amount of risk of each contract
added together. Id. Second, simply measuring the market by total activity does not
account for risks created by varying maturities of the derivatives contracts. Id. Con-
tracts with different maturities carry different risks, and therefore, a true measure of
market size and risk must also examine the maturities of each contract. Id. Finally,
different types of derivatives have different risk profiles. Id. Market size calculations
must subsequently account for the nature of particular derivatives instruments. Id.
524. See Waldman, supra note 2, at 1032 (estimating only US$170 billion to be at
risk in a US$7 billion derivatives market).
525. Zaitzeff, supra note 8, at B9.
526. See supra notes 302-13 and accompanying text (discussing derivatives losses
and causes).
527. Tony Munroe, Fed Chief Urges Senate Not to Make 'Mistake' of Regulating Deriva-
tives, WASH. TIMEs, Jan. 6, 1995, at B7. Orange County's financial planners made large
leveraged bets on interest rates and lost. Mark Platte, 0. C. To Liquidate Its Portfolio, LA
TIMEs, Dec. 14, 1994, at Al.
528. See supra notes 119-84 and accompanying text (discussing derivative inherent
risks).
529. See supra notes 94-109 and accompanying text (discussing derivatives and
hedging).
530. See supra notes 93-118 and accompanying text (discussing aspects of hedging
and speculation).
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C. Current Regulators Are Qualified to Address Derivatives-Related
Challenges Without Congressional Assistance
Accepting that somebody must take responsibility for keep-
ing a regulatory watch on derivatives markets, current regulatory
agencies, not distant legislators in Washington, are better suited
for the challenge. By imposing untested legislation upon deriva-
tives markets, Congress runs the risk of hampering, if not com-
pletely disrupting the efforts of those entities that are developing
solutions to derivatives problems. 53  Any approach by Congress
other than to let regulators regulate, would risk worsening cur-
rent derivatives-related risks.
Regulators and private industry representatives have proved
their willingness to carefully and methodically address deriva-
tives-related problems with respect to derivatives dealers.53
These efforts have been able to achieve material results. The
SEC's cooperation with six large derivatives firms, for example,
culminated in an agreement whereby those firms would be sub-
ject to SEC and CFTC oversight.53 3 Proposed legislation also ne-
glects to acknowledge the SEC's dealer regulating powers con-
veyed by the SEC's Final Temporary Risk Assessment rules.534
The rules provide the SEC with much of the information and
regulatory oversight that House bill 4745 seeks to grant.5 5 The
SEC has also promulgated specific rules to provide itself with in-
formation necessary to efficiently oversee the activities of broker-
dealers and their associated persons.536 Passing legislation that
would impose new rules, or grant current SEC authority to an-
531. See supra notes 438-518 and accompanying text (discussing past and current
regulatory efforts directed towards derivatives).
532. See supra notes 438-518 and accompanying text (noting public regulator and
private industry organizations responses to derivatives-related problems).
533. See supra note 474 and accompanying text (discussing SEC cooperation with
CS First Boston, Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley &
Co., and Salomon Brothers).
534. See supra note 470 and accompanying text (discussing Final Temporary Risk
Assessment Rules).
535. See supra notes 380-82 and accompanying text (discussing House Bill 4745's
requirements regarding materially associated persons of brokers and dealers); see also
supra notes 469-73 and accompanying text (discussing Final Temporary Risk Assess-
ment Rules' requirements with regard to materially associated persons of brokers and
dealers).
536. See supra notes 469-70 and accompanying text (discussing new SEC disclosure
rules).
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other agency,5 37 would only invite less efficient oversight, while
interrupting current effective regulatory efforts.
Additionally, between the SEC, CFTC, and SIBjoint regula-
tory efforts,538 and other actions by the FRB and OCC,53 9 most
all of the current concerns of Congress are already being ad-
dressed. Congressional proposals appear to be aimed at reduc-
ing the risk of market losses by developing sufficient control
mechanisms for banks and other end-users.54 ° Yet, the OCC and
FRB for example, have already issued mandatory derivatives
guidelines that require the same standards and controls that the
new congressional legislation proposes."l The FRB and OCC
also have the power to discourage the more speculative uses of
derivatives by banks, simply by assigning risky derivatives a lower
value when calculating capital adequacy.542 The derivatives
guidelines and capital adequacy requirements provide banking
regulators two substantial tools with which to control derivatives
use by the nation's banks. Further legislatively granted tools are
at this point, unnecessary.
Like the OCC and FRB guidelines, the SEC, CFTC, and SIB
statement also aims to achieve goals similar to those behind pro-
posed legislation. The joint statement shows for example, that
the three agencies recognize the value of capital standards, spe-
cifically rewarding lower risk with lower capital requirements.543
Similar to proposed legislation, the three regulatory authorities
also plan to require derivatives users to implement management
control standards that directly address market, credit, and legal
537. See, e.g., H.R. 20 (seeking to establish Federal Derivatives Commission usurp-
ing regulatory control of SEC); see also H.R. 4745 103d Cong. 2d Sess. (1994) (seeking
to establish new agency to oversee derivatives dealers).
538. See supra notes 508-18 and accompanying text (discussing SEC, CFTC and SIB
joint regulatory efforts).
539. See supra notes 446-60 and accompanying text (discussing FRB and OCC reg-
ulatory efforts).
540. See supra notes 338-96, and accompanying text (discussing specific provisions
of proposed derivatives-governing bills).
541. See Zaitzeff, supra note 8, at B9 (noting that because banking guidelines re-
quire banks to develop written derivatives policies and identification of fundamental
derivatives risks, they appear to address key safety and soundness objectives of Gonzalez
and Leach bills).
542. See supra note 254 and accompanying text (discussing FRB and OCC power to
discourage speculative derivatives use by changing capital adequacy calculations).
543. See supra note 514 (discussing capital adequacy provisions ofjoint statement).
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risks. 5" The authorities are thus, already in cross-border agree-
ment on the very requirements the Gonzalez and Leach bills
plan to impose.545 The proposed bills in this respect will not
accomplish anything on a single nationality basis that is not al-
ready being accomplished transnationally by current market reg-
ulators.
D. Transnational Regulation Is the Optimal Solution
Congress should also refrain from passing derivatives gov-
erning legislation because derivatives present a global challenge
that is not an exclusive responsibility of the United States to re-
solve. 5" Passing new regulations that will restrict the freedom of
derivatives dealers and users in the United States invites the risk
of sending U.S. markets to other countries. 47 Investors in deriv-
atives seek the benefits that derivatives provide.548 If that bene-
fit, however, is outweighed by the cost of complying with new
legislation, investors will no longer seek those benefits in United
States markets. Congress should take careful note of the drying
up of Japanese markets after those markets became subject to
new regulation.549 If Congress chooses to pass legislation that
affects only U.S. markets, it will face the risk of substantially limit-
ing a multi-billion dollar profit-making and taxpaying indus-
try, 5 ° while offering little protection to the investor who will be
544. See supra note 515 (discussing requirements of joint statement that manage-
ment controls address credit, market and legal risks).
545. See H.R. 20, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); H.R. 31, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1995) (imposing requirements substantially similar to those alredy imposed by current
regulations).
546. See GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 13 (discussing need for coordinated trans-
national efforts to meet derivatives-related challenges).
547. See Waldman, supra note 2, at 1080 (noting that government regulation im-
poses substantial costs and impediments on users of financial products).
548. See supra notes 57-118 and accompanying text (discussing benefits derived
from using derivatives).
549. See Anthony Rowley, Tokyo, London Exchange Chiefs Clash Over Securities Laws,
BUSINEss TIMES - SINGAPORE, October 21, 1994, at 1 (noting Japan's loss of derivatives
business due to high cost of excessive regulation). Japan's constrictive regulatory ap-
proach to derivatives has moved much ofJapan's derivatives business to less restrictive
overseas locations. Linda Sieg, Japan Derivatives Players Bemoan Restrictions, Reuter New-
swire - Far East, October 14, 1994, at 1, available in Weslaw, INT-NEWS Database. Japa-
nese regulators are expected to relax some of their more restrictive requirements in
order to win back lost business. Id.
550. See Peltz, supra note 12, at 65 (noting that uneven transnational regulation
will cause business to shift to least regulated markets). Lewis Teel, a high ranking deriv-
atives manager at BankAmerica corp. stated that derivatives markets are "one of the
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forced to seek alternatives in markets governed by even less regu-
lation than those currently found in the United States.'5 '
Furthermore, provisions in Washington's proposed bills
that require regulatory authorities to work together on a transna-
tional scale epitomize the bills' lack of substance.55 The degree
of cooperation existing between subject authorities is commend-
able as evidenced by the joint statement 553 and other mentioned
joint efforts.554 Advancement in the field of derivatives regula-
tion certainly need not be ordered by a Congress ready to take
credit for resolving a nonexistent market crisis.
E. Congressional Restraint Will Promote Further Understanding and
Control of Derivatives-Related Risks
Congress should be patient with the derivatives industry.
Derivative financial instruments are still relatively new555 to the
financial community and as such, investors will need time to get
to know all the benefits and risks presented by derivatives. Sig-
nificant financial losses incurred by some investors,5 56 are serv-
ing as warning signals to other investors contemplating putting
their investment money into risky financial instruments. The
riskiest derivatives have already seen a decline in popularity,5 7
and many users are currently reevaluating their derivatives posi-
tions and policies.558
only truly global product markets, which can move at the drop of a pin." Id. Federal
Reserve Board Governor John Laware stated that if Congress chooses to write a bill to
impose restrictions on derivatives, "we'll simply export this market to London or Frank-
furt or Tokyo or someplace else." Fed to Issue Proposal to Address Capital Assessment Needs
for Loan Securitization, 64 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 4, at 150 (Jan. 23, 1995).
551. See Waldman, supra note 2, at 1081 (noting that impact of legislation in
United States would force transactions to other markets, thus subjecting users to less
regulation).
552. See supra notes 367-69 and accompanying text (discussing House Bill 20's
transnational cooperation provision).
553. Joint Statement, supra note 319.
554. See supra notes 491-518 and accompanying text (discussing transnational co-
operation in addressing derivatives-related issues).
555. See supra note 3 (discussing history of derivatives).
556. See supra notes 302-13 and accompanying text (discussing derivatives-related
losses).
557. See Beleaguered Giant, supra note 2, at Al (noting that investors' fear of large
derivatives-related losses has stalled business in riskier derivatives). New offerings of the
riskiest types of derivatives are virtually non-existent. Id.
558. Id. Corporate law firms, for example, have sent advisory letters to clients al-
erting clients to controls they might want to impose on their derivative trading activi-
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CONCLUSION
The introduction of derivative financial instruments into
world capital markets has provided investors with new opportu-
nities and regulators with evolving challenges. The subject of
how to treat these instruments from a regulatory standpoint has
attracted the attention of cautious congressmen and professional
market regulators. Efforts of existing financial market regulators
are addressing, from a transnational perspective, derivatives-re-
lated challenges in an orderly and efficient manner. Congress
has proposed legislation aimed at eliminating problems that
have yet to materialize. These proposals may, at worst, threaten
the existing regulatory framework, and, at best, simply add a leg-
islative gloss to current regulation, thus, allowing Congress to
take credit for averting a financial disaster that was never to oc-
cur. By allowing regulatory agencies to handle financial market
challenges without interference, Congress will be able to take
credit not only for creating the real problem solvers, but also for
resisting the impulse to interfere when interference is unneces-
sary.
ties. Id. Federal Reserve Board Governor noted that derivatives users are now focusing
much more closely on fundamental derivatives risks. Regulators' Progress Will Determine
Lawmakers'Actions, Fed's Phillips Says, Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 4, at 160 (Jan. 23, 1995).
